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AND THE

SOLIDARITY OF NATIONS.

BY GENERAL G. CLUSERET.

NEW YORK:

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MEXICO,

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SOLIDARITY OF NATIONS.

CHAPTER I.

THE FACTS.

It was on the 5th of January, 1862 that the first vessels of the united fleets of France, England and Spain appeared upon the Mexican coast.

Spain had taken the first step. Its monarchial impatience could not wait, and in its desire to hurry events forward, probably also to profit by them, it had not shrunk from wounding the susceptibility of its allies by taking precedence.

Excuses and explanations, through diplomatic agency, calmed the two parties offended.

The Spanish landing corps numbered 7000 men at General Prim's orders, that of France, 2,500 men, under Admiral Juvien de la Graviere. As for England, she had furnished but 700 men.

The Fort of San Juan d' Ulloa was evacuated without being defended, and with it the city of Vera Cruz fell into the hands of the allies.

Here a series of negociations began, between the plenipotentiaries and the government of Juarez, which ended in the Convention of the Soledad, signed on the 19th of February, 1862.

This convention, signed in the name of France, by Monsieur Dubois de Saligny and Admiral Jurien de la Graviere, contained these words:

"Article 1. The constitutional government, which is now in power in the Mexican Republic, having informed the commissaries of the allied powers that it does not need the assistance offered with so much benevolence by them to the Mexican people, because that nation contains within itself sufficient elements of strength to preserve itself from all internal revolt; the allies will have recourse to treaties, to present all the reclamations that they are charged to make in the name of their respective nations.

"Article 2. With this view, the representatives of the allied powers protesting that they have no intention of injuring the sovereignty and integrity of the Mexican Republic, negociations will be opened at Orizaba, &c. &c.

"Article 3. Stipulates that the allied forces shall have the right to occupy the cities of Cordaba, Orizaba and Tehuacan, in order to be free from the deleterious influences of Vera Cruz and its environs."

If we observe that, at this epoch, the expedition numbered in all

10,000 men of whom 7,000 belonged to Spain, which had resolved to withdraw after a certain conversation between Monsieur Thouvenel and Monsieur Mon, in which the latter had declared that in no case would France lend her aid to establish a Mexican Throne in favor of a Prince of the house of Bourbon; that, out of the 3,000 remaining, France possessed only 2,500, and that the English were about to follow the example of Spain, it will be seen what an immense interest Monsieur de Saligny had in deceiving the Mexican government by these preliminaries, in order to give time for the reinforcements to arrive and to save the 2,500 unfortunate French soldiers from the *vomito* and from Mexican bullets.

The preliminaries were never serious in the intent of the French government. They were an expediency and nothing more. It is sufficient, in order to be convinced of this, to observe the progress of events. Firstly, take Saligny's diplomatic correspondence, which, from beginning to end, insists upon the necessity of founding a *stable and durable government*. This, in a sort of stereotyped phrase, became the pivot of all future combinations. Every one knows what a stable and durable government means in the language of diplomacy. In the second place, Monsieur de Saligny supports himself exclusively upon the clerical party, beaten by Juarez, the chief of which is Miramon, while its lieutenant is Almonte.

Almonte, at the head of a deputation of notables wandered from capital to capital, with the crown of Mexico in his pocket. The son of Leopold refused it, and his son-in-law accepted it. All this had taken time. Maximilian must have studied the language of his new subjects. Napoleon had to take measures to induce Spain, England and the United States not to thwart his designs. In fine, it was necessary to allow time for the reinforcements to arrive.

On the 9th of April, 1862, all was ready, and, dissimulation being no longer necessary, Almonte removed his mask.

The French plenipotentiaries addressed the following letter to Gen. Doblado:

"At the moment when General Almonte left France, the government of His Majesty the Emperor of the French *had no doubt* that hostilities had long since begun between our armies and the Mexican armies. General Almonte then offered his services to bear words of conciliation to his fellow countrymen and lead them to comprehend the purely benevolent aim which European intervention proposed to itself. This overture was welcomed by His Majesty's government, and the general was not only authorized but *invited* to repair to Mexico."

This is clear, and the duplicity of the French government is apparent. What is to follow is still more clear.

On the 16th of April, the preliminaries were denounced by Monsieur de Saligny, after having been violated by him. and General Almonte; in his proclamation to the Mexicans, previously submitted to the criticism of the French plenipotentiaries, was able to say, officially:

"Having reason for knowing, as I do know, the desire of the allied governments, and especially that of the Emperor of the French, a desire which is no other than to see in our unfortunate country and for ourselves, a *stable government*, based upon peace and morality, &c., &c."

This proclamation ended by the promise of a government adapted

to the *religious belief* of the Mexican people, which meant respect for the property and privileges of the clergy; a promise which has not been kept by Maximilian, *inde ire.*

Monsieur de Saligny, in virtue of the adage that all bad cases can be denied, wished to deny the rupture of the treaty and throw the responsibility upon the government of Juarez. He spoke of attacks made upon the property of certain French, and of some isolated soldiers killed upon the Vera Cruz road. It is impossible to be more affirmative, more clear and precise than Jesu Teran, the *minister* of Juarez, in his reply. To the reproach of attacks made upon the property of French subjects, he denies that a single fact of the kind has taken place; to that of the French soldiers having been assassinated, he states that this is the first intelligence of the kind that he has received, and declares himself ready to punish, if the plenipotentiaries are able to prove what they advance. In return, Jesu Teran complained in the name of his government that the French had not respected the treaty, that they had not only brought back into the country and protected men who had fled from it to escape from justice at the hands of the law, but that they had paralyzed the efforts of the legitmate authorities and have gone so far as to imprison and threaten the latter with death, in several cases.

Now, to support this assertion. I find, in the official collection of the messages and diplomatic correspondence of 1862, a letter from a certain Telavera to General Ixtapo, commander-in-chief of the army of the East, dated from Cosmokatepee, 17th of April, 1862, in which he excuses himself for not having executed certain orders relative to the National Guard of Cordaba, where he had been on the 14th, because the French had already invaded the country, and "*had forbidden the authorities to lend their united support to the supreme government (that of Juarez)" under penalty of being rendered personally responsible.*" The French plenipotentiaries had not, in point of fact, shrunk from tarnishing the honor of France by violating even this primordial condition, which had served as a basis to the treaty, "to wit, that in case of rupture, each of the belligerent parties will resume the site occupied before the conferences." The French, when the convention was broken, refused to evacuate. I believe this is the only example of like nature in the military annals of France, although a breach of trust has always been the trade mark of the Bonaparte family.

Furthermore, the duplicity of the French government had completely disgusted the allied powers. The rupture of the treaty without plausible motives, and the fixed determination to go to Mexico, completed the breaking off of the convention of the 31st of October. This rupture took place on the 9th of April. In that day's session Monsieur de Saligny, urged on by the *emigres*, who were already organized and led by the influence of Jefferson Davis' cabinet, insisted that they should march upon Mexico, while the plenipotentiaries of Spain and England objected: "that no act was of a nature to justify this, revolution." This drew upon General Prim, from Saligny, the accusation of having wished to work for his own profit and of coveting the Mexican crown.

At the end of this session, England and Spain resolved to treat sepa-

rately with Juarez, which they did at Puebla; and they were none the worse for it.

Throughout the affair, Saligny had displayed that spirit of subaltern intrigue which loves intrigue for its own sake and cannot resist the desire to glorify its own acts. He wanted an admirer of the depth of his conception, and so chose General Serrano as his confidant.

On the 24th of November, 1861, he wrote to him to ridicule the "incredible *innocence* of perfidious Albion." The word innocence being underlined. Five days later he promised proofs of "the simplicity of the British minister;" further on, his lynx eye discovered what no one had yet been able to see. He announced "curious revelations with regard to the chimerical project of alliance between Mexico, England and the United States against France and Spain." So much inaptitude is scarcely creditable, nevertheless this man's warnings were believed and influenced Louis Napoleon's policy. General Prim, who had passed sometime at Vichy, and had, like many others, paid his tribute to imperial seduction, was indignant at being taken for a dupe.

On the 22d of January, 1862, Prim addressed a dispatch to his government, in which I observe the following passage:

"The Emperor of the French has made known to the Queen's government, by the intervention of his ambassador, that he has resolved upon increasing by 3,000 men the expedition destined for Mexico.

"The object of this increase seems to be to unite elements enough to go to the Capital, in order not to prolong the operations and the sojourn of the land and sea forces in that country upon its coasts.

"The instructions communicated to Your Excellency are clear and formal. I have nothing to add to them. But it is proper that Your Excellency should know that the project for the establishment of a monarchy in Mexico appears every day to assume a more definite form.

"Some natives of this country—and this is worthy of note—who reside or are established in Europe, are working to that end."

On the 17th of March, General Prim addressed a fresh dispatch to his government:

"The articles in the French papers, which openly announced that the mission of our imperial troops is to place the arch-duke Maximilian upon the throne, contribute to cause difficulties to be foreseen not only between France and Mexico, but between the imperial government and those of Spain and England. At the same time with Generals Lawrencey, Almonte, Haro, Ramirez and other promoters of the monarchial project have arrived at Vera Cruz. The Mexican government, informed of the project of these gentlemen, has just addressed a letter to us, in which it announces its firm resolution of using its right, by causing those enemies of the nation to be pursued, who, finding themselves proscribed, are penetrating into Mexico with culpable intent."

Finally, on the 23d of March, General Prim's indignation burst forth in the following letter to Admiral Jurien de la Graviere, the commander-in-chief of the French forces.

"The act of conducting the political *emigres* into the interior of the country, in order that they may organize a conspiracy which will one day destroy the existing government; such an act, when you have

come forward as friends, and are waiting for the day set for conference is without a precedent, and I cannot recover from my astonishment thereat.

"If you have received the orders of your government with regard to this, I confess that I no longer recognize the *wisdom, justice and greatness* of the imperial policy, as I no longer recognize the lofty spirit of conciliation of the Emperor towards England and Spain. For I am grieved to tell you so, my friend, but it must be done: the policy which you propose to follow in Mexico, in contempt of the conference, since it is not your duty to consult it in so grave an affair, will have the unfortunate result, such is my belief, of causing the friendly relations between England and Spain, towards France, to grow cold, and no one in the world will be more pained at this than I, for no one in the world has more veneration and respect for the Emperor than I have, no one is more wholly attached to him, and no one loves France and the French better."

Was General Prim vexed as to his personal hopes? Had he, as Monsieur Saligny had reproached him with doing, on the 9th of April, really formed a plan of working for himself and placing the crown of Montezuma upon his own brow? Certain it is, that the man who professes veneration for the perjured hero of the 2d of December, did not display very fastidious morality. What indignation he shows, however! Would not any one suppose it to be that of an honest man?

On the 17th of March, General Prim wrote to Louis Napoleon the following letter from Orizaba;

"SIRE,

Your Imperial Majesty has deigned to write me a letter with your own hand, which, owing to the benevolent words it contains with relation to myself, will be a title of honor to my posterity. * * *

Spanish monarchs, but solely in that of the viceroys who governed each according to his good or bad judgment and his own light, and all according to the custom and mode of governing nations made use of at a period not very remote.

"Monarchy, then, has not left in this country the immense interests of secular nobility, as was the case in Europe when, under the impulsion of revolutionary tempests, thrones crumbled away; it has not left moral interests either, nor any thing that concerns the present generation to desire the reestablishment of a system which it has not known, and which no one has taught it to desire or venerate. The neighborhood of the United States, and the ever severe language of those republicans against the monarchial institution, have contributed to create here *a veritable hatred of monarchy.* In spite of constant agitation and disorder, the establishing of the Republic, which took place more than forty years ago, has created habits, customs and even *a certain republican language*, which it would not be easy to destroy.

"For these and other reasons, which cannot escape the lofty penetration of Your Imperial Majesty, you will understand that the preponderance of opinion in this country, is not and cannot be monarchial. If logic did not suffice to demonstrate this, it would be sufficiently proved by the fact that, although the allied flags have been floating for two months over the public square in Vera Cruz, and we now occupy the important cities of Cordoba, Orizaba, and Tehuacan, in which no Mexican forces have remained, nor any other than civil authority, neither the conservatives nor the partisans of the monarchy have made the least demonstration which might ever show the allies that such partisans exist.

"Far be it from me, Sire, to even suppose that the power of Your Imperial Highness is insufficient to raise a throne in Mexico for the House of Austria. Your Majesty directs the destiny of a great nation, rich in brave and intelligent men, rich in resources, and which manifests its enthusiasm every time that it is called upon to second the views of Your Imperial Majesty. It would be easy for Your Imperial Majesty to lead Prince Maximilian to the capital and to crown him king; but the king would meet with *no support* in the country except that of *the conservative chiefs, who did not dream of establishing the monarchy when they were in power, and who only think of it now that they are dispersed, conquered, and forced to be emigrants.*"

"Some rich men also will admit a foreign monarch who may arrive sustained by Your Majesty's soldiers; but this monarch will have nothing to uphold him when that support fails him, and would fall from the throne raised by Your Majesty, as others of the powerful upon earth will fall on the day when the imperial mantle of Your Majesty ceases to cover and protect them. I know that Your Imperial Majesty, guided by your lofty sense of justice, will not wish to force this country to change its institutions in so radical a manner, if the country does not desire it and demand it of itself. But the chiefs of the conservative party, who have landed at Vera Cruz, say that it will suffice to consult the elevated classes of society, without caring for the others, and this agitates minds, and inspires a fear that violence will be done to the will of the nation.

"The English troops, which were to come to Orizaba, and had

already prepared their means of transportation, re-embarked as soon as they became aware that a larger number of French forces would arrive than was stipulated for at the Convention. Your Majesty can judge of the importance of this retreat.

"I ask a thousand pardons of Your Imperial Majesty for having presumed to submit so long a letter to your attention; but I have thought that the true manner of replying worthily to Your Majesty's goodness to me, was to tell the truth, and the whole truth, as to the political state of this country, as I comprehend it. In doing so, I have not only fulfilled a duty, but obeyed the great, noble, and respectful attachment which I feel for the person of Your Imperial Majesty.

Count of Reuss, General Prim."

It clearly appears from this letter, that Mexico is republican, and not monarchial. It was only on the 3d of July, 1862, that Louis Napoleon replied, indirectly, to General Prim's effusion, by a letter to General Forey. But we have not yet arrived at that. Let us resume the course of events.

It is henceforth a fact acquired to history that the idea of the French government, from the outset, was clearly determined in contradiction to the repeated assertions of its chief and of his ministers, in the presence of the Legislative Body, as well as in connection with foreign governments. England alone saw clearly, and feigned to associate itself with French policy in order the better to involve its originator. This policy, it is true, was not the exclusive work of Saligny and the *emigres*, but it is certain that they were the precipitating and predominant cause thereof.

We shall soon see Louis Napoleon's real thought reveal itself in his letter to General Forey.

CHAPTER II.

FACTS—(CONTINUED).

The proclamation which denounced the already violated treaty, began by a falsehood and ended by rhodomontade. It was published on the 16th of April, and dated from Orizaba. It began thus:

"Mexicans! we have not come here to interfere in your internal dissension," &c., &c.

This was published when the proscribed Mexican politicians were brought back in French wagons, protected by French bayonets on the same day, 16th of April, when Almonte, their chief, launched forth his proclamation, and spoke in the name of the Emperor of the French. It ended with these words: "The flag of France has been planted upon Mexican soil; it will not recoil." This was but four years ago, and the French flag, so well planted, is already taken down by those who put it up.

In spite of the violation of the treaty by the French plenipotentiaries, General Larapoza did not wish to retort. He announced to General Lawreneez, who had just become the commander-in-chief of the French

expedition, that his sick had nothing to fear, and could "remain in the hospital, under the safeguard of Mexican loyalty."

Alea jacta est! the sword was drawn; 11,000 men and 750 millions were about to pay for the visions of a Bonaparte, the Jecker credit, the inaptitude and covetousness of a Morny and a Saligny; touching example of the manner in which nations are administered when they confide the direction of their affairs to one man alone.

Monsieur de Saligny had represented in his proclamation, as well as in his correspondence and private conversation, that the majority of the Mexican people were oppressed by the violent minority, who had placed Juarez in power. To hear him, one would have supposed that it was sufficient to spread the flag of France upon the breeze of monarchial . . . . . *liberty*, to behold that oppressed majority flying for shelter beneath its glorious folds. General Lawrencez, newly landed, entirely ignorant of men and things in the country, listened to his speeches and believed them. His nature led him to do so. I was acquainted with General Lawrencez in the Crimea; he then commanded a company of *Chasseurs de Vincennes*; we formed part of the same brigade. I never saw a man so fastidious about discipline, so haughty and so little beloved by his soldiers. His regiment was the only corps in the brigade that came from France; all the rest were composed of old *troupes d'Afrique*, bronzed and hardened, upon whom neither fatigue nor malady had any hold, but whose discipline was naturally somewhat freer. He was so fearful that we would corrupt his troops that he forbade our soldiers to enter his camp. A fervent Catholic and monarchist by descent, tall, dry and thin, narrow from head to foot, physically as well as morally; as to the rest, honest, upright and brave; such was the man chosen to re-establish monarchy in Mexico. The wish being father to the thought, he believed what he was told, relied upon Mexican enthusiasm and upon streets strewn with flowers, and upon balconies where pretty hands were to be seen waving white handkerchiefs, and so directed himself towards Puebla. On the 5th, he came upon the monastery of Guadaloupe, transformed into a citadel, and was received with grape instead of flowers.

A sad deception! But the trick was played; a corner of the French flag had caught upon a hitch in national honor; gold, blood, flag, everything was about to follow, and Saligny rubbed his hands, while General Lawrencez, indignant and deceived, published, upon the 27th of May, 1862, the following order of the day, the sad and dignified protestation of an honest man conquered by surprise and made the dupe of intrigue:

"Soldiers, &c.: Your march upon Mexico has been arrested by material obstacles which you were far from expecting, after the information that had been given you; it had been repeated to you a hundred times that the city of Puebla summoned you with every good wish, and that its population would hasten in your footsteps and crown you with flowers.

"It was with the confidence inspired by these deceitful assurances that we presented ourselves before Puebla. This city was surrounded by barricades, and overlooked by a fortress where means of defence had been accumulated."

It is not only the powerless voice of an impotent general which

arises here to protest against the duplicity of "Napoleon's policy," but the smoking blood of the sons of France, sacrificed to put a few crowns in the pocket of a favorite, to overthrow the liberty and laws of a friendly country for the advantage of a troop of factious men, and to give the crown to an Austrian archduke; that blood will long cry out for vengeance to the ear of the French nation, to teach them that the surest means of saving their gold and their lives is to manage their affairs themselves.

The check at Puebla could not remain unavenged. General Forey was sent with reinforcements to replace General Lawrencez, who was beaten, deceived, and removed from his command. He embarked at Cherbourg on the 30th of July. The effective of the troops under his orders amounted to 20,000 men, and on the 15th of February, 1863, after having divided his army into three columns, he directed himself towards Puebla, which he attacked on the 18th of March, and captured on the 18th of May. On the 10th of June, he made his entrance into Mexico.

The first act of the military campaign was at an end; the second act of the political campaign was about to begin.

A year previous, the 3d of July 1862, Louis Napoleon, in reply to General Prim's letter, had addressed one to General Forey, in which he unveiled his thoughts. It is as follows:

FONTAINEBLEAU, July 3, 1862.

MY DEAR GENERAL:

* * * * * * People will not be wanting who will ask you why *we are about to spend men and money to found a regular government in Mexico.*

In the present state of the civilization of the world, the prosperity of America is not indifferent to Europe; *for it is she who feeds our factories and causes our commerce to live.* It is to our interest that the Republic of the United States should be powerful and prosperous, but we have no interest in her possessing the whole Gulf of Mexico, in her having dominion from there, over the Antilles, as well as South America, and being the only dispenser of the products of the New World. We now see, through sad experience, how precarious is the fate of a branch which is reduced to seeking its prime matter in a single market, of which it endures all the vicissitudes.

If, on the contrary, Mexico preserves its independence and maintains the integrity of its territory, if a stable government is constituted there with the assistance of France, *we shall have restored to the Latin race upon the opposite side of the ocean its strength* and its *prestige;* we shall have guaranteed their security to our colonies in the Antilles and to those of Spain; we shall have established our beneficent influence in the centre of America; and this influence, by creating immense openings to our commerce, will procure to us the matter indispensable to our industry.

Mexico, thus regenerated, will always be favorable to us, not only through gratitude, but because its interests are in harmony with ours, and it will find a *point d'appui* in its cordial relations with European powers.

NAPOLEON.

There lies the true and secret thought of the man who directs the

destiny of France, and wishes to found a dynasty. It is against the United States and its form of government that the enterprise was planned. It is in the name of an interest, commercial to the French people, dynastic to their chief, that the French flag crossed the ocean. But do not let us forget, above all, this precious avowal; it is important, and contains the solution of the question. I shall return to it: "*It is she, America, who feeds our factories and causes our commerce to live.*"

The political campaign opened by the re-union of a *junta* of note, completed by Almonte from among his friends and the partisans of the clergy. This *junta*, without consulting the people, who could not be consulted on the existing state of the country, decided that the archduke, Maximilian, was the man designed by Providence to secure the happiness of the Mexicans, and resolved to send to Miramon a deputation charged with offering, definitely and officially, that crown which for more than a year had been dragged over the dust of the European highways, sent from the Hapsburgs to the Coburgs, the Coburgs to the Hapsburgs, and which, since the taking of Vera Cruz, the French trooper had been carrying in his cartridge-box.

As Maximilian would only accept a crown purified by the people's sanction, a vote of the people was improvised for him without *plebiscitum* or legal authority, and on the 10th of April, 1864, in spite of Mr. Seward's previsions, which affirm, in his letters to Mr. Corwin, "that if ever a thought of monarchial restoration in Mexico had been entertained in France, that thought had long been given up," the Mexican imperial throne was raised and constituted, *pro tempore*, by the acceptance of the archduke Maximilian, who embarked, four days after, at Miramon, for Vera Cruz. "It is not all to cause one's self to be proclaimed president or emperor of Mexico," said a celebrated Mexican general to me one day, "any one can succeed without any more trouble than Maximilian had; the thing is to maintain one's self."

France and its *protege* were soon to perceive the truth of this assertion. From the seizure of Mexico was to date that war against an intangible enemy, constantly beaten, annihilated, yet, like the phœnix, constantly arising from its own ashes.

I have set forth the principal vicisitudes of this war in an article written for the *Army and Navy Journal*, 29th July, 1865.

The taking of Mexico put the French army in possession of the central zone of Mexico, whose great axis extends from Vera Cruz to Mexico, passing by Puebla. All roads, radiating from the centre to the circumference start, in the northern region, from Mexico, and in the southern region from Vera Cruz. Juarez and his generals occupied the heads of these roads; it was in order to disperse them that five columns immediately set themselves in motion. Vera Cruz, Puebla, and Mexico were chosen as bases of operation. The first of these places was left to the Mexicans, Imperialists, and negroes brought from Egypt; the second was confided to Colonel Jeanningros, and the third to General Neiger. The most important columns directed themselves towards the north, one to the east, under General Douay's command, the other to the west under that of General Bazaine. The first of these generals made himself master of Queretaro, and the second of Morelia, then both effected a junction at Guanajoto, whence, reinforced by Mexican

troops of Miramon, they continued their march towards San Luis de Potosi and Durango.

It is unnecessary to follow these columns in all the details of a skirmishing war against an enemy whose troops were without organization, discipline, or energy, who fled instead of fighting, who could not resist with success even when fighting ten against one. There were exceptions; but they were few. And the French General-in-Chief was not long in announcing that five provinces enjoyed perfect tranquility.

Such was the situation on the 12th June, when the new Emperor made his entry into the capital. Nevertheless, in spite of tranquility being loudly proclaimed, the war continued, the French easily repeating their victories. At Guanajuato, on the 27th June, at Titacuaro, on the 2d July, they beat the Mexican patriots. On the 5th July, Commander Marshall embarked at Vera Cruz at the head of six hundred men, and landed at Alvarado on the morrow, for the purpose of attacking General Garcia, who had established himself in an entrenched camp in the Gorge of Conejo, and was protected by four little forts. On the same evening the camp, forts, baggage, munitions, etc., were all in Commander Marshall's power, and two days later he took the city of Tlacotolpan. On the 1st August, Colonel Tourre forced the passage of Cantabria, and occupied Huajutla. On the 10th August, Porforio Diaz assumed the offensive in his turn, and attacked Colonel Giraud, but his patriotism was powerless against the French organization, and he retired, losing four cannon and seven hundred men. On the 9th August, Colonel Clinchant had beaten General Neri near Tourlot, and made General Echeverria prisoner. Meanwhile, Uraga had deserted the National cause, to submit himself to the foreigner, and Vidaurri had betrayed his government.

On the night of the 24th August, Cortinas arrived at Matamoras, and Mejia, at the head of 4,000 men, after having made his junction with Colonel Du Pin's banditti, advanced to drive Cortinas thence. General Castaguy, at the same time, marched upon Monterey, the capital of Nuevo Leon, at the head of a very strong column. He arrived there on the 26th August, took possession of the city without a combat, found fifty pieces of artillery there, and promulgated a decree of organization, in which we read a curious article that we quote. It needs scarcely any commentary. After having provided for all situations by the first article, the second adds that 'any person designated by the preceding article who refuses to fulfill the offices confided to him, will be immediately punished with six months' imprisonment, in conformity with the law.'

On his side, General L. Heriller, commander of the subdivision of Zacatecas, wrote to the political prefect of Durango:—'Since, in despite of my efforts, the landholders will see nothing—understand nothing, the decrees which impose a fine of a thousand dollars upon the landholders who do not warn the authorities of the movements of the enemy are maintained in all their rigor. All those who by any means whatever intimidate the population, or trammel the operations of the government, shall be *under penalty of being brought before a court-martial*, transported to Martinique, or sent to a locality where they will be under the eye of military authority, and subjected to the other penalties set forth by the law.'

These examples sufficiently explain what Maximilian means by saying he is indebted for his crown to the 'universal, free, and unanimous vote of the Mexicans,' and what Louis Napoleon means by consulting them. *Bis repetitia placent.* What succeeded on the 2d December in France must succeed also in Mexico. And in order that nothing may be wanting in that organized terror which hangs over the people's vote, the hero of the *coup d' etat* inscribes rape, theft, and murder upon the flag of France: and then, after creating that unprecedented body which Colonel Du Pin calls 'contra-guerrillas,' and which honest men call banditti, he tells them, 'Go and make universal suffrage work out my purpose.' An officer of the French staff, in relating to us the horrors committed by those contra-guerrillas, said: 'I would rather fall into the hands of Juarez' guerillas than into those of the French contra-guerillas; with the first, persons are often shot, with the last always. Bestiality and ferocity with them are carried 'to their uttermost extent.' Their manner of proceeding reminds me of the Piedmontese gendarmes in Matesa in 1860, under Cialdini and Pinelli. A peasant had been denounced as an insurgent through personal revenge. His wife hastened to Cialdini, to whom she proved her husband's innocence. He sent a telegraphic order to the Brigadier of the *gendarmerie* to set the peasant free; the wife was pouring forth her grateful thanks, when the Brigadier returned this laconic reply: '*Provisionally shot.*' The Mexicans are *provisionally* shot by the French contra-guerillas.

As a consequence of this provisionary measure, defection from the lawful government and adhesion to that of the stranger increased, and there were 5,500,000 votes at least, according to Marshal Bazaine—who was called upon to initiate this strange mode of consulting populations—to do his work.

In spite of repeated victories and various success; in spite of the salutary terror inspired by the contra-guerillas, and the reiterated assertions of the *Moniteur Universal* (an official paper of the French Empire) with regard to pacification, the safety of the roads, and the spontaneous adhesion of the population to this new *regime*, we read in the Mexican papers that a stage-coach was stopped at a league and a half from Mexico the day before; that a day before that, it was stopped at two leagues distance. And the French engineers employed upon the Vera Cruz Railroad write: 'It is sad not to be able to go forty paces from the works without an escort, or running the risk of being shot.' On his side, Maximilian treated with the Trans-Atlantic Company for the transportation of seven thousand Austrians and several thousand Belgians, to protect him from the enthusiasm of his subjects.

It would be tedious—in resuming the recital of military events—to do more than briefly indicate the results attained. General Castagny having seized Monterey, his operations were now mainly directed against Juarez, who had concentrated in the state of Durango the troops of Negrete, Ortega, and Doblado. Success still rested with the French. The Mexicans were badly whipped by a greatly inferior force. Juarez fled with a few cavalrymen, Patoni was isolated from supports, and Ortega could not even retain his staff. Meantime, Mejia entered Matamoras without the inhabitants striking a blow. Cortinas submitted himself to the empire and publicly fraternized with Mejia. Canales

alone refused to submit. He crossed the Rio Grande with four hundred men, and was disarmed by Colonel Ford.

Success always causes defection. Zuloga, the former president of Mexico, General La Gorza, the former governor of Tamaulipas, General Batadre, Iturbide's former aid-de-camp, Vidaurri, the former governor of Nuevo Leon, and General Quiroga, his lieutenant, came to submit themselves to the new Emperor, upon whom all seemed to smile, and who, meanwhile, journeyed on amidst the acclamations, more or less sincere, of the population; acclamations which, within the memory of man, have never been wanting to sovereigns on their journeys.

In order to confirm this satisfactory aspect of the situation, the return to France of the 1st and 20th battalions of *chasseurs a pied*, was loudly proclaimed, and that of the 90th of the line, as well as of six hundred men who had served their time, belonging to divers corps, and the companies of the Imperial Guard. But in spite of this apparent success, it was not possible to leave the capital without a strong escort. The stage-coach, as before, was stopped within cannon shot of its gates. The minister-of-war, on the 10th September, promulgated a decree from Irapuato, which gave up all the robbers to French courts-martial, in order, said the decree, to check the frequency of their attacks; and impotent efforts were made to put the Mexican Urban Guard in a condition to protect the inhabitants from the robbers.

During the remaining months of the fall of 1864, and in January and February of 1865, the invaders pursued their military advantages. Colima, Mazatlan, Morelia, and Oajaca successively fell into the hands of the enemy. With Oajaca fell the last centre of resistance, organized by men more patriotic than skilful. General Mangin immediately took the command of Oajaca, where he left Lieutenant-Colonel Carteret Trecourt at the head of a weak garrison. Juchitlan and Tehantepec did not long escape the unhappy fate of Oajaca. But, strangely enough at the moment when the struggle seemed to reach its end, and it appeared impossible for the exhausted patriots to keep it up, that courage which had failed them when they had the means of causing it to effect their victory, revived suddenly again; they seemed at last to perceive the kind of combat which could alone bring them success. On the 11th April they annihilated the detachment of commander Tydgodt at Tocamboro, in Michoacan. This detachment of 250 men lost a dozen officers, among whom was the son of general Chazal, the minister-of-war in Belgium. General Cortinas returned to that duty he should never have abandoned, and bore away with him, on his defection, 750 men, and threatened Matamoras.

In the north General Negrete bore down upon Salsilo, the capital of Coahuila, and upon Monterey, capital of Nuevo Leon, and seized both places successively. This movement appears to have been serious enough to force Marshal Bazaine himself to direct his attention to San Luis. The imperialists did certainly take great revenge, at different times, for this partial defeat. Colonel De Potier dispersed the republicans, vanquishers of Commander Tydgodt, and two columns directed themselves towards the places captured by Negrete.

On the 25th of March, the expedition which was so long planned against Sonora, that golden lure whose deceitful mirage had been

disastrous to more than one adventurer, before Louis Napoleon himself, began to be put into execution. A division of the Pacific squadron, composed of the Lucifer, the Assas, the Cordeliere, and the Pallas, started from Mazatlan and landed Colonel Garnier's troops on the 29th at Guaymas, which troops entered the city without resistance. The garrison, 1,100 men strong, disappeared and escaped in spite of all the attempts made by reconnoitering parties to discover it.

At the same time, General Mangin penetrated into the Chiapas territory and seized Tobasco, the capital of the state bearing the same name. Juarez was in Chihuahua in communication with California, where, by the intervention of Racido Vega, he succeeded in negotiating for the purchase of 21,000 guns, two rifled batteries, and three millions of cartridges, which Mr. Seward thought it his duty to seize, at the request of Louis Napoleon's minister.

It clearly results, from a general view of the whole situation, and from the report of the French Commander-in-Chief, in spite of his desire to prove the contrary, that the situation had become less favorable than it was in the month of February; that the insurrection, like the wave which unceasingly effaces the track of the vessel, without, however, opposing its progress, had reunited behind the French army; that Monterey was no longer in the possession of the French, but in that of Negrete, who, according to the admission of Marshal Bazaine himself, effected his "retreat" in good order, as well as every other movement he saw fit to make.

Since these events, no important military action has broken the monotony of the coming and going of imperial troops, who alternately occupy and quit the Northern provinces. The Mexican people understand that against the French military organization there is no struggle possible, save through scattered forces, aided by time and space. They aim to strike terror to the hearts of the guilty, and not allow those who came from Europe to compliment crime, to return there bearing its thanks. Let them continue to make war in this manner; let them avoid all important engagements, and, like the gad fly, which ends by driving the bull mad and overcoming it, they will annihilate, little by little, the military colossus which they cannot attack in front. I need no better proof of this than Maximilian s insane proclamation against defenceless prisoners, and their execution by Dupin, Marquez, Mendez and others, in contrast with the generosity of Juarez to the Belgian prisoners.

From terror to folly the step is short, and it is taken; from folly to ruin the step is still less. There is no worse enemy than one whose presence is unceasingly felt, and who is, nevertheless, invisible.

And now I leave it to a Frenchman, Monsieur Clement Duvernois, (who passed eight months in Mexico, upon a mission to Maximilian, in order to study the situation), to say what he thinks of the security established by the Imperial government, and of the interest that French subjects, in whose name the intervention has taken place, may hope for in return.

The following extract is from *La Presse*, a Paris paper. It is in reply to *La France*, Louis Napoleon's private organ, which is directed by Senator Laguerouniere.

Let us examine the interest of the expatriated.

"We went to Mexico," says *La France*, "to uphold the reclamations of our natives." Let *La France* then tell us the present state of these reclamations; let it tell us the total of the reclamations, of the reductions submitted to, and the sums now received. The amount of the reclamation will show that with a small part of the expenses of the intervention there would have been enough to pay all the indemnifications, which justifies us in repeating that the sacrifices accomplished are not in proportion with the proposed end, if, as *La France* persists in believing, the expedition had no other aim than the defence of reclamations. The reduction that these reclamations have been subjected to will still further diminish the importance of the result sought. As for the figure of the sums actually received, we are not acquainted with it.

Let us speak of the security of persons after having spoken of their interests.

"The Mexican government," says *La France*, "has been reproached with the assassination of several Frenchmen by the bands in the country, or robbers in the streets of Mexico. *La France* mentions, in effect, *eight Frenchmen*, as having been assassinated.

This is doubtless deplorable, but what must be reasonably expected of a government? It may be asked to guarantee to strangers the same security that it grants to its own natives, neither more nor less. What security is possible in Mexico? Are there no more banditti in Mexico? Are there no more stage-coaches stopped, no *haciendas* plundered, no men assassinated? We read this horrible narrative but yesterday in the *Opinion Nationale*:

"A very distressing fact will serve us as a proof among many isolated cases. A few days ago, as I have said, I was returning from Mexico to Vera Cruz. Although the French papers, which I have been reading for five months past, have more than once attested that the roads were perfectly safe, I had an opportunity of convincing myself that such was not the case, and that even the military convoys require to be very strongly escorted. But this will show you the persistency with which a part of the population continue to struggle by every means against our intervention, which it is not willing to comprehend.

"On the railroad track which we had been following for some time, we saw traces of recent repairs. The evening before a tragedy had occurred there. A passenger train had left Mexico bringing some troops and officers, beside other passengers. When the train arrived where we saw the repairs, the rails were found to be missing. Then an armed band rushed upon the disordered train. Nothing was stolen, nothing plundered; the passengers were not ill-treated, but all who wore the French uniform were massacred without mercy."

Admitting that the train attached had contained eight American citizens, that, in the confusion, these eight citizens had been killed, would the United States, for that reason, have a right to accuse Maximilian and declare war upon him?

And if Maximilian, aided by a loan of 340 millions, having at his service a Belgian and Austrian corps, sustained by a number of French soldiers, whose heroic conduct and unalterable constancy are above all

praise, if, we repeat, Maximilian, placed in such circumstances, is not in a state to prevent the stopping of a train at the gates of Vera Cruz, and the daily stopping of coaches upon the principal Mexican roads, how can Juarez, left to himself, scarcely yet established, be responsible for deeds committed by the clerical bands who hold the country?

What would Monsieur Clement Duvernois have said had he been aware that, at a few miles from the capital, Maximilian was not able to secure the safe return to Europe of his father-in-law's envoys?

THE GUERILLA ATTACK ON THE BELGIAN EMBASSY—Mexico, March 8, 166.—The Belgian embassy took leave of their Majesties last Saturday, and left yesterday by diligence for Vera Cruz, in order to take passage in the North American packet of the 8th inst. Unfortunately, before the diligence had arrived at Rio Frio, it was stopped by a band of brigands. The members of the Belgian mission, who were accompanied by three or four soldiers within and outside the vehicle, took immediate steps to defend themselves, whereupon the brigands skedaddled with precipitate haste, but not before they had fired one volley, by which Captain D'Huart and General Foury and two other persons were killed.

The same evening notice of the occurrence was received in Mexico city, and his Majesty, the Emperor, set out with a French escort for Rio Frio.

Yesterday morning at 8 o'clock, according to previous announcement, the funeral services for the soul of Baron D'Huart were performed in the Church of St. Hyeronimus. A detachment of Belgian infantry formed guard inside the church, and the band of their regiment executed some splendid funeral music in one of the side aisles, close to the vestry. Their Majesties the Emperor and Empress assisted at the sad ceremonies, as also the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the President of the Academy, Don Eernando Ramirez, some few persons belonging to the court and government, the *personnel* of the Belgian Legation, and a great number of French, Austrian, and Belgian generals and officials. The ceremonies commmenced at half-past eight.

"What is certain, is that during the long siege of Puebla, the government of Juarez has, with a firmness which should not be forgotten, been able to protect the lives of our natives, inhabiting the capital, against the intoxicated band who threatened to massacre them.

Thus the griefs brought up against Juarez might be brought against any government in Mexico, including the present one.

But suppose that Juarez had decided by decree that in all the colonists from eighteen to thirty-five were liable to be called to military service, and that at the same time he had refused to grant them the rights of citizens, then there would have been an outcry of violence and wrong.

Is not this, however, what Maximilian has done?

What then would really be the immense advantages that our natives resident in Mexico, will have reaped from the intervention? The payment of the indemnifications, but reduced. *La France* will tell us, the security of individuals. The *Opinion Nationale* will reply to that question. So that at the end of the account, after all the sacrifices

accomplished, no other benefit can be seen except conscription, the benefit of a foreign country.

And now, let persons ask themselves what will be the situation of Frenchmen after the departure of our soldiers; let them ask themselves if our expedition is of a nature to increase the popularity of our natives, and it may be said then exactly in what manner the interest of the French residents in Mexico will have been served by the intervention.

CLEMENT DUVERNOIS.

Would the reader form an idea of the horrors committed upon points of territory more distant from the capital, let him cast his eyes upon the following extract from the San Francisco *Bulletin*:

"When I arrived, in March, 1865, at Mazatlan, I found only that city, in the whole State of Sinaloa, in the hands of the French. All west of that State was in the hands of guerillas. In order to go into the interior I was obliged to smuggle myself, accompanied by two friends, during the night, from Mazatlan, and as soon as I passed through into the lines of the republicans we were all captured, and brought before General Ramen Corona. As soon as that gentleman got sight of our American passports we were set at liberty; he wished us farewell, and promised in no way to molest us in the future. We passed the two months of March and April in perfect peace, but in May the campaign was opened, and the French-Mexican general brought his hordes from Tepic.

LIBERAL MAGNANIMITY.—In order to illustrate the contrast between the conduct of the Liberals and the French-Mexican commanders, I shall relate a little occurrence which happened a month before my arrival at Altale, a small port in the State of Sinaloa. From this little port one hundred French-Africans sailed, accompanied by a few sailors from a French man-of-war, and commanded by a ship's captain, and marched into the interior, in order to capture the seat of government of the State, the City of Cullacan. But not far from Altetus the commander of the Liberal forces received them, and with about one hundred men attacked them in the almost impassible mountain roads so impetuously, that after about forty of the French had been killed, the balance, about seventy, had to surrender at discretion. Colonel Rube, who was well aware what would have been his fate if he had been captured and the French had been the captors, treated the vanquished with the greatest attention, divided everything he had with them, gave them horses in order to facilitate the toilsome traveling, and sent them to Chihuahua as prisoners of war.

VANDALISM OF THE FRENCH.—At the time the above affair ended so disgracefully for the French, another column of four hundred started from Mazatlan in a southerly direction, via Presidio, to the Villa de San Libertian Messillas, Rosario, and from there back to Mazatlan. That expedition resembled rather the desolating march of the Goths and Vandals than that of a civilized army. In Presidio, without the necessity of firing a single shot, the greater part of the houses of one class were burned down, while the other class were saved by having above them the American and English flag. In San Libertian the Liberal troops, under General Corona, made some resistance, and when they were conquered and compelled to retire, the flourishing little village was reduced to ashes. Two thousand people were driven into the

mountains without food or shelter, and every cow, calf, hog, or chicken which could not be taken along was killed; even the dogs were not spared. More than four thousand people live in the State of Sinaloa to-day like wild cattle in the woods, without any other food than half-ripe fruits, which grow wild in the woods; the corn-fields have been destroyed, the fences torn down, and many poor women and children have perished through misery in the woods.

[Would not one think it was Sherman marching through the South?]

But what the author of these lines should have said is that these four hundred men had nothing in common with the French army, except their cause. They were imperialistic Mexicans and banditti, under Captain Dupin's orders. They were French by birth, it is true, to the shame of France, but in no manner belonging to the French army.

In the first week of May last, the Imperial General Lozado moved from Tepic with one thousand five hundred men, via San Jago to the State of Jalisco. He found the first resistance near Acaponeta, where Prefecto Guzina, with his Indians, tried to hinder him in his advance. But resistance was in vain. When Lozado arrived at Acaponeta he gave the sign for pillage. The most abominable acts were committed by a dissolute *soldateska*, the cruelty of which cannot be conceived by the widest imagination. I do not intend to go into specialties of the invasion of Mexico, and am, therefore, obliged to pass over details of extreme cruelties. I will only remark that Acaponeta was destroyed, burned down, and its inhabitants driven into the mountains, without food or shelter, glad to have escaped with their lives. From Acapeneta the destroying hordes moved to Escuinape, where the same spectacle was enacted, only in a more cruel and terrible manner: because here some earnest resistance was made, and the little village, with its three thousand inhabitants, has been known as the seat of Democratic principles. On the 10th of May Lozado arrived at Rosario. Here he met with a column of the French, and both united, whipped Corona near Matalan, took this village, as also Cocotota, destroyed the villages, farm houses, fences, and everything, while the inhabitants who had not been cut down, and had not escaped, were brought as captives to Rosario.

In Rosario began now a reign of terror and death. After the defeat of Corona, at Mazatlan, he escaped with some hundred men into the mountains. Lozado issued a proclamation promising an amnesty to all who should voluntarily lay down their arms and take the oath of allegiance to the Empire. Many Mexicans, who considered all further resistance useless, and who were without any means whatever to continue the war, appeared at Rosario, counting upon the conditions of the proclamation, to lay down their arms and take the oath for the Empire. They came with honest intentions. I have known and spoken with many of them. All were agreed if they would be suffered to till their soil, and follow their occupations in peace, they would gladly accommodate themselves to the new order of things, and give up all further resistance.

But we shall see how Lozado kept his written proclamation. To illustrate what happened, I will give here a single instance out of fifty similar ones; Dr. Francisco Rimienta never carried any arms himself, but out of old friendship for Corona, could not refuse to officiate as his

private secretary. He himself told me of his having spoken to Corona, and that he had explained to him the uselessness of any further resistance. Besides, he said, he had a wife with four little children, who would starve without his taking care of them, and, therefore, he had come to take advantage of the proclamation. He was brought before Lozado, who handed to him his papers of pardon and release. In the evening he left Rosario in order to stay at Chametie with his family. The same night a creature of Lozado, by the name of Mauricio Castaneda, went to Dr. Ramienta, who was torn from the side of his wife, in spite of the prayers and cries of four little children, and shot. This tiger remained till morning with his victim, and then threatened with sure death anybody who should dare to bury the corpse, leaving, in order to commit similar crimes at some other place.

I repeat again, all these things happened before my own eyes. On the night of June 1st last, I counted fourteen victims who were led past my window to be brought to the Campo Santo, (cemetery) to be shot and their corpses to be thrown upon the road. In and around Rosario, at the report of a rifle, the hogs came running as a signal for getting hold of a corpse. I have seen a man by the name of Perez well in the evening, and the following day lying before my door half devoured by the hogs; and a woman, under seal of secrecy, has told me that she had seen how Perez was torn by four soldiers from his house, stabbed with their bayonets and afterwards thrown into the street. On the 18th of June, twenty-two Liberals, under the leadership of Correa, were surrounded by a French party, and though the Mexicans laid down their arms and made no attempt to run away, they were all stabbed with bayonets and given over to the hogs. When it is stated that these twenty-two men were on the way to Rosario to take advantage of the proclamation of amnesty, the deed appears the more horrible.

At that time I had to make a trip from Mazatlan to Durango. This section was formerly one of the most prosperous in Mexico, and the whole way was lined with habitations and fences. But great God! what a sight it presented in the month of July! Heaps of ashes instead of houses; skeletons of men and beasts around the ashes; weeds and parasitical plants covered the open fields; no fence, no root, no man. From San Marcus to Saragossa and Messates, one single desert, one cemetery. More than 5,000 people used to live in these districts, and to-day not a single soul is to be found—all driven away from their habitations, and their fields destroyed and wasted. Heaven knows what has become of all those people, but I saw some of them in the woods, who tell heart-breaking stories of their sufferings.

Returning to Mazatlan, I had an opportunity to move in every class of society. My linguistic abilities and my social position afforded me a chance to be on a confidential footing with many of the best people. I have often taken my breakfast with French officers, who openly and sincerely confessed their regret at the unnatural state of the country, and assured me they should consider themselves very happy at being recalled from Mexico; not because these gentlemen were afraid, but because they had the moral conviction that they would never be able to appease the country. I frequented the best families, and remarked with astonishment that no French officer was admitted into respectable

society. I found the antipathy against the French amongst all classes, but with the fair sex the feeling and the hatred were the most bitter. The nickname *Chinaco*, which the French call the Mexicans, is accepted with pride by the latter; but woe to the Frenchman who is found alone upon an isolated road.

I would mention the names of five of the largest houses among the merchants, if I did not fear to injure them, which complain bitterly of the inactivity of the French, of the exortion of the imperial officers, and other kinds of oppression. I could mention hundreds of the best men in Mexico who acknowledge the Imperial government, but who are longing for the intervention of the United States, even with the loss of independence.

What I have told is the result of ten months' close observation. In conclusion I have to remark that I started last year for Mexico, because I believed in a regeneratien of that country, through the French; that I had many a tournament with my friends at the time, because I was a zealous partizan of the Napoleonic politics. I have returned thoroughly cured"

Is it astonishing that such should be the case? Is it surprising that a country of which the stranger occupies the territory, overthrows the laws, massacres the inhabitants and what is worse to a Mexican, adds insult to injury, should be in a state of fierce fermentation which leaves no room for the security of persons or interests.

What the author of the following lines says is true with regard to the French contempt of the Mexicans. The proprietor of large estates rich, and possessing the faults of the Spanish grandee, very rarely his virtues, resents very bitterly the treatment of the Gallic conqueror. The French superior in character, look upon the whole Mexican nation with the most undisguised contempt; and what makes it worse, they take advantage of every opportunity to show it. I have noticed with astonishment now inveterate that contempt is with the conquerors; how indiscreetly they show it, and how deeply it is felt by all classes of the Mexican people. He who knows the Mexicans will understand how they will pardon a crime, but never an insult.

Whoever knows the character of the French military, knows that thy are kind and generous in their acts, but mocking, insulting, contemptuous in their words. They invariably take the refined civilzation of their own country for the criterion of their judgments, and treat with scorn whatever has not their elegance. The sight of the impovished officers of Mexico would naturally create a smile, then give rise to a sarcasm from their lips. Marshall Forey has even dared to echo such words in the open Senate.

I remember having passed through similar circumstances myself.—I have laughed at the coarse customs and uncivilized habits of the Arabs, and in the Crimea was sickened and disgusted with the savagery of certain officers of the south-east of Russia, * I have often jested upon many such things, though certainly without spite. But at a later day, I saw that the coarsely-clad man, with rough manners and words, who leaves his family and sets aside his interests, to defend his country is much more worthy of esteem and respect than the young gentlemen educated for correct and elegant murder and trained to wear their embroidered uniforms with taste in apartments glittering with

light. My experience tells what the French officers have probably done, and my heart what the Mexicans must certainly have suffered.

Now let it be seen from the following document and article borrowed from *La Presse*, and the *Opinion Nationale* of Paris, on which side is civilization and on which is barbarity.

"The Mexican Banditti."—At the moment when the dissenters of Mexico are accused of being simply banditti, at the moment when we are surprised at seeing the Americans indignant at the summary shooting done by our Mexican auxiliaries, it is proper to investigate how these summary executions are judged of by the Belgian officers and soldiers in the Mexican service.

Letter to Emperor Maximilian.

"Sire,

We have learned with horror and consternation the act committed by Colonel Mendez, who, in violation of every law of humanity and every law of war, has put to death a certain number of officers of the liberal army, whom he had made prisoners. In all civilized countries, officers respect prisoners of war. The Liberal army—to which you even refuse to give the name of army—itself professes a greater respect for these laws than do the chiefs of your forces, for, we who are prisoners, are respected by all from the general to the common soldier.

"*If we did not find ourselves in the hands of troops sincerely liberal, the act of Colonal Mendez would call forth a bloody retaliation; and we Belgians*, who have come to Mexico solely with a view to acting as a guard of honor to our princess, *but whom you have forced to fight against principles identical with our own, might have expiated by our blood the crime of a man who is a traitor to his own country.*

"We hope, sire, that the barbarous act of Colonel Mendez will not remain unpunished, and that you will have the kindness to give orders that the laws between nations shall be observed. We energetically protest against this nameless act.

"Bruer, Guyot, Flachat, Van Hollenbeck and two hundred others."

The following is the petition addressed to the Belgian Parliament.

"To the Representatives of the Belgian Nation.

Gentlemen,

The Mexican question has frequently been discussed by you, but principally as to the legality or illegality of recruiting for the Belgian Legion. At the present day, an event of the greatest gravity obliges us to call your attention anew to this question. The lives of two hundred Belgian prisoners are at stake.

"Resuming the question a little further on, we recall the fact that we were exclusively to perform the service of guard of honor to a Belgian princess. But the Emperor, caring nothing for the special service for which the Legion had been enrolled, nor for the neutrality of the Belgian Legion, ordered us to enter upon a campaign, and urged on by the warlike ardour which belongs to Belgian soldiers, we obeyed and resolutely marched at the head of the ranks.

"Although we have had success, we have also, unfortunately, experienced reverses, and two hundred of our number have been made

prisoners. Having no regard for our peculiar situation, the Emperor has recently published a decree, the consequences of which may be terrible. This decree announces to the republicans that, after the 15th of November, all prisoners taken with arms in their hands will be shot.

"At the beginning of this month an Imperialist colonel, named Mendez—an ex-Republican, who had sold himself to the empire—a man who had nought but hate for the Belgians, made a large number of prisoners in the Republican army, among whom were two generals and several superior officers. He has caused them to be shot, in violation of military laws, without even waiting till the delay fixed by the decree should have expired. He said after the execution, to those who remonstrated with him as to the enormity of this act: 'Well, let them revenge themselves upon the Belgians.' All the other (French) prisoners are, in effect, exchanged.

"We have expected that all the Belgian prisoners would be put to death; but the Mexican Republic, great and generous as all free nations are, has preferred to do nothing till it should learn what course of conduct the administration of the empire will pursue with regard to Colonel Mendez,

"Gentlemen, it is your place to interfere. The Belgian Legion has long desired to return to its native country; it desires to take no further part in this unjust war, and will no longer serve an empire where such acts are permitted.

"As representatives of the nation, you are called upon to act whenever the Belgian name is brought forward. It is not a question of party here, but a question of nationality.

"Representatives of Belgium, remember our device: 'Union and Strength.' We address ourselves to you in the name of Belgium, whose honest confidence is being imposed upon. It is your place to prevent the sacrifice of Belgian blood. In the name of the country, accomplish your duty!

"In the name of all the Belgians made prisoners by the Repub-
"lican army. BREUER.

* * * * *

"It results from this act of accusation that the Mexican dissenters (whom we call banditti) treat their prisoners in conformity to the laws of war, while the Mexicans who have rallied around the empire shoot the prisoners they make, at the risk of compromising the lives of two hundred Belgians exposed to a bloody retaliation.

"Let all judge now.

CLEMENT DUVERNOIS.

CHAPTER III.

APPEARANCES AND REALITY.

We must now go far enough back in the history of the past to find the first diplomatic trace of the thought of intervention in Mexico. It originated in Spain. That power has not yet lost the hope of reëntering into possession of its American colonies. It hoped, by means

of European intervention, to reëstablish a throne in Mexico and cause it to be occupied by a prince of the house of Bourbon.

On the 24th of November, 1858, Mr. Mon, then Spanish ambassador to France, represented to Count Walewski, "the necessity of establishing a strong power and government in these countries."

On the 3d of January, 1859, Mr. Mon wrote to Mr. Calderon Collantes, minister of foreign affairs in Spain:

"My idea, which I have not been so fortunate as to enable your Excellency to understand, reduced itself to examining whether it would be possible to form a government in Mexico, which, supported at the outset by the three powers, would end by having no need of any.

"Will your Excellency indicate to me, if possible, the form, as well as the means, which appear to you suitable to be made use of under such circumstances. Count Walewski and myself have left the question at this point, in order to be able to resume it when we think fit."

Seven days later Mr. Calderon Collantes replied that he shared Mr. Mon's views, but that, according to him, "moral and purely diplomatic means were sufficient."

If there could still remain any doubt as to the initiative of Spain in this affair, of its powerful efforts and the project long premeditated between herself and France, of overthrowing the republican government in Mexico, the following dispatch, from Mr. Calderon Collantes to Mr. Mon, dated 18th of April, 1860, would remove them:

"Your Excellency is aware of the attempt made several times by His Majesty's government with regard to those of England and France, with a view to adopting a measure to put an end to the anarchy which exhausts the Mexican Republic.

"Some time ago, I had with Mr. Barrot (French ambassador to this court) a conference upon this serious affair. Mr. Barrot transmitted my indications to the Emperor's minister of foreign affairs, and, a few days ago, he read me an extract from one of his dispatches, in which it is shown that the governments of France and England are now disposed to combine their efforts in order to obtain the establishment of a government in Mexico which will be recognized by the entire nation, and will put an end to the sad situation in which this unhappy republic has found itself for so many years past.

"Mr. Thouvenal thinks that the best means would be to propose the convocation of a Constituent Assembly, which should determine the form of government in a stable and definite manner, and solve all the pending questions, whatever their nature and importance."

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

"His majesty's will is, then, that Your Excellency should have an interview with Mr. Thouvenel, with a view to seeking the means for the three respective powers, of intervening in the disorder of the Mexican republic. The government of His Majesty thinks that the mere news of this resolution and the first measures taken to bring it to a good end will suffice to give courage to honorable persons in Mexico, and predispose minds to labor in favor of the establishment of a government which, without limiting the exercise of legitmate rights or the guarantee which they have in civilized countries, will for ever enchain that spirit of rebellion which has caused so much damage in this unfortunate country."

As is clear, the spirit had progressed. *Moral and dipolmatic means* were no longer talked of, the overthrow of the government of Juarez and the placing a monarchial government in his stead are as clearly traced as dipolmatic language demands. "A strong and durable power," on the 24th of November, 1858; on the 3d of January, 1859, "a new government supported at the outset by three monarchial powers," which certainly cannot be a republican government, and finally on the 18th of April, 1860, "the overthrow of the Mexican Republic will give courage to honorable persons in Mexico, and predisposed minds to work in favor of the establishment of a government * * * * * which will forever enchain the spirit of rebellion, &c." Every one knows that this diplomatic language means. The establishment of a monarchy could not be more clearly indicated.

It appears to result from the examination of this correspondence that France abdicated its traditional policy of inatiative in this affair and that it suffers itself to glide quietly along the slope of Spanish policy.

Was this consciously or involuntary? that would be very difficult to decide and I leave each one to form his personal opinion upon the basis of facts as they are about to be demonstrated.

Thanks to the favorable reception given to Spanish propositions by France and England, Calderon Collantes thought fit to risk a project of constitution for the reorganization of Mexico which he sent to Paris and to London on the 24th of May, 1860. This was going to work too fast, England stopped him forthwith. That power protestant above all things, had no intention of being used as a cats paw by the catholic powers.

Mr. Jsturitz, minister of Spain to London, wrote on the 27th of April, 1860, to Mr. Calderon Collantes:

"In effect, on the 27th of April, 1860, Lord John Russell, warned as to the cooperation that England might give, replied laconically to Mr. Isturitz that he did not repel it, provided that it was "thoroughly understood that the use of force should not enter into the execution" of these projects. In a second interview, Mr. Isturitz insists, in order to obtain a more explicit answer from Lord John Russell: the Secretary of State explains that on its part "England will exact the protection of the protestant faith" "to which I replied," adds Mr. Isturitz, "that in that case, England must not rely upon the cooperation of Spain."

The most curious part of all this intrigue is the sudden reviling of Louis Napoleon. He who had not a single objection to make to the Spanish propositions, who had seen them augment and develop with satisfaction, immediatly brought them back to the starting point by the passage of the following despatch which Mr. Barrot, minister of France to Madrid was charged to transmit to Mr. Colderon in the name of his government.

"It is besides understood," says this dispatch, "that the measures in question shall have an entirely friendly character and that they shall exclude the idea of recourse to any means of material coercion."

Louis Napoleon was afraid of England and his love for the supremacy of the Latin race did not go so far as to lead him to engage himself in an adventure in which he might have found himself caught

between England and the United States, with poor Spain for an ally.

Thus ended this first period of the Mexican question. Spanish intrigue, English prudence, French reluctance, sums it up. It was to be set aside till the 1st of September, 1861.

CHAPTER IV.

APPEARANCES VS. REALITIES.

In the time of Miramon, of the very man whose advice was followed in 1862 and 1863, on the 16th of March, 1860, the government had begun to loudly set forth its complaints against a country, the situation of which could not be more unfortunate. In April Mr. Pacheco had renewed them, by a *mise en demeure* to be acted upon. But in order to comprehend what is about to follow, it is necessary to know that Spain, in no wise discouraged by England's refusal, and that of France, to aid her enterprise, had pursued its execution alone and directly, through the intervention of the Captain-General of the island of Cuba. A year later, when she was ready to act, she again put the Mexican question upon the diplomatic carpet.

Mr. Mon, alluding to the approaching secession of the South, wrote to Calderon Collantes:

"The Government cannot conceal that this may be an occasion for reviving past souvenirs, and placing upon the throne of Mexico a prince of the Bourbon blood, more or less intimately united to this house."

This is the last word of the Spanish political thought—that which was destined to remove all scruples from Louis Napoleon's mind, and to bring about the retreat of Spain at the outset of hostilities.

On the 6th of September, 1861, Mr. Mon received orders to announce to Mr. Thouvenal that a Spanish fleet was ready to set sail to operate against Mexico, and the Captain-General of the island of Cuba received orders to that effect. It was difficult, it must be confessed, to act with more resolution and skill; and, if her strength had been equal to her good will, Spain, without doubt, would have brought her plan to a good issue. Napoleon, terrified at the thought of any Bourbon restoration whatever, even at 3,000 leagues from France, and no less enchanted at the prospect of profiting by American complications, to weaken the republican form, no longer hesitated. He intervened and determined England to do the same. A month later, on the 11th of October, 1861, Monsieur Thouvenal wrote to Monsieur de Flahaut in London:

"I have replied to the English ambassador that I was entirely in harmony with his government as to one point: that I admit, like Lord Russell, that the legitimacy of our coercive action with regard to Mexico, would only result from our griefs against the government of that country, and that those griefs, as well as the means of redressing

them and preventing their renewal, could alone, in effect, be the object of an *ostensible* convention."

It is evident that if there was an *ostensible* convention for the *vulgum pecus*, there was another for the contracting parties. We shall soon see what use Monsieur Billaut, in the name of Napoleon's government, made of the *ostensible* convention with regard to the *vulgum pecus*, or the legislative assembly, and that made of the real convention by his master as regards Mexico. It is good to remember the date of the 11th of October, 1861, for it clearly proves, when we shall have reached the public debate in the French House, that Monsieur Billaut either tells a falsehood or was himself a dupe, which latter is not credible.

The dispatch continued thus:

"But it appeared to me useless to go beyond and interfere in advance with the ultimate exercise of a legitimate participation in the events of which our operations might be the origin. . . . . It is permissible to suppose, in effect, that if the issue of the American crisis consecrated the separation of the North and South, the two new confederations would both seek for such compensation as the territory of Mexico, given up to social dissolution, would offer to their competition. Such an event could not be indifferent to England; and the principal obstacle which might, according to us, prevent its accomplishment, would be the constituting of a reparative government in Mexico, strong enough to check its internal dissolution."

It is impossible to be more clear, or to say in more moderate and choice terms, that everything is hoped from the success of the Rebellion, and that, in case it did succeed, a good monarch, gloved in iron, would know how to bring the North and South to terms and prevent both from emerging beyond their limits, until, probably, making use of the ever-true maxim, *div de et impera*, it should be judged necessary to the development of monarchial institutions, to excite a fresh civil war, a new dismemberment and a new weakening of the Great Republic. It is the "balance of power" transported from Europe to America.

Heaven be praised that, thanks to the energy of "our boys" and, let us hope, to that of Congress, we shall come out of our trouble safe, sound and complete.

The above dispatch was prior, by twenty days, to the famous ostensible convention of the 31st of October, and was sent five months before the lying declarations made by Monsieur Billaut to the French Tribune, in reply to interpellations of Monsieur Jules Favre.

Such are the facts in the simplicity of reality. Let us examine the appearances the *ostensible* convention intended for the vulgar herd.

CHAPTER V.

It is on the 18th of April, 1861, that we find the first diplomatic trace of a thought of intervention in Mexico. it came from Monsieur Dubois de Saligny:

"In the state of anarchy, one may say of social decomposition, in

which this unfortunate country finds itself, it is now difficult to forsee the turn which events will take. A single thing is clear to me, the impossibility of remaining in *statu quo*.

Everything indicates that we are touching upon a new revolution.—In this situation, it appears to me absolutely necessary that we should have upon the coast of Mexico, a material force sufficient to provide, whatever may happen, for the protection of our interests.

On the Twelfth of the following June, Monsieur de Saligny returns to the same subject with more force, his thought is more clearly shown.

"It only remains for me to add that I have little confidence in the new administeration; that the position of this government appears to me, besides, so precarious, that I more than ever believe in the necessity of taking precautions without delay and placing ourselves in a way to support by force if necessary, the justice of our reclamations."

Meanwhile, the question is only of a reclamation a main armée, in conformity with international right when it is limited to redressing the wrongs of which one nation has cause to complain with regard to that of another.

On the 27th of July, 1861, the French minister officially announces to his government that in accordance with Mr. Charles Wyke, the English minister, he has broken off the diplomatic relations with the government of Juarez.

Mr. Thouvenel approves of his conduct and on the 5th of September, the evening of the day on which Mr. Mon officially notified him of the sending out of a Spanish fleet to operate against Mexico, the French minister thus sums up Monsieur de Saligny's instructions.

"The Emperor's government entirely approves of your conduct and protests in the most formal manner against that of the government of Juarez * * * * * * It is important that the latter government should not ignore the impression of the Emperor's government and that he should be edified as to what we exact of him. You are then to declare to him that the suspension of the payment of foreign conventions, let it be covered with whatever pretext it may, is, on our part, the object of the most lively disapprobation, and that we demand the immediate repeal of the law of the 17th of July, last * * * * You will add that we claim the establishment of commissiaries in the parts of Vera Cruz, and of Tampico, whom we shall point out and whose mission will be to secure the payment, to the powers who have a right to it, of the funds which are to be raised to their profit, in execution of foreign conventions, upon the product of the maritine custom houses of Mexico. If the Mexican government refuses to accept these conditions, you are called upon, sir, to quit Mexico without delay, with all the persons who compose his Majesty's legation."

Such language on the part of a colossus like France in unison with England and Spain, towards a poor little country like Mexico, is the brutal but legal act of the usurer who causes his creditor's furniture to be sold by the sheriff, if that crditor is too poor to pay him. To withdraw the jurisdiction of its ports from a free country, to keep them under foreign sequester and garrison, is one of those acts which are equivalent to a declaration of war, for where is the nation however low it may have fallen, that will submit to such a humiliation?

The intervention was resolved upon. On the 30th of October, 1861, on the eve of the famous ostensible convention, Monsieur Thouvenel announces it in these terms to Monsieur Dubois de Saligny :

"The Emperor," (said Monsieur Thouvenel), has decided that a naval division placed under command of Rear Admiral Jurrien de la Graviere, shall receive the mission to repair to the Gulf of Mexico to obtain the satisfaction, which, after a final examination of the situation appears to be exacted by regard for our dignity and for the violence of all kinds to which our nation is subjected. The Emperor's government will not act alone. The government of Her British Majesty and that of Her Catholic Majesty propose to unite their forces to those with which we intend to make this expedition."

This is the first time that, in a dispatch, Monsieur Thouvenel reveals the existence of a convention between France, Spain and England, which was to be signed on the morrow, the terms of which Calderon Collantes discussed with Mr. Mon in a dispatch dated the 23d, and which was the object of diplomatic correspondence for nearly two years, as we have seen.

On the 21st of October, 1861, between France, England and Spain, that *ostensible* convention was signed, the first article of which ran thus:

"The commander of the allied forces shall be authorized to accomplish upon the most suitable spots, all other operations which shall be judged proper for the realization of the aim proposed in the preamble of the present conventions, and especially to guarantee the security of foreign residents.

Calderon Collantes, touched by scruples as to the interpretation which might be given to the words "and especially to guarantee the security of foreign residents," asked that they should be suppressed in his dispatch of the 23d of October to Mr. Mon. Worthy man! He is the same who kept a minister in Paris, who advised him, a month and a half before, to profit by the embarrassed position of the United States to establish a monarchy in Mexico for the profit of a prince of the house of Bourbon, and who, a few days after the 6th of September, notified the French Government of the sending forth of a Spanish fleet for that purpose!

Article Second is not less *ostensibly* honest than the first:

"Article 2.—The high parties contracting agree not to seek for themselves, in the use of the coercive measures foreseen by the present convention, any acquisition of territory, nor any particular advantage, and to exercise, in the internal affairs of Mexico, no influence of a nature to injure the right of the Mexican nation to freely choose and constitute the form of its government."

If clearness and precision ever existed, it is here. The contracting powers ostensibly engage to exercise no influence of a nature to injure the right of the Mexican nation to freely choose and constitute the form of its government.

To add still further to the solemnity of this declaration, the three powers propose to the government of the United States to unite with them to obtain the redress of common wrongs. Was this offer any more sincere than the declaration of France and Spain? It is permitted us to doubt. They knew the government to be engaged in a

civil war, the issue of which, according to them, was to be quite differerent from what it proved, and the existence of which was the *point d' appui* of common intervention. They knew, besides, without there being any necessity for Mr. Seward to remind them, that our traditional policy was to ally ourselves with no European power, and must have comprehended that the moment would have been badly chosen indeed to depart from this wise policy. They must, above all, have understood that, however cheap Mr. Seward *ostensibly* held the Monroe doctrine, he was not the American nation, and that the American nation, to be consistent with itself and be able in the future to claim the maintainence of that doctrine, of vital importance to America and her institutions, must abstain from lending a hand in any foreign intervention upon this continent.

This invitation was then purely ironical, and a jest in bad taste, to which Mr. Seward nevertheless thought fit to reply seriously; which he did in a dispatch dated from Washington, 4th of December, 1861.

Let this dispatch be placed beside another dated from Washington on the 14th of July, 1862, and addressed to Mr. T. Corwin, our minister to Mexico, in which the following passage is found: "It is very certain that the idea of preparing a throne in Mexico, if ever entertained, was long since discarded." Let it be compared with another, from the same to the same, sent from Washington on June 24, 1862, "Notwithstanding the course adopted by the French agents and army in Mexico, the government of France reassures us that it is their purpose to be content with an adjustment of grievances, leaving it exclusively to the people of Mexico to determine their own form of government; and in no case to put up any or to maintain any one that may come in consequence of war;" and with this dispatch, dated Washington, June 23, and addressed to Hon. J. Perry, our minister in Madrid, in which he thus judges the speech of Calderon Collantes: "No one can read it without being satisfied that the Spanish Government has acted with eminent honor and good faith."

I might multiply quotations of this nature. I think these three suffice.

It will be easily perceived that the French Government had not ceased, from the outset of the Mexican question, to hide its true intentions under a cover of false assertions, of which Mr. Seward was the dupe. This is the first time, since the half-barbaric days which preceded the revolution of '93, that French diplomacy has stooped to rivalling Italian, Spanish and English diplomacy in cunning and deceit.

In the midst of all these extraordinary assertions one fact remains patent, avowed, irrefragable, and that interests us to the highest degree. It is the insufficiency of our diplomacy. We have no diplomatists—such is the consequence of our system of distribution of diplomatic posts, without regard for personal fitness. To make a devoted orator, having the qualities necessary to amass a crowd around the hustings in favor of a presidential candidate, an ambassador to Madrid, Berlin, Chili, or elsewhere, is an absurdity, the result of which is apparent here. Mr. Seward was not informed, because he had no diplomatist either at Madrid or Paris. Like credulous children, our agents believed what it pleased the foreign ministers to say to them, and Mr. Seward did the same. How different from England!

Meanwhile, Calderon Collantes addressed his ostensible instructions to the Captain-General of the island of Cuba. They are summed up in three points:

First—Personal satisfaction for the dismissal of the Spanish minister.

Second—The execution of the treaty signed at Paris between Mon and Almonte.

Third—The indemnification stipulated.

Nothing in all this reveals the monarchial thought, if not the absurdity of such reclamations. equivalent to an appeal to brutal force with all its political consequences. How could it be reasonably supposed that Juarez would submit to Almonte, a man politically condemned?

Monsieur Thouvenel had also sent his dispatches to Admiral Jurien de la Graviere, on the 11th of November, 1861.

"When the combined forces of the three powers, shall have arrived upon the eastern shore of Mexico, you will, as I have said, claim the delivery into your hands, of the ports of that shore. After taking this step, two alternatives may present themselves: either your summons will be resisted, and then your remaining course will be to concert, without delay, with the commanders of the allied forces, for the capture of these ports by force; or the local authorities will renounce opposing a material resistance, but the Maxican government will refuse to enter into relations with you."

"Renewing a tactic employed by one of his predecessors in the war with the United States, Juarez will, if necessary retire into the interior of the country. The allied powers could not suffer themselves to be held in check by such an expedient. The intent of our dignity and a consideration for the circumstances of the climate on the eastern shore, unite to exact a prompt and decsive result * * * * The Emperor's government admit that, either to reach the Mexican government. or to render more efficacious the coercion exercised upon it by the taking possession of its ports, you will find yourself in the necessity of combining a march into the interior of the country which would, if necessary, lead the allied forces to Mexico itself.

"The allied powers only profess, I have told you, the aim indicated in the Convention, they interdict themselves from intervening in the internal affairs of the country, and especially from exercising any pressure upon the will of the people in the choice of their government.—There are, however, certain circumstances which our foresight is called upon to provide for and which we have been called upon to examine. It might happen that the presence of the allied forces upon the territory of Mexico would determine the healthy part of the population, tired of anarchy, eager for order and repose, to make an effort to constitute a government in the country, offering the guarantees of strength and stability which have failed to exist in all those which have succeeded each other since the emancipation. The allied powers have a common interest, a manifest interest, in seeing Mexico emerge from the state of social dissolution in which it is plunged, which paralyses all development of its prosperity, annuls for it and the rest of the world all the riches with which Providence has endowed its privileged soil, and obliges the allied powers to have periodical recourse to costly expeditions to recall the duties of epherneral and unreasonable governments. This interest should lead them

not to discourage attempts of the nature of that which I have just indicated to you, and you should not refuse them your encouragement and moral support, if, through the position of men who would take the initiative and through the sympathy that they would meet with from the mass of the population, you saw a chance of success for establishing an order of things of a nature to secure the interests of the foreign residents, that protection to and those guarantees, which have failed them until now. The Emperor's government relies upon your prudence and discernment to judge in concert with His Majesty? commissary, whose knowledge acquired in his sojourn in Mexico will be precious to you, during the events which may develop themselves under your eyes and aid you to determine the measure in which you may be called upon to take part in them.

Signed, THOUVENEL."

All Louis Napoleon's duplicity appears in this dispatch. We remember the confidential dispatch which Monsieur Thouvenel addressed, but a month before the 11th of October, 1860, to the French ambassador in London, and in which he spoke of that *ostensible* Convention for the *vulgum pecus* the Legislative Assembly of France and the government of the United States, and in which he foresaw the establishment of a monarchial government in Mexico, thanks to the complications of our civil war. Well, then! that very government, which had condemned the Mexican Republic and had already taken measures for throttling it, treats with its representative, Juarez, and proposes to him, with hypocrisy, conditions which it was impossible for him to accept; thus recognizing its existence in the face of the world when, for a month or more, it has ceased to exist in the thought of the governments of France and Spain. Beside this, the minister of France renews this aironical declaration that the allies interdict themselves from intervening in the internal affairs of the country and especially from exercising any pressure upon the will of the people as to the choice of their government, when already the Mexican emigres, Almonte and those in concert with him, have received instructions to overthrow the government of Juarez, and are at work under the flag of France.

Is this all that is left of old French loyalty?

In fine, as a last act of this shameful and ridiculous farce, in which the honor of France, true honor, not that of its flag, but its loyalty, is at stake,—Monsieur Thouvenel sends to the French plenipotentiaries instructions from which I extract the last article thus conceived:

"Article 9. As a guarantee of the accomplishment of the financial and other conditions laid down by the present *ultimatum*, France shall have a right to occupy the ports of Vera Cruz and Tampico, and such other ports of the Republic as she shall think fit, and to establish such commissaries at those ports as the Imperial government shall point out. The commissaries will have the mission to secure the payment, in the hands of the powers which have a right to them, of the funds to be raised for their profit, in execution of foreign conventions, upon the products upon the maritime custom-houses of Mexico, and the payment, into the hands of the French agents, of the sums due to France."

"The commissaries in question will, besides, be invested with the

power to reduce, either by half, or in a less proportion, as they judge proper, the duties now prescribed in the ports of the Republic.

"It is expressly understood that merchandise having already paid the rights of importation, cannot, in any case, or under any pretext whatever, be subjected by the supreme government or the state authorities, to any additional rights of the internal or other custom-house duties, exceeding the proportion of fifteen per cent. upon the rights paid to importation."

Where is the government which would consent to leave to foreign powers the right of determining the tariff of its ports?

And i tis in the name of the debt of a Swiss usurer, bought up by Monsieur de Morny, (whose relationship to Louis Napoleon is known to all), and to divide it among a few minions and courtesans, that France casts to the winds of chance its gold, the lives of its sons, and what is more, its old reputation for loyalty and generosity towards the weak! There was a time when France boasted of being rich enough to pay for her glory; she should have kept something in reserve, to buy back her honor and wrest it from the hands of adventurers.

CHAPTER VI.

APPEARANCES VS. REALITY.

The opening of the session of 1862 was awaited with great impatience everywhere, and by all parties. Every one observed, with anxiety, the spirit of adventure which promenaded the flag of France from the Sahara to the Black Sea; from Italy to China, and from Cochin-China to Mexico. There were no more, it is true; vast hecatombs offered by ambition to victory, and no longer was the old soil of Europe turned up, torn by the iron of France, and watered by the blood of her sons, to cause new scions of the Corsican dynasty to spring up there. Nothing so great, nothing so frightful was to be feared. It was only the prodigal nephew playing truant, and casting to the four winds of heaven the ill-gotten inheritance of his millionaire uncle.

France, at the moment when her Houses were about to meet, no more feared great catastrophes like Waterloo than she hoped for great victories like Austerlitz. What tormented her was to see her money, every day, taken from her pocket, now to prop up the Pope's throne, and again to furnish one to an Austrian archduke. France was sad at seeing that, spite of the millions expended in China and at Rome, she had only obtained of the first country a Count of Pelikow, and some old china, and of the second a few blessings as an offset to many maledictions. What would be the result of this new Mexican adventure? was now the query.

On the 27th January, 1862, the emperor, in his opening speech, expressed himself thus:

"We should be struggling with no one if, in Mexico, the proceedings of an unscrupulous government had not obliged us to unite with

Spain and England to protect our natives and repress attempts made against humanity and international rights."

In spite of this declaration, which seemed to indicate some other aim in the expedition besides a legitimate reparation, to be demanded by force of arms, the country was not reassured. It was already known that measures had been taken at Miramar with regard to Archduke Maximilian. These measures were so far from being a secret, that the officers of the expedition said, in the *cafes* and elsewhere, that they were going to raise a throne for Archduke Maximilian, upon the Mexican soil. Such rumors even reached the ears of Lord Cowley, who, on the 24th January, 1862, wrote to Lord John Russell:

"I have heard it said, in so many directions, that the officers who are going to Mexico with reinforcements declare that they are going there with the aim of placing Archduke Maximilian upon the throne, that I have thought it necessary to question Monsieur Thouvenel on the subject.

"I have asked him whether negotiations were pending between France and Austria with regard to the Archduke Maximilian. His Excellency replied in the negative, and said that the negotiations had been opened by the Mexicans alone, who had come to Vienna with this aim."

There was a great difference already between rumors going the rounds of the streets and barracks, and that mysterious silence which, for several months, had not ceased to surround those secret measures, the result of which was no longer a secret to English diplomacy; for, three days later, on the very day when the emperor opened the legislative session, (and nothing was talked of but a simple redress of wrongs), Lord J. Russell sent the following dispatch to his plenipotentiary minister in Mexico:

"Sir: I have received your dispatches of the 18th and 28th November, and have placed them under the eyes of the queen. Since I wrote to you, the Emperor of the French has decided to send 3,000 more men to Vera Cruz.

"It is supposed that these troops will march upon Mexico with the French and Spanish troops already in Mexico. It is said that the Archduke Ferdinand Maximilian *will be invited* by a great number of Mexicans to mount the throne of Mexico, and that the *Mexican people will be glad* of this change in their form of government.

"I have little to add to my first instructions upon this subject. If the Mexican people, by a simultaneous movement, place the Austrian archduke upon the throne of Mexico, we have nothing to do with preventing this proceeding; that is not in our convention.

"On the other hand, we cannot take part in an intervention by force, with this aim; the Mexicans must consult their own interests.

The archduke Maximilian "will be invited" by a great number! "The Mexican people will be glad!" This is the sublimity of contempt for the people, and it is impossible to mock at a nation with more graceful ease. To decree joy and foresee the will of the people! There is nothing like an emperor for power and perspicuity. The Opposition took fire and thought proper to propose the following

amendment to the address in reply to the discourse from the throne:

"We see with regret that the Mexican expedition is beginning. Its aim appears to be to intervene in the internal affairs of a nation. We engage the government to pursue nothing but the redress of our wrongs."

A discourse took place between Jules Favre, in the name of the Opposition, and Monsieur Billaut, then *ministere de la parole*, in the name of the government.

Jules Favre seemed to fear some hidden thought of monarchial restoration; he had heard the rumors, and read the English minister's dispatches over his shoulder. Monsieur Billaut replied:

"England and Spain have united with us. The same offer has been made to the United States; but the United States, as regards Mexico, does not appear to concentrate its views upon a simple reparation of the damage done. Its policy sees things in another light, and we have decided to act without it. [Very well!]

"But should not this reunion of the three powers reassure you fully against the particular suppositions which have made the basis of your speech? *Beyond the patent and decided facts, you persist in seeing, I know not what secret machinations of France for the benefit of a foreign interest.*

"When such suppositions are formed some proof should be given, and you have none!"

Jules Favre still insisted.

Monsieur Billaut became still more explicit.

"The convention passed between the three powers is clear and precise. The aim is to exact from Mexico, 1st, A more efficacious protection for the persons and property of their subjects. 2dly, The execution of the obligations contracted towards them by that Republic; and article 3d of the convention adds:

"The three contracting parties engage not to seek for themselves, in the employment of the coercive measures foreseen by the present convention, any acquisition of territory, or any particular advantage, nor to exercise in the internal affairs of Mexico any influence of a nature to injure the right of the Mexican nation, to choose and freely constitute the form of its government. All this is clear and precise; all this very clearly expresses what the three powers wish to do in common, and what they interdict themselves from doing; against these solemn declarations what proof have you?"

"Then why do you go to Mexico?" exclaimed Jules Favre, with great good sense.

"You ask us why we go to Mexico? Gentlemen, the topographic and hygienic situation of the country commands it as much as the needs of policy. To seize the shore, and remain there, is to give up our troops to yellow fever, (cries of 'That is true! that is true!") it is to condemn our action to powerlessness; anarchy would retrench itself in the interior, and laugh at France and her efforts.

"It is in the very heart of this power that a decisive blow must be given; and, leaving the yellow fever behind us, we must go, as early as possible, to use force with an enemy less formidable than the fever itself.

"It is there, and there alone, that it will be possible to impose

respect for our laws by force, and the respect of those of our natives, as well as the execution of obligations too long ago contracted towards our country.

"This is why our troops are going to Mexico; they departed on the 20th February, and must now be there."

The argument, though specious, might not be without value. They could not in effect leave the *troupes de debarquement* to die of yellow fever in the hot lands; it was necessary to reach the temperate regions, and Monsieur Billaut must necessarily receive great applause from the majority, which was the case. Led away by that majority, heated with success, the government orator did not wish to leave his triumph incomplete; he confirmed it by these words, which every man must necessarily have thought to be inspired at that moment by the most sincere candor and the warmest conviction:

"This principle which we proclaim, this principle which is the basis of our public right, the independence of the people's vote and of national sovereignty, is one that we shall not go to Mexico to violate, but we will leave those unfortunate populations perfectly free, pressed upon as they are by the governments which you praise, and which have never been able to give them any of those benefits, any of the securities which form the rights of civilized society; if they wish to continue this miserable existence, *we do not impose a better lot upon them;* but if they wish a better lot for themselves, oh! then, we shall encourage them with all our sympathy, counsel and moral support."

We who have seen the contents of the Spanish and French dispatches of 1861, that of Lord John Russell on the 27th of January, 1862, and have been to Miramar with the Mexican *emigres*, know what to think of phrases like this.

As for those rumors in the barracks and cafés, which exalted Maximilian to the throne of Mexico, and to which the English minister wrongfully attached sufficient importance to make them the subject of a dispatch, they are not, of course, worth dwelling upon!

"Such gentlemen is the situation very clearly set forth. And as for the rumors which, said the honorable speaker, "gave umbrage to Her British Majesty," permit me to pass them by. Officers about departing have said that they were going to Mexico to place a foreign prince upon the throne. What! do you imagine that this great secret of diplomacy, if it have ever existed, could have been thus given up to the first officer that came in the way as he was setting out for Mexico? This cannot be serious."

Public credulity cannot be more skilfully imposed upon. Our American Secretary of State was caught in the trap, and with lively emotion thanked the French government for its candor and uprightness, in the following dispatch, addressed from Washington on the 14th of May, 1862, and sent through Mr. Dayton.

"Monsieur Thouvenel fulfills the desire of the President as to the Mexican question when he affirms that we may look upon the speech made by Monsieur Billaut as an expression of the thoughts and views of the French government. You will express to Monsieur Thouvenel the esteem with which *the uprightness and the frankness of his explanations inspire us, &c., &c.*

Let it not be thought that this was a moment of surprise; for, two months after on the 14th of July, 1862, Mr. Seward wrote to our minister in Mexico, (Mr. Corwin): "It is very certain that if there was ever a project for raising a throne in Mexico for an Austrian archduke, *it was long ago abandoned.*"

It is impossible to be more innocent or more easily duped.

In the midst of all this one asks oneself, What were our agents abroad doing, and of what use were they? Can we not, with our money, be served as well as France and England?

CHAPTER VII.

APPEARANCES VS. REALITY.

Events no longer delayed giving a formal contradiction to Monsieur Billaut's assertions. On the very eve of the expedition, when uncertain minds looked upon it with anxiety, it was necessary, above all, to reassure public opinion in the interior and that of foreign governments abroad. We have seen how Monsieur Billaut acquitted himself of this difficult task. We have listened to his assertions, so formal, so precise, so often repeated in proof of the disinterestedness of French intervention, and of the profound respect of the government of France for the absolute independence of the Mexican people.

We come to 1864. Time has progressed and events have hastened on. Vera Cruz, evacuated by the Mexicans, the Convention of the *Soledad* broken, Puebla carried by assault, Mexico occupied, the empire proclaimed, Juarez flying, and the Republic strangled, it was necessary to explain all that, and especially to make events harmonize with the policy of Louis Napoleon's government, in order to prove his consistency, the unity of his policy, as well as depth of his views, and show him to the people as directing events without ever being governed by them. As for the truth of those assertions made in the House in 1862, they were held as of but little importance.

Mr. Billaut was no longer in office. It is Monsieur Rouher who speaks. As for Jules Favre, he is always at his post, and it is to him that Rouher replied, on the 28th of January, 1864, in these words:

"From the first day, then, we have said the truth; reparation of our griefs, protection of our nationality, eventuality, necessity, perhaps, for going to Mexico. If we go to Mexico, *the government of Juarez cannot be maintained*, and a new one will certainly be needed.

"Such being the case, the form and condition of this government must necessarily be studied by prudent cabinets, decisive upon engaging themselves in a distant expedition."

Little store, as is seen, is set upon Monsieur Billaut's assertions in 1862, and the just susceptibility of a House and people unworthily mocked. Monsieur Billaut was no longer there, the House elected by the government no longer counted, and as to the people, the Imperial Guard and its 40,000 bayonets answered for them.

Led away by his force of reasoning and by the self-love of success, Monsieur Rouher read a dispatch from Monsieur Thouvenel to Count Flahaut, written on *the 11th October*, 1861. Let the date be remarked and remembered, as it preceded the Convention of the 31st of October, and the reiterated assertions of Monsieur Thouvenel to our government, as well as those of Monsieur Billaut to the Legislative Assembly.

"But the interest which, (says Monsieur Thouvenel) in our eyes, attaches itself to the regeneration of this country, does not, it appears to us, admit of neglecting any of the symptoms which may insure the success of such an attempt. With regard to the form of this government, because it gave the country and ourselves sufficient guarantees, we had not, nor do I suppose that England had, any preference or predisposition. But, if the Mexicans themselves, tired of their trials, decided upon reacting against a disastrous past, derived fresh vigor from the consciousness of the dangers which threaten them; if, returning, for example, to the instincts of their race, they found it good to seek in a monarchial government that repose and prosperity which they have not met with in the republican institutions, I do not think that we should absolutely interdict ourselves from aiding them, if there were room for doing so, in the work of their regeneration, while recognizing that we ought to leave them entirely free to choose the way by which it appears to them best to be led.

"Pursuing the development of these ideas in the form of a private and confidential conversation, I added that, in case the provision which I have indicated was realized, the government of the Emperor, disengaged from all interested preoccupation, would, in advance, hold aloof from any candidature of a prince of the Imperial family, and that, desirous of sparing all susceptibility, it would see, with pleasure, that the choice of the Mexicans and the assent of the powers were bestowed upon a prince of the House of Austria."

It probably was this conversation that caused Lord John Russell to notify his agent in Mexico, on the 27th of January, 1862, of the invitation, foreseen on the part of a great number of Mexicans, calling upon Maximilian to the throne: and the future joy of the Mexican nation on learning this good news.

Was Monsieur Billaut ignorant of this dispatch in 1862, or was he acquainted with it?

This language does not yet appear to have been sufficiently clear. Monsieur Rouher wishes to leave no doubt remaining in the minds of his hearers, as to the deep thought which had foreseen, conceived and executed the great Mexican adventure; so he reads the following passage from a dispatch sent by Monsieur Thouvenel to Monsieur Barrot, dated 15th of October, 1864.

"Pudence counselled us not to discourage, in advance, the efforts that this country would itself attempt, *with the moral support that the presence of our forces upon its shores might afford it, to give it a stable and regular government;* prudence suggested, in fine, that, while leaving it completely free in the choice of its government, the three powers could not, in the name of their interest, absolutely interdict themselves *from aiding the Mexicans in the*

work of their regeneration. It was by bringing myself to look from this point of view that I was led to speak to Lord Crowley of the EVENTUALITY *of the monarchial form in Mexico*; as, you will also see, is the case, in my dispatch to Monsieur de Flahaut. Monsieur Rouher continues, and quotes a conversation between Monsieur Thouvenel and the Spanish ambassador, Mon, in which he declared to him that—

"In the event of a monarchy in Mexico, France would accept the arch-duke of Austria, thus removing, in an absolute manner, that intervention of a prince of the house of Bourbon whom Spain was seeking to place upon the Mexican throne."

A declaration wanting in tact, which, reducing to nothingness the project of Spain as to the Bourbonian restoration, determined the defection of that power.

In the sessions of the 12th of May, 1864, our indefatigable champion of the Imperial government replied anew to Jules Favre:

"We have not attached ourselves to vain recriminations, we have not wished to accept ephemeral reparation; from the first day, we were resolved te march upon Mexico, if the care for our honor and the protection of our natives required it, in spite of the severe blame and something also, of ignoble calumuny; then, when the situation became modified, we did not abandon the path we had traced out for ourselves. We had gone to Mexico to overthrow a man who had dared to outrage France, as well as for the satisfaction of our honor. We had undertaken the general pacification of the country; we had organized the finances, the administration, the army of that nation so long unhappy, and we *had called upon it to chose* the government under which it desires to live."

Thus, when the French plenipotentiaries according to Monsieur Thouvenel's orders, imposed in acceptable conditions upon Juaeez, which he neverless accepted, the government of France played an unworthy farce.

Is it, then, surprising that Monsieur de Saligny, who had sought to throw upon the Mexican government the responsibility of the rupture of the Convention of the *Soledad*, by reproaching it, as he does in the letter of the 16th April, 1862, dated Cordoba, with having "after the signature of the said Convention, continued with redoubled violence to attempt inquiry into the rights and property of subjects of His Imperial Majesty, of having outraged the most sacred rights of humanity, &c., * * * of having suffered French soldiers to be assassinated upon the Vera Cruz road, and, consequently, of having necessitated the rupture of the Conventions, and the use of force."

Was this declaration included in the programme from the outset? What did the reply of Jesu Teran, the minister of Juarez, avail (this reply was dated 20th of April, 1862 and sent from Mexico), affirming that no attempt had been made upon the property of any French resident, and that, as for the soldiers killed upon the road of Vera Cruz, it was the first news that he had of it; also that he was quite disposed to have recourse to severe punishment, if such a fact had really occurred? What avails it to add, in return, that the Mexican Government had a right to complain, that "a few days after the signing of the preliminaries, the allied plenipotentiaries gave hospitality to

several men, criminals towards the Republic, some from Europe and others from Vera Cruz, where they had fled from their country's justice; and that others, encouraged by them, had left the rebel forces, of which they formed a part, and all had conspired to overthrow public order," as appeared from the documents furnished by the minister of Juarez? What does it avail to add, that "all these criminals have reappeared upon every point of the territory, protected by French troops against the action of the legal authorities of the nation?" What avails it to add, that the French officers have gone so far as to cast Mexican authorities into prison, threatening them with shooting upon the smallest pretext?

Had not all this been made ready and foreseen by the French government? Did not Monsieur Rouher say that the Emperor had not sent the flag of France into Mexico to content himself with an *ephemeral reparation*, but to overthrow Juarez and his government?

And what need was there of Monsieur Rouher's declarations. So any one who knows the French soldier, to any one who has lived with the French armies, it it is evident that the acts committed by the French army were acts *ordered in advance*, consequently foreseen.—Never does a French officer commit an act of impetuous zeal. There is too little latitude for such acts, and the discipline is too rigid.

A French officer does what he is told to do; nothing more. But he does *all* that he is told to do, and as it had been decided that the government of Juarez had ceased to exist, as it had been decided, according to Lord John Russell, that "a great number of Mexicans were to invite the arch-duke Maximilian to mount the throne of Mexico," and that "the entire Mexican nation would rejoice," it was necessary that the numerous Mexicans who had been exiled and condemned by Mexican law should circulate freely, and that Mexican authorities should be prevented from placing any obstacle in their way.

Nothing can be more simple or more natural, and the French officers, in imprisoning Mexican authorities, only executed the orders from Paris transmitted by Dubois de Saligny. The only difficult point to explain is how to cause Monsieur Billaut's declarations to harmonize with the facts. Such a thing was not even thought of.

CHAPTER VIII.

But, though Monsieur Rouher did not not consider it of any importance to show the difference between the declarations of Monsieur Billaut in 1862, and those of the government in 1864, between facts and promises. I do not consider it necessary to imitate his reserve—and shall continue to show how much the word of their government is to be depended upon. Surely, if the Honorable Monsieur Larabure had any precise idea of the degree of faith that a man of good sense should attach to *the official declarations of a Minister, be he whom he may, or those of any Monarch whatsoever*, he would have smiled when Monsieur Billant, in 1862, represented the intervention in the light of an expe-

dition, without importance, and reduced to slender proportions. In 1863, he would have shrugged his shoulders when the same orator represented the French government as led on, in spite of itself, by circumstances, into a successive development of expeditions which it had not expected to undertake. And when the master himself, Louis Napoleon, affirmed in the discourse from the throne, of the same year, that: "The distant expeditions, the object of so much criticism, have not been the execution of a premeditated plan; the force of circumstances has brought them about; nevertheless, they are not to be regretted." Monsieur Larabure would have contented himself with reading over his imperial letter, addressed to General Forey, on the 3d July, 1862, and would have been convinced that His Imperial Majesty lied like a mere mortal.

The great error of nations is in believing that there is a difference between a royal word and that of a charlatan; the only real difference, in my eyes, is that one repeats, always, with ostentation: "I give you my royal word," while the other, after having given explanations, which the public are free to accept or reject, has the good sense not to stake his word as a charlatan. Now, as the people believe all that is said to them, they believe the royal word, and the quack's speech, and the result is always the same—they are duped.

This is what happened to Monsieur Larabure, as is proved by his report upon supplementary credit, in the session of 1864. The following passage occurs therein with relation to Mexico:

"We must not disguise it from ourselves, these repeated expeditions disquiet the nation. Let us say it forthwith, to be just, that as to that of Mexico, which weighs the most upon the public mind, and upon our budget, it has only acquired the considerable proportions of which it now gives evidence, owing to a series of unfortunate incidents, which the government could neither foresee nor prevent."

How much more sensible was Monsieur Berryer, when, during the same year, in the discussions relative to the same credits, he said;

"Nothing afflicts me more than the present division of the United States. I aspire to the re-establishment of peace with as little sacrifice as possible to both parties in that great nation. But in what manner soever affairs terminate, do not forget that North America will always be a considerable and powerful State, upon the whole American territory; do not forget that there is offence to her in our conduct in the expedition to Mexico.

"Those who exclaim have not sufficiently studied either the documents under our eyes or all the historical facts that cannot be denied, and which only go back during the three last years, I do not speak of that profound feeling which is the vital principle, the nerve of political existence in the United States, of that sentiment called the *Monroe doctrine;* that is to say, in the impatient and inimical feeling with which these United States regard the intervention of any European power in American affairs.

"I do not speak of this feeling—but how did you begin the Mexican expedition? By the Convention of the 31st October.

"And what did you say in that convention? Yielding to a desire on the part of England, you say that the United States are invited to form a part in it. You beg them to do so; and in a letter written on

the 25th of July, 1862, I have read, in the clearest terms, that you propose to form a new establishment in Mexico, precisely in order to diminish the influence of the Northern States, and to prevent that power, whose prosperity would nevertheless be so useful to our commerce, from assuming a disquieting development in South America. Thus, the Mexican expedition *was partly undertaken against the United States.*

"I exaggerate nothing, gentlemen; I tell the truth. Read once more the letter of the mouth of July, 1862, and you will see, in plain terms, that the *development of the United States must be arrested.*

"Well, then, if you succeed, when the United States, toward which you have acted thus, (and who have that vital principle of which I have just spoken,) see, after the termination of their war, a State that you cannot sustain, even at the cost of immense sacrifices, and, however immense they may be. I fear they would, unfortunately, be useless. When the United States see, I repeat, that establishment that will have been raised against them, hostilities will come from all sides; the Republic of the North will not endure the imperial monarchy of Mexico, and war will break out sooner or later. Such are the perils into which you draw Prince Maximilian by inviting him to enter an impossible situation, an impracticable one, which will be ruinous to France if she persists in such an enterprise." [Applause from several benches.]

What admirable good sense is shown by this octegenarian, the Nestor of parliamentary debate! Is it not strange to see this accredited representative of legitimacy expressing himself with so much sympathy for our great Republic, when, at the same moment, one of the *enfants terribles* of the same party, the Prince de Polignac, the descendant of those court minions who, under all circumstances, have known how to ruin and compromise all that they have attempted to defend, was fighting in the Confederate ranks and contributing to Banks' defeat upon the Red River!

Monsieur Berryer is not a man to content himself with a simple *exposé*; he wishes to know to what degree France was engaged.

He interrogates the government on the 27th of January, 1864:

"Is it true that the government has not taken any engagement for the country, either in a financial view or as regarded our soldiers? Are we engaged, or are we not?"

And Monsieur Rouher sends him back to Monsieur Larabure and his report: "If you have read Monsieur Larabure's report, you will be edified."

Now this is what the report said:

"At this moment the emperor's government declares that it is engaged toward no one, neither to leave a corps of troops in Mexico nor to guarantee any loan whatever. He declares that he has no reason for thinking that it is necessary to increase the French forces now upon Mexican soil."

And Monsieur Rouher added, in the name of the government:

"The government will not, in treating with the sovereign, have contracted a permanent and indefinite solidarity for the maintaining of an empire in Mexico."

This was vague; nevertheless, the argument remained where it was

for the moment, but it was soon to be resumed on the occasion of the acceptance of the Mexican crown by Maximilian, on the 10th of April, 1864. On receiving the deputation, the new emperor had pronounced enigmatical words, the scope of which might be immense—he had said:

"The guarantees necessary to place the independence and prosperity of the country upon a solid base are also acquired, thanks to the magnanimity of the emperor of the French."

What were the necessary guarantees acquired, thanks to imperial magnanimity?

On the 16th of April the *Moniteur* threw some light upon that magnanimity, by publishing the diplomatic convention, in which the following passages appear:

"The governments of His Majesty, the emperor of the French, and His Majesty, the emperor of Mexico, animated by an equal desire to secure the establishment of order in Mexico and consolidate the new empire, have resolved to regulate by a convention. . . . . .

"Article First—The French troops now in Mexico will be reduced as soon as possible to 25,000 men, including the Foreign Legion.

This corps as a safeguard to the interests which have been the motive of the intervention, will remain temporarily in Mexico, conditions regulated by the following articles:

"Article Second—The French troops will evacuate Mexico by degrees, as His Majesty can organize the troops necessary to replace them."

"Article Third—The Foreign Legion in the service of France, composed of 8,000 men, will nevertheless remain during three years in Mexico, after all the other French forces shall have been recalled, in conformity to Article Three. From that moment, the said Legion will pass into the sevice and pay of the Mexican government. The Mexican government reserves to itself the faculty of abridging the duration of employment in Mexico for the Foreign Legion.

"Article Ten—The indemnity to be paid to France by the Mexican government for expenses, pay, feeding and keeping the troops of the *corps d' armee* from the 1st of July, 1864, will remain taxed at the rate of 1,000 francs to each man for each year."

A vague increasinn anxiety on the subjects of moral and political responsibility of France hangs over these Articles, in presence of the ever increasing expense. Every one asked how long, how much money, how many men? On the 11th of May, Monsieur Berryer speaks again and becomes the interpreter of this inquietude. Always clear and pressing, as well as eloquent, the orator suffers no door of escape to open for his adversary; nevertheless Monsieur Rouher does escape by relating the history of the expedition to the deputies who must have been acquainted with it already.

His Excellency Monsieur Rouher, minister of state, resuming his discourse! The honorable Monsieur Berryer, with regard to the general discussion of the budget, has discussed the whole Mexican question. This question has given rise in the House to numerous unfavorable apprehensions. The worst is looked for.

"When we discussed it last year, we were told, 'Your expedition to San Luis de Potosi is madness; you will disperse the French army

over 400 leagues of territory; the Mexican army, at the orders of Juarez, of Uragua, and of Doblado, will beat our detached battalions.' "

Monsieur Thiers—"That was not said." [Interruption.]

His Excellency, M. Rouher, minister of state—"The Honorable Monsieur Thiers has only to take up the discourse of the Honorable Monsieur Jules Favre, and he will see what appreciations are contained therein."

Monsieur Jules Favre—"I have never doubted our military success."

Monsieur Rouher—"We were told that the expedition was marching against the wishes of the Mexican population."

A Voice—"That was justly said." [Interruption.]

Monsieur Rouher—"Justly! Does any one dare say that? You have forgotten the triumphant march of General Bazaine over 400 leagues of territory, our entrance into Guanajuato, Queretaro and San Luis de Potosi, the shouts uttered wherever the French army flung forth its flag! Have the facts of history, then, no truth in the eyes of certain blind men? [Very well! very well!] You have criticised this expedition to San Luis de Potosi; it was a triumphant march. [Fresh approbation.]

"What, here is a new empire founded, a sovereign who has not yet taken possession of his throne, a government that is not yet organized, and you think that it is not a great proof of confidence on the part of the capitalists to have subscribed to the credit of this government 9,000,000 of rentes, when you see old governments find no subscribers to their loans? It is not to be doubted that when the Emperor Maximilian goes from Vera Cruz to Mexico, amid the enthusiastic demonstration of the people, ——" [Noise on some of the benches.]

Monsieur E. Picard—"Let the army be recalled, then."

This is precisely what good sense advised, but what Louis Napoleon's policy did not wish. Our struggle with the South was at its apogee, our finances, which were said to be exhausted, gave Europe the hope that, with a recruiting system in which each volunteer paid himself from $700 to $900, the war would end—"*faute de combattants*"—after having dragged on for some years longer, and left both sides so exhausted that Louis Napoleon's political aim would be attained, the republic weakened and held in check by a powerful monarchy.

Monsieur Rouher, as may easily be imagined, did not think fit to reply to Monsieur Picard.

On the morrow, the 12th of May, the attack was renewed. This time it was Jules Favre who mounted to the assault of the ministerial intrenchments. The breach was made, and he entered the place.

"You know, gentlemen," said he, "what arrangement has been made. In order to defray the expenses of the war, a new mode of procedure has been found: it is to cause them to be paid by the victorious power, for France issues 6,000,000 of titles, which are only notes of obligation under her signature. [Exclamations.]

"The convention inserted in the *Monteur* on the 16th of April has regulated the conditions of the sojourn of our French troops in Mexico. This is very different from the declarations made in Monsieur Larabure's report: our troops are to remain in Mexico; how long? so long

as the new empire is not consolidated, for this is, in reality, the work that France has undertaken. The empire of Maximilian must be consolidated. France is deceived when it is told that the expedition is ended. It has only begun. [A confused noise.]

"We leave 25,000 men in Mexico, without any time being determined; political circumstances alone will fix the day for recalling our troops. It is said that these troops will be paid by the government of Mexico. This is a deplorable thing for France. [Interruption.] Our troops are thus placed under the pay of a foreign prince; they will obey foreign policy; they may be engaged in adventures, enterprises and peril."

Monsieur Rouher was here obliged to break in with an explanation as to the bearings of the convention of the 10th of April:

"The question of Mexico must once more be treated. The honorable Monsieur Jules Favre has told you that the treaty concluded with the Emperor, Maximilian, would violate the engagements we have made with you; he has spoken to you of the threats of American intervention suspended, like the sword of Damocles, over the head of this new Mexican empire.

"While I heard the ironical praises bestowed upon the eloquence of the orators of the government when they portrayed the prosperity promised and already secured to Mexico, little affected by this irony, I partially read the Mexican Courior, which reached me on the instant. Here is what I read:

"The general situation of Mexico is every day ameliorated, as the masses understand and appreciate better the general views of the Emperor with regard to them. There resistance, localised upon a few points, has henceforward lost all national color. The bands fly at the approach of our troops and every time that they are surprised, they are cut to pieces. It is more and more a question of brigandage from which the inoffensive population suffers cruelly, which can be put down by a well-organized police system.

"For a month or two it was apparent that confidence revived. In the capital men of all classes and of all opinions were constantly crossing and meeting forgetting their enemy in a single sentiment—forgetfulness of the past, faith in the future. Under these conditions, with the support of the Emperor's government and the aid of European capital, Mexico cannot fail to enter promptly into its path of national prosperity, by which Europe will be the first to profit."

Several voices. "Where is the signature?"

Monsieur Rouher.

"It is signed by Monsieur de Montholon."

"A poor guarantee," said several voices.

Mr. Rouher continued:

"But, it is said, the treaty contains engagements contrary to our declaration. What does the treaty say? In the first place, the *corps d' armee* will be reduced to 25,000 men. The expedition will be ended, and the return of the troops, until they comprise 10,000 men, will be effected between now and the 1st of January, 1865. As for the remaining 15,000 men, we declare that they will remain, for the time being, in Mexico, to guard the interests of France, which interests have been the motive of our intervention."

But the 1st of January, 1865 and that of '66, also have passed by. Not only the 10,000 men have not returned to France, but others are sent thither every day.

"Monsieur Geroult. Be so kind as to read the treaty. [A noise.]

Monsieur Rouher, "I have not brought it with me; but if the honorable Monsieur Geroult will be so kind as to hand it to me, I will read it to the House."

Monsieur Géroult. "I have not got it at hand; but I think that the period for the return of our troops is left to the judgment of Emperor Maximilian."

Monsieur Rouher. The honorable Monsirur Geroult is in error, and, from memory, I can re-peat if not the text, at least the formal sense of the treaty.

"Article First indicates that the *corps d' armee* will be reduced to 25,000 men, and, for the time, will remain in Mexico as a safeguard to the interests which have been the motive of our interventiun.

"Thus 25,000 men will remain in Mexico, temporaily, that is to say, so long as the interests of France require it, but no delay is imposed upon us. The limit of that delay is left to France.

"Now, can this occupation be indefinite? No. The Emperor of Mexico reserves the right to himself to demand the return of our troops as soon as the army of Mexico is organized.

Monsieur Geroult: But we cannot remain until then. [A noise.]

A voice. Do not interrupt.

Monsieur Rouher. Does Monsieur Geroult know the facts? Does he know that in Mexico there is already a national army of 25,000 men, and does he not see that there is a common interest in putting an end, as soon as possible, to an occupation which is onerous to the Emperor of Mexico? The Mexican army is being organized. Monsieur Berryer declared yesterday that this year it will cost the Mexican government thirty-seven millions. It exists then. Our soldiers will return as soon as our interests no longer require their presence. Every day brings us nearer to the moment of the evacuation of the French troops, and the day when they will return will be hailed by both governments with equal satisfaction.

"The treaty contains nothing which is a denial of the declaration made to the Legislative Corps; and if some are pained at the prolongation of our sojourn in Mexico, I care little for it, because those are *revolutionaries*, who would be glad to renew in the country that agitation which existed in the time of Juarez. (Well said!) The treaty is above all criticism. It has nothing but what is in conformity with the thoughts expressed by the Legislative Corps in the address. (Well said! well said!)"

Is it possible to read this sorry conclusion without thinking, with shame at heart and a blush upon the cheek, of the abasement into which that Assembly of France, formerly so great through the independence and energy of its liberal genius, has now fallen? One would think we had returned to the days of Louis XIV, booted and spurred, with his whip in hand, and his hat upon his head, dictating orders to his Parliament. Where the manly accents of Mirabeau, Danton, Manuel, Victor Hugo, and Ledru Rollin resounded, nothing is heard but the cracking of an imperial whip, calling its subjects to

good behavior. "Revolutionaries!" cries the shrill voice of the minister *de la parole* and the frightened pack runs to its kennel, with ears down and head bent.

Poor France!

CHAPTER IX.

THE REALITY.

The session of 1865, by bringing the discourse from the throne and the address, brought back the same vain promises and the same timid wishes. This session was particularly remarkable from the speech made by Thiers with relation to the financial situation, but let us not anticipate.

In his opening discourse, Louis Napoleon said:

"Thus all our expeditions are near their end: our land troops have evacuated China; the navy suffices to maintain our establishment in Cochin China; our army of Africa is about to be reduced; that of Mexico is already reëntering France; the garrison of Rome will soon return, and, in closing the temple of war, we may, with pride, inscribe upon a new arch of triumph these words: 'To the glory of the French armies, for victories gained in Europe, Asia, Africa and America.'

"Let us give ourselves up without anxiety to the labors of peace.

"In Mexico, the new throne is being consolidated, the country is being pacified, its immense resources are being developed: the happy effect of the valor of our soldiers, of the good sense of the Mexican population, of the intelligence and energy of the sovereign."

He forgot to tell France what vast sums these distant expeditions had cost, and how little they had effected; but France, for a long time past, has ceased to be curious; docile and resigned, it pays without murmuring. As for the truth, it persists in holding aloof from Louis Napoleon, and obstinately refuses to sanction his assertions relative to the "development of the immense resources of Mexico," and the consolidation of the throne, as well as the pacification of the country.

Louis Napoleon cared very little for this, and, passing it over, gave the following plausible *expose* of the situation of the empire:

"The Emperor Maximilian has taken possession of the crown, which had been offered him by the national desire; and his arrival in his States has fortunately put an end to the provisionary situation of Mexico. The reception given to the Emperor in the capital and in the provinces by all classes of the population, the adhesion that the important men of the different parties have come, successively, to offer to the imperial *regime*, permit no doubt as to the aspirations of the immense majority of the Mexican people.

"The new sovereign will derive from these dazzling manifestations that strengthened confidence which is necessary to enable him to accomplish the great and generous mission which he has resolutely accepted. The pacification of so vast a country, where brigandage, profiting by the permanence of internal dissension, had constantly sheltered

itself under the flag of a political party, could not be accomplished in a day. It is, nevertheless, rapidly ending, thanks to the activity and courage of our soldiers in the expeditions which have led them to the most opposite points of the territory. In fact, the re-entrance into France of the men who compose our effective, has already begun, and will follow its course in the measure which our solicitude for the interest that led us to Mexico shall indicate. Functionaries from the different branches of our administration have been placed at the disposition of the Mexican government, upon its demand, to aid it in the work of internal reorganization."

Thus spoke the Emperor. The Legislative Corps replied:

"The Legislative Corps thinks, like yourself, sire, that the nations most wisely governed must not flatter themselves that they can always escape external complications, or that they can judge without error as well as without weakness. The distant expeditions to China, Cochin-China and Mexico, which have followed, one upon another, have, in truth, greatly disturbed the mind of France, owing to the obligations and sacrifices to which they have led. We admit that, abroad, they must inspire respect for our natives and for the French flag, and that they may also develop our maritime commerce; but we should be happy to see those good results soon realized, which your Majesty leads us to hope."

For the Legislative Corps, this language, humble as it may appear in a free country, was very daring. It almost expressed a wish.

Thiers came to clear up the financial question by his experience and his logical, clear and cutting words.

The budget of 1862, voted in 1861, (ordinary and extraordinary,) comprised 1,970,000,000. The 1862, when the rectifying budget came, it added 192,000,000 to the preceding figure, which, added M. Thiers, is "easily explained; was it not the year of the great Mexican expenditure, the year of the check of Puebla?" In 1862 the definitive liquidation of the said budget added 50,000,000, so that the entire expenditure of 1862 amounted to 2,212,000,000.

The budget of 1863, voted in 1862, (both ordinary and extraordinary,) comprised 2,061,000,000. The rectifying budget and liquidation brought this sum up to 2,292,000,000, "which is quite natural," adds M. Thiers, with his ironical good nature; "this year was a year of great expenditure—we were obliged to transport 40,000 men to Mexico."

The budget of 1864, voted in 1863, (ordinary and extraordinary,) comprised 2,105,000,000; the rectifying budget added 135,000,000 and liquidation added 40,000,000, which gives a total of 2,270,000,000, a total sum-up of less than that of the preceding year, which M. Thiers explains to us in the following manner: Instead of having the expenses of transporting these men to pay for, France had only their keep to pay. If we refer to the budgets which preceded the new imperial wars, the normal amount of which was about 1,500,000,000, it will be seen that this figure of 762,000,000—necessary to fill up the difference in these old budgets and the new ones—can be attributed to but one thing: military expeditions and occupation; now, those of Cochin-China and Rome cost comparatively little; in fact those of

Rome do not amount to 20,000,000, and Cochin-China can only be counted from memory.

The expenses carried to the budget for the embellishments of the capital may be alleged. The supposed amount in 1863 was 250,000,000; but it is incontestible that these expenses bring in, while those in Mexico have never given a cent; and it may be concluded that Mexico costs France, every year, more than 100,000,000, more or less skilfully disguised or dissembled by five budgets, which, under divers titles, consummate the annual despoiling of the French people. M. Thiers writes that the evacuation of Mexico would produce merely an annual economy of 50,000,000. In this he is entirely wrong. The support of the troops alone costs that sum. There are, besides, secret expenses in a country where the security of the new order of things only rests upon spying and denouncing; and these, as well as the maintaining of Maximilian and his court, certainly cost, at least, as much.

Mexico has engaged to pay 25,000,000 annually to France, to support the French troops, and 2,400,000 francs for maritime transportation. There was a sum of 54 Mexican millions upon the budget of 1864, inscribed in the chapter of receipts. These 54,000,000 have been given under title of the first loan emitted at 63, which is now at 46. Can this be realized at such a discount? Can Mexico pay it? With what? In obligations of the first loan? But these titles which were at 345 have fallen to 315.50. Will it pay with money? Where can it be found? Where are the resources to meet its engagements? Its income revenue, carried up to 100,000,000, has, in reality, never exceeded 80,000,000 receipts; nevertheless. the expenses of Mexico amount to 180,000,000.

The custom houses, it is said, have, in these latter days, given fabulous products. The total figure of importation and exportation is 200,000,000. Can they bear a tax of 50 per cent. and be able to produce the 100,000,000 deficient in the receipts?

The loan remains; let us see what it produces. Thanks to arrears, commissions and remittances, which it has been obliged to make—thanks to these prizes, an immoral lure thrown out by imperial coveteousness to popular cupidity, Mexico has received 40,000,000 out of 250,000,000 which it had borrowed, as it is easy to see by the following letter from Mr. Romero to Mr. Seward:

"MEXICO, December 17, 1865.

[Extract from a letter written by a commercial house in the City of Mexico, Dec, 17, 1865.]

"'The three loans put upon the market since the establishment of the empire have burdened the nation with a new debt of nearly $80,000,000. Of this sum only a small part, amounting to about $8,000,000, has been really used for the public service. The rest has disappeared in the amount withheld for interest in advance on the loans, the difference between the nominal value of the loans and the price at which the bonds were sold, commissions to various bankers and others, expenses of operations on the Bourse, payment of the French army, return of sums advanced for the support of the Mexican forces, subvention to the line of steamers from St. Nazaire, payments on account of the civil list of the emperor, presents to various favorites, and remittances to Miramar.

"'In consequence, the finance commission in Paris has at the disposition of Maximilian only a small balance, which will be barely sufficient to cover expenses during the month of January.'

"Although not in round numbers, on account of the danger of intrusting the exact figures to a letter, I propose to give you some idea of the amount of the late loans, their distribution, and the sums that remain to be disposed of, reserving for some perfectly safe opportunity the transmission to you of the exact balances and the total amount of the foreign debt since the creation of the empire.

"The acquisition of these important documents will reveal to the world the infamy that has been perpetrated in seeking to load Mexico with enormous sums that have only served to pay the war expenses of France and to enrich our sovereign and other high personages connected with the present order of affairs.

"Perhaps in this letter I may be able to inclose you a copy of the *revista* which is periodically sent to the United States, and in that you will find further details of the financial situation of the empire; but, as it may not be possible, I give you here some idea of it:

Total product of the loans, 360,000,000 francs. Of this—	
The French army has received	$12,500,000
Bankers' commissions	5,000,000
Invested in the French rentes for the conversion of the first loan	4,000,000
Interest on the English debt	6,000,000
Difference between 100 francs and 63 francs, which was the selling price	26,500,000
Reserved for interest in advance on both loans (discount less than 63 francs), commissions, brokerages, and other expenses	7,500,000
Received in Mexico	8,000,000
	$69,500,000
Balance remaining to the Government	2,500,000
Total	$72,000,000

Equal to 360,000,000 francs.

"From the above sum that remains, there has to be paid on the 15th of February, the stipulated time, the last payment that remains to be made on account of the famous claim of Jecker, which was settled at $5,000,000, and of which $3,000,000 have already been paid. The remaining sum of $500,000 has already been drawn for, to cover advances made by the French to the Mexican army in October and November, and $200,000 on account of $600,000 due to Maximilian for salary up to the end of December.

"The Convention of Miramar, as it was signed on the 10th of April, 1864, has been fully and duly carried out, there having been paid monthly to the expeditionary army $471,000, which is the sum monthly accruing, and which has been paid up to the 30th of November of this year. In this way it is easy to see how it is that only the sum of $8,000,000 has remained to come to Mexico.

"From the estimate of expenses for December, January and February, 1865 and 1866, an idea can be formed of the sum expended by the government of Maximilian. It amounts to $10,000,000. The income from national revenues is estimated at $3,500,000. The balance of the loans is $2,500,000, thus leaving a deficiency of $4,000,000. But if, as I believe, the $2,000,000 to Jecker shall not be paid, and which are included in the above $10,000,000 of expenses, nor the subvention to the railroad, or the $60,000 which are remitted monthly to Yucatan, nor the $15,000 monthly which are remitted to New York for the press and other purposes, as well as various other sums which are not

vitally indispensable, I believe that, without other sources of supply, the existence of the Government may be prolonged until the end of February. From that time forward, neither by the greatest extortions, nor by duplicating the exactions of to-day, can its existence be prolonged for six months more."

How can it pay 54,000,000 in two years—1865 and 1866? The enterprise may as well be called a failure at once, for the empire would not have a year's existence.

As M. Thiers very properly and very cunningly remarks, Mexico uses French money, and France uses the Mexican signature. That is the truth.

It is the same with governments as with private individuals—their credit gives the measure of their strength.

A government which, to procure 40,000,000, consents to sign an obligation for 400,000,000, and which, to arrive at this result, appeals to the worst passions and stirs up the dregs of human cupidity, has no faith in its own future; it borrows without a thought of returning; the law would reach it as a madman or as a swindler, were it a private individual, and honest people should mark it with moral stigma, in order to establish an impenetrable barrier between them and adventurers.

The following exposure of the financial situation of Mexico, taken from *The Herald* of the 21st of March, 1866, is still more eloquent than Monsieur Thiers' speech:

The following tables, compiled from information recently received from official sources, present the financial condition of Mexico as it was in 1862, at the commencement of the French intervention, and as it would be under the indebtedness already incurred by Maximilian, should his attempted throne be maintained by France.

First, they show that the French Government has charged Mexico for the expenses of invasion of her territory and other acts of intervention up to July 1, 1864, the sum of $50,000,000. Of this sum 10,000,000 have been paid out of a loan subsequently made, and the remainder (40,000,000) has been funded as a claim due by Mexico to the French government itself.

Second, that besides the above 40,000,000, loans have been negotiated for Maximilian in France to the amount of more than $150,000,000, which loans France is seeking to foist on the Mexican people as a legitimate debt, although every dollar realized therefrom has been used not for the welfare or benefit of Mexico, but to meet the expenses which have been incurred in this iniquitous attempt to overthrow republican institutions and establish a monarchy on American soil.

Third, that while the claims of France against Mexico, as admitted by the constitutional government before the intervention began, amounted to less than $3,000,000, the claims of France, as now put forward under Maximilian, and recognized by him, amount to over $193,000,000. This is apart from what may still be added under General Forey's recent and very significant reminder on the part of France, that it may be necessary "to make further pecuniary outlays in Mexico."

Fourth, that while the entire foreign debt of Mexico before the French intervention commenced, amounted to but a little over $80,000,000, that debt, if Maximilian is allowed to succeed, will be in-

creased, even if no further addition is made to it, to over $270,000,000.

Fifth, that the annual expenses of Mexico under the republic were less than $12,000,000, while under Maximilian they have already reached the sum of $49,000,000. Of this sum over 10,000,000 per annum is due for interest from Maximilian to France.

The following is a comparative statement of the legitimate foreign debt of Mexico, as recognized by the constitutional government of the republic, with the annual expenditures as established by act of Congress, August 16, 1861, and the debt which the French intervention seeks to impose upon the country, and the annual expenditures under the so-called government of Maximilian:

FOREIGN DEBT AS RECOGNIZED BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN 1862.

To English Subjects.

Funded Debt—		
Debt contracted in London, £10,241,650, interest 3 per cent. a $5 per pound		$51,268,250
English convention debt, interest 6 per cent		4,175,000
Pending Claims—		
Back interest unpaid, and other acknowledged claims		13,231,790
Various reclamations		696,616
Total due English subjects June 30, 1862		$69,311,656

To Spanish Subjects.

Funded Debt—		
Admitted convention debt, interest 3 per cent	$4,205,481	
Additional amount in dispute, interest 3 per cent	2,427,942	
		$6,033,423
Pending Claims—		
Back interest unpaid and other acknowledged claims		1,549,560
Various reclamations		1,278,000
Total due Spanish subjects June 30, 1862		$9,460,980

To French Subjects.

Funded Debt—		
Balance of convention debt		$190,000
Pending Claims—		
To Juan B. Jecker, for capital expended in his scandalous claim, and interest		1,984,000
Other claims		685,917
Total debt due to French subjects		$2,859,917

RECAPITULATION.

Debt due to English subjects	$69,311,656
Debt due to Spanish subjects	9,460,980
Debt due to French subjects	2,859,917
Total foreign debt as recognized in 1862	$81,632,560

ANNUAL INTEREST.

	Debt.	*Per Cent.*	*Interest.*
On debt contracted in London	$51,208,250	5	$1,536,247
On English convention debt	4,175,000	6	250,500
On other English claims, if capitalized	13,928,407	3	517,852
On Spanish convention debt	6,633 423	3	199,002
On other Spanish claims, if capitalized	2,827,563	3	84,829
On French claims, if capitalized	2,859,917	6	171,595
Total debt	$81,632,560		
Total interest to English creditors			$2,304,599
Total interest to Spanish creditors			283,829
Total interest to French creditors			171,595
Total annual interest			$2,760,022

ANNUAL EXPENDITURES OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC, AS ESTABLISHED BY LAW OF CONGRESS AUGUST 16, 1861.

Interest on the foreign debt		$2,760,020
For foreign relations	$210,340	
For home departments	1,798,053	
For finance	1,573,624	
For war	4,745,395	8,327,418
Total annual expenditures of the national government		$11,087,433

The interior debt of Mexico has been entirely extinguished by sales of church property.

DEBT WHICH THE FRENCH INTERVENTION SEEKS TO IMPOSE UPON MEXICO.

Indebtedness acknowledged to France by Maximilian for the expenses of the intervention to July 1, 1864, 270,000,000 francs, or $50,000,000, of which $10,000,000 were paid out of the first loan and the balance funded at 3 per cent.. viz.....	$40,000,000
First loan put out for account of Maximilian. 216,000,000 francs, at 6 per cent. interest,	40,000,000
To pay France the above $10,000,000, or 54,000,000 francs, and 12,000,000 francs more on account of reclamations to French subjects, further bonds (as an additional loan) were put in circulation, to the amount of 110,000,000 francs, at 6 per cent....	20,370,370
Second loan put out for account of Maximilian in Paris, being the Lottery loan, of two series of bonds at 6 per cent. interest, amounting to 500,000,000 francs, negotiated at 340.....	92,592,592
Total debt recognized by Maximilian in favor of France.....	$192,962,960
The debt in favor of France, as recognized by the constitutional government, is.....	2,859,917
Amount that Maximilian desires to augment the debt to France.....	$190,103,040

The debt to English subjects remains the same under Maximilian as before, the back interest only having been capitalized.

The debt to Spanish subjects remains as before, the interest unpaid.

ANNUAL INTEREST UNDER MAXIMILIAN.

	Debt.	*Per Cent.*	*Interest.*
On the debt to the French government for part of the cost of intervention.....	$40,000,000	3	$1,200,000
On the first loan.....	40,000,000	6	2,400,000
On additional amount issued to pay French government and claims.....	20,370,370	6	1,222,222
On second loan put out in Paris, or Lottery loan.....	92,592,592	6	5,555,555
Total annual interest on French claims under Maximilian.....			$10,377,777
Interest on debt due to English subjects, same as under the constitutional government.			2,304,599
On debt due to Spanish subjects, same as under the constitutional government.....			283,828
Total annual interest on the foreign debt under Maximilian.....			$12,966,204

ANNUAL EXPENDITURES OF THE SO-CALLED GOVERNMENT OF MAXIMILIAN.

Interest on his foreign debt (of which interest $10,377,777 is to France).....	$12,966,204
Annual cost of his lottery scheme in Paris.....	1,391,237
Personal expenses and civil list of Maximilian, $10,500 per day (paid daily).....	3,832,500
25,000,000 francs per annum on account of expenses of French contingent, according to treaty of Miramar.....	4,629,629
400,000 francs per voyage subvention to the French line of transport steamers from St. Nazaire.....	888,888
Ministers, legations, consulates, agents, employes, pensions, gifts, traveling expenses, military and civil expenses and charges of his foreign armed force.....	26,220,868
Total annual expenses under Maximilian.....	$49,929,326

COMPARISONS.

Foreign debt as attempted to be recognized by Maximilian.....	$271,735,605
Foreign debt as recognized by the constitutional government.....	81,632,560
Attempted increase by Maximilian.....	$190,103,045
Annual interest required to be paid by Maximilian.....	$12,966,204
Annual interest under the government of the republic.....	2,760,022
Attempted increase by Maximilian.....	$10,206,182
Annual expenditures under Maximilian.....	$49,929,326
Annual expenses as fixed by the national congress under the republic.....	11,087,440
Annual increase under Maximilian.....	$38,841,886
Annual salary of Maximilian, so-called Emperor of Mexico.....	$1,500,000
Annual salary of the President of the Republic.....	30,000

Since the foregoing tables were made out it has become known that, in addition to the $150,000,000 therein set down as the amount of the public loans put out for Maximilian in France, and taken by French subjects, and for which Louis Napoleon is morally responsible, there have been expended from the public revenues of France, up to the end of the year 1865, in this attempt to propagate monarchial institutions on the American continent, $150,000,000 more. Three hundred millions of dollars, therefore, is the amount which Louis Napoleon will have to acknowledge he has lost to France whenever he abandons his Mexican experiment and withdraws Maximilian from Mexico.

The vigorous attack of Monsieur Thiers placed the government in

a state of great embarrasments. What could be said in reply to the eloquence of his figures? The minister, president of the Council of State, contented himself with pleading extenuating circumstances. "The task is difficult, but we must not be discouraged. We have gone to Mexico, and we desire to return, but it would be awkward to hurry on the moment, and give, to a great national enterprise, the character of a giddy act."

Is it not confessing when you seek to hide? What more sad and complete avowal could there be than this?

Further on, the minister expresses astonishment, and plays the part of ingenuousness: "This Mexican question is really something strange. The government endeavors to give it a reasonable, pacific, honorable solution, in conformity with our *interests* (the expression is a fine one!) and it seems that every day fresh difficulties arise."

"Instead of helping us, you talk only of ruin and disaster. But to exaggerate the evil, is to render it more painful and formidable still. Let us have confidence; that confidence will be the best element of a solution in conformity with our interests as well as those of Mexico, and the honor of France."

What a difference between this language and the pompous eloquence of the preceding year. The brilliant and deceitful mirage, the golden horizon, had disappeared; the South had been subjugated by the North, Juarez, arms in hand, with heroic obstinacy, persisted in upholding the majesty of right, liberty and law; the situation was a bad one. Monsieur Rouher admits it, he wishes to emerge from it, and, to arrive at that aim, finds no words other than a vain appeal to fatality and to national confidence. In the confusion of his ideas, he becomes embarrassed, his words are incoherent, he contradicts himself, and in the same paragraph, without preceiving it, he recognises that the Mexican expedition was a giddy act, and calls it a *national*, meaning, an *imperial* enterprise.

Garnier Pages, with great good sense, quotes the example of Belgium: "In Belgium, on the occasion of a struggle, over which the Belgians sigh and groan, the minister of war made haste to declare that there was no Belgian batallion in Mexico, but *volunteers making use of their liberty*. I recommend this precedent to the Fenians and American volunteers who desire to avenge republican institutions in Mexico. Garnier Pages continues: "And should the French government, which is solemnly engaged, as regards the House and country, think itself bound as to the Emperor Maximilian? Should it believe itself obliged to create another Algiers at 6,000 leagues from France? Who has bound it to an Austrian prince? The duty of the government is to release and recall its troops."

This, in fact, is what the government wished, as Monsieur Rouher confesses, but the difficulty was to succeed in obtaining this result, without diminishing its consideration in the eyes of France and covering itself with ridicule before the world.

A recognition of the Mexican empire by the American government would have made all clear. But what interest had we in compromising a principle to withdraw Louis Napoleon from his difficulty?

CHAPTER X.

THE REALITY.

1866.

On the 22d of January, 1866, Louis Napoleon opened the Legislative session by a speech containing the following passage relative to Mexico and America:

"In Mexico, the government founded by the will of the people *is being consolidated*; the dissenters, conquerred and dispersed, have no longer any chief; the national troops have shown their valor, and the country has found guarantees of *order and security*, which have developed its recourses and brought its commerce, with France alone, up to from 21 to 77 millions. Our expedition is drawing to a close, as, I, last year expressed the hope would be the case. I have come to an understanding with Emperor Maximilian to determine the period for recalling our troops, in order that their return may be effected without compromising those French interests which we went to that foreign clime to defend.

"North America, having emerged victoriously from a formidable struggle, has re-established the old Union, and solemnly proclaimed the abolition of slavery. *France which never forgets any noble page in her history, forms the sincerest wishes for the prosperity of the great American Republic*, and for the maintaining of our friendly relations, now soon to become secular. The emotion produced in the United States by the presence of our army upon the Mexican soil, will be appeased *by the frankness* of our declarations. The American nation will understand that our expedition, of *which we invited it to form a part*, was not opposed to its interests. Two nations equally jealous of their independence should avoid any measures which would involve their honor and dignity."

I have shown in chapter second, of part first, what should be thought of the *guarantees of order and security* offered by the Imperial government, they may appear sufficient to the friends and agents of Louis Napoleon, they will certainly never satisfy the mass of sensible men.

As regards the promise to put a speedy end to the expedition, it will probably be renewed in '67, as it was in '65 and '66. For how many years will this continue? This is what can only be judged of by referring to the occupation of Rome. In any case, I will show that, at this moment, and in spite of the official declarations of Louis Napoleon, Jules Favre felt no faith.

The letter of the 23d of July, to General Forey, should edify us as to the sincerity of the Napoleonic good wishes for the great American Republic and the *frankness* of the declarations of the French government. If the reader suffers himself to be caught thereby, after the various testimonies which I have placed before his eyes, the old proverb could be justly applied to him: "None so deaf as he who won't hear." On the 10th of February, the discussion of paragraph 7, of

the address relative to Mexico, came into the order of the day, at the Senate.

This paragraph is as follows:

"Your Majesty has announced that this memorable Mexican expedition is drawing to a close, and that you have come to an understanding with Emperor Maximilian to determine the period for recalling the troops. That is to say, to satisfy France that the protection of her commercial interests will be secured upon that vast and rich market restored, by our intervention, to security.

"As for the United States, if, through a misunderstanding, the presence of the French flag upon the American continent appears to them less well-timed than at another period of their very illustrious history, the firm communications of our government have shown that it is not haughty and threatening words which will determine our return. France is accustomed to march only when it suits her. [Very well said!] But she loves to remember her old friendship for the United States. What you ask of them is neutrality and the right of nations. Through this, they will quickly see that a war undertaken in the-so-often declared aim of protecting our natives against a government without loyality, does not, because it is successful, become a war of conquest, domineering and propaganda." [Fresh approbation.]

These words were certainly anythind but flattering to us, and decidedly bear the stamp of defiance. Nevertheless, they did not yet satisfy Marshal Forey, who takes up the word against their adoption. What this unintelligent warrior wishes, is a continuation of the struggle of the occupation, and the sending out of fresh troops. The new Marshal was acquainted with his master's secret thoughts, and wished to pay, in flattery, for that *baton de marechal* which he has not been able to pay for in victory. What does it matter, that the minister disavows him before the Senate? Louis Napoleon approves of him in a second letter, worthy pendant to that of 1862:

"Let it not be thought that the government which we have overthrown in Mexico, was maintained by the sympathies of the population; no, it maintained itself by the fear which it inspired; this is why it has been sufficient, in order to beat it down, that our flag should be there, which, according to the Emperor's beautiful expression, everywhere represents the cause of nations and of civilization.

"Once delivered from the government of Juarez, the Mexican people, free in the expression of its vote, has given itself to Emperor Maximilian."

Thus according to Marshal Forey as well as according to Monsieur de L'huys, Maximilian and Napoleon, the Mexican empire, like that of France, was founded by the people's desire. If such is the case, show us the *plebiscitum* which founded the empire, let us know its date and text, in order that we may be able to see the number of the votes. You talk of the assembly of important men without any legal mandate. What is that? Merely isolate, men, *pronunciamentos*, without any legal organization. But a regular *plebiscitum* is what we defy you to show? You are a government in fact, a successful attempt, *pro-tempore*, like that of the 2d of December—nothing more. And if these populations, oppressed by Juarez, were restored to liberty by you, why do you not withdraw your bayonets, in

order to suffer them to enjoy your benefactions in peace while blessing their authors ?

To this Marshal Forey replies:

"According to my views, there would be greater peril in recalling our troops immediately. The Emperor has declared that we went to Mexico as a safeguard to French interests, and to defend our natives.

"Well, then! if our Mexican army was recalled, all the French would be obliged to return with it, or they would be the victims of far worse violence than we have already witnessed.

"In fine, if we have the interests of our natives to defend, there are still others which we should protect.

"Is it not our duty to protect those populations which received us with open arms, who cried out: 'Long live Maximilian.'" Is not our honor involved in this? I know that it may be said: They shouted 'Long live Maximilian!' let them sustain him, then.

"But let it be remembered, that they have, as yet, no confidence in their own strength, that they have been demoralized by the authorities which oppress them and take advantage of them. They must be allowed time to take courage and gain strength; our support must be continued; we must aid them to sustain the power they have placed over themselves.

"France does not wish to incur the reproach of not having comprehended the great idea of the Emperor; she will not wish to leave these unfortunate populations to the fury of their former oppressors.

"At the first news of our retreat, the abettors of discord will reawaken, the banditti, who are now put to flight, will rally around the flag of Juarez, and the Mexicans themselves will have to suffer from those barbarous hordes who have shown what they are in atrocity."

In Marshal Forey's eyes, the defenders of Puebla only fought through fear; had they been suffered to be free they would all have come to the liberating army.

"At Puebla they would have deserted in a mass, had they not been unceasingly watched by their chiefs, who obliged them to fight by shutting them up in churches and convents without leaving them any issue; the same was the case at Oajaca.

"Let not the army of Juarez be called a national army."

General Lorencez might give precious information in this regard.

During all time, the military of France have been considered the first in their profession, and the last in every thing else. The Marshal certainly thought he would form an exception to this rule, and produce an argument without reply, in the following paragraph:

"It is not my place to treat the question of the relations between France and the United States. But, it is permitted me to say that I have too much esteem for the great American Republic, to believe that it would prefer to see in Mexico a republic formed of despoilers and of banditti, in place of a monarchy formed of *honest men*, and founded upon the principles of civilization. [Approbation from some benches.]"

The proposition might, *a la rigueur* be discussed, after having an understanding however, as to the value of words. What are honest men? In 1848, I remember the honest and moderate men of the *Rue de Poitiers*. Bonaparte and Republicans were the despoilers and

robbers. After the *coup d' etat*, the Bonapartists became the honest men, *par excellence*. The honest men of the *Rue de Poitiers* were suspected. As for the Republicans, they were naturally called despoilers and robbers. Here the *roles* change. The legal, universal principle of the governments upon this continent is the republican principle. Then we must call the republicans honest men, and the royalists despoilers and banditti. Marshal Forey, consequently, will agree that the signification of the words "honest men" varies according to continents and times, and that in his speech he confounds America and Europe; a mere geographical error! And, as in all things a conclusion is necessary, the illustrious Marshal concludes thus:

"New troops must perhaps be sent to Mexico. [Murmurs.] Those now there must, at all events, be kept there. Some fresh sacrifices in money must be made. [Murmurs.]

"It was said once, that France was rich enough to pay for her glory; will it not then be a glorious thing for us not to leave unfinished that task which we have undertaken upon distant shores?

"Money, certainly, has its importance. [A noise.] But, for the sake of a sum of money, must the success of this enterprise, based upon a great idea of the Emperor, be compromised? No, gentlemen, this ought not to be? And this is why France applauded the sovereign's language, this is why it will associate itself with the sentiments which your plan of address so proudly sets forth. [A few voices: Very well said!]"

The Minister of State—"The Senate understands that it is not my intention to reply to the honorable Marshal's discourse. He has besides taken care to show, that he only spoke under the impression of personal opinion.

"As for the opinion of the government it has not been modified by the words you have just heard. It remains, such as it was, set forth in the speech from the throne and in the paragraph of the address that you are called to vote." [General mark of approbation.]

Paragraph 7 is put to vote and adopted.

The Senator-Secretary reads paragraph 8, with reference to the United States.

It is put to vote and adopted.

The Emperor made haste to write a private letter of approbation to the Marshall, in order to destroy, with regard to the army, the disastrous impression, made by his official disavowal. He even went further, and replied to the vote of address by these words:

"SENATORS,

"The address of the Senate is an eloquent commentary upon my speech; it develops what I have only indicated; it explains all that I wished to cause to be comprehended."

Then, there again, besides the ostensible text, there was as in the Convention of the 31st of October, a secret thought, a thought which had only been indicated, which the Senate understood, and upon which its speech was an "eloquent commentary." Now, this thought, to judge from Forey's speech and the applause of the Senate, is contained in this phrase: "The firm communications of your government have shown that it is not lofty and threatening words which will determine our return. France is in the habit of marching only *at her own hour*." [Lively applause.]

And that hour appears not to have arrived, a few weeks ago; for reinforcements were sent to Mexico, instead of troops being recalled.

It is true that if the Senate of France—of which the members, thanks to their age, or their functions, have a right to the indulgence of man—seems to have lost its memory and perception, the Legislative House, which is younger, has clearer judgment, apparently, as to the present and the future. Its plan of address is conceived as follows:

"Our expedition to Mexico is drawing to a close. The country has received this assurance with satisfaction. Led into Mexico by the imperative duty of protecting our natives against odious violence, and pursuing the redress of only two legitmate griefs, our soldiers and sailors have worthily fulfilled the task that your Majesty confided to their devotion. This expedition has once more shown, in a foreign country, the power and disinterestedness of France. [Very well said!] The people of the United States, who have long known the loyalty of our policy, and the sympathy which it feels as of old, has no cause to take exception at the presence of our troops upon the Mexican soil. To wish to make their recall subordinate, to other convenience than ours, would be doing injury to our intersts and to our honor. [Applause.] You have the guardianship of them, sire, and the Legislative Corps knows that you will watch over them with a solicitude worthy of France and of your name." [Very well said!]

The same mania for rhodomontade, though better disguised, is evident here, as well as in the Senate's address.

Poor men! if we carried on a tariff war upon the people of France, the true, the only people, those who produce, and whom you grind down, would force you to quicken your pace, and hasten that of Louis Napoleon, whatever may be his usual habits and yours. Besides, the withdrawing of the troops, amassed by Louis Napoleon and his government, only rests upon his word. There is not a being, however innocent, who, with the history of the last eighteen years in hand, can fail to know how much that is worth. Shall we be more confiding than Jules Favre? His speech, during the session of the 13th of June, to the Legislative Corps, is as follows:

"The government has, nevertheless, been under the painful necessity of accepting this document and of declaring, in presence of the injunctions it contains, that we ought to quit Mexico. And, at the last moment, there have been sudden revelations, unexpectedly made as to this Mexican question, which light up the *ensemble* of the situation, and cause it to assume a very different aspect from that given it heretofore. In effect, since the expedition began, it has been unceasingly predicted, not only that our arms would succeed, but that the enterprise would be successful in a political point of view. If the adhesion of the House has been obtained, it has been because it has never been told the truth. [Interuption.] I do not wish to undertake, with regard to this matter, an examination which I have declared ill timed.

"It will come in on another occasion. I content myself to-day with interrogating facts, such as they are shown by the official declarations, which we wave been acquainted with for some time past, and

wish to go back to last year. At this period, it was said in answer to our reproaches, that the policy which we attacked was superior to our own views. The fairest gem of the crown of the Empire was to be this expedition. The star of France was to radiate over the American continent. History was one day to say:

"It was a man of genius who, in spite of resistance, obstacles and hesitations, had the courage to open a new source of prosperity to the nation of which he was the chief. He was the apostle of a bold, but wise and farsighted policy, which did not limit its views to the present generation; he understood his own time and the future, and saw that European equilibrium now embraces the entire world, and that there is no interest which, even to the limits of the world, should fail to be the object of solicitude of France."

"Such was the historical passage written by the bold and sincere hand of the Minister of State. At the beginning of our labours the Emperor himself declared that the new throne was being consolidated in Mexico, that the country was becoming pacified, and the expose of the situation of the empire, by confirming these declarations, also caused it to appear that Maximilian was preparing an era of peace and prosperity for his own country."

It is true that this concert of praise was disturbed by the authorized word of the warrior, who had led our victorious legions, in that country: "Everything has to be done afresh, in Mexico," said he, in the discussion of the address on the 11th of March, 1865, "moral sense is perverted there, there is no longer any administeration, justice, army or national spirit. There is nothing. But this is not the fault of the nation. It still has Castilian feelings, and there is no cause whatever for despairing as to this country."

Such were the "extenuating circumstances" granted to that country, where there was nothing left!

"The question presented itself thus in 1865. At this period, however, there was a shade upon the picture—the financial question. If Mexico had accepted Maximilian upon the throne with enthusiasm, that enthusiasm was very costly, for, in 1864, 150,000,000 were swallowed up, and 250,000,000 more were demanded, under scandalous and onerous circumstances, as will be remembered.

"At this moment, one of our colleagues, whose situation was exceptional, arose. He had received from government a mission which he had loyally accomplished. He knew Mexico better than we, and his word fell upon the majority like a sort of dew which had descended to calm all things after a stifling heat.' [Laughter.]

"Distrust then seemed unjust and culpable."

"This took place in April, 1865. During this year, the *Monitеur*, every fortnight, published, not official documents, which we have unceasingly asked for, without obtaining them, but a periodical *resume* of the situation: which *resume* constantly repeated 'All is peaceable,' and stated that wherever our troops were not placed, there were dissenters to be pursued.

"All these bulletins were, for a moment, effaced by a fresh statement: Juarez has quitted Mexico! he has yielded to the national will! The Emperor Maximilian has no competitor! How does he sanctify this definitive possession of his authority? He announces, by

a decree, that whoever resists his government shall be placed beyond the law, treated as a robber and dealt with by arms?

"These statements, pompously made by the official paper, were false, except, unfortunately, the decree of Maximilian.

"The country had not ceased to be occupied by the dissenters, for, on the 16th of November, Marshal Bazaine wrote to the general-in-chief of the Juarist center, to ask him to exchange prisoners.

"The struggle still lasted, then; but the loan had been contracted, the money had left the *epargne des familles* to be engulfed in the Mexican disaster.

"The situation was a singular one! In November, 1865, 265,000,000 had been subscribed, thanks to the attraction of the lottery, which was held up to dazzle the eyes of poor families, and our natives had not yet been indemnified for the losses which had been the primary cause of the expedition. The figure of their reclamations, verified and accepted by Mexico, amounted to 750,000,000 francs, and in November, 1865, nothing was settled, except, perhaps, the scandalous affairs of the Jecker bonds, which was the principal preoccupation of those engaged in the traffic." [A noise.]

M. Rouher, minister of State—"You should not make use of your talent to propagate such a calumny." [Very well said.]

Monsieur Jules Favre—'In the months of September and November, 1865, the indemnities of our natives were at last fixed at a sum of 40,000,000; but did they receive these 40,000,000? They are not yet in their hands; they are millions in paper in an empty cash-box."

"In a dispatch of the 28th of December, 1865, our *charge d' affaires* in Mexico spoke of resistance opposed to Emperor Maximilian in the payment of these debts. 'But I have been so pressing,' he adds, 'that I gained the cause the next day. I declared that it was to put the Emperor Napoleon III and his government in a situation to declare to the French Houses that this affair is settled.'

"Your control, gentlemen, is something, then, at least in the eyes of our *charge d' affaires* in Mexico.

"Thus 40,000,000 have been allotted to our natives. In a dispatch of the 15th of January, 1866, the minister of foreign affairs in France expresses the ill-humor which such a reduction in the verified reclamations of our natives causes him to feel. He, nevertheless, engages Mr. Dano not to show himself too exacting toward a creditor who is in an alarming state. He adds that any new appeal to the credit would be fruitless, that we cannot take to our exclusive account the expenses of the Mexican government, provide by our army for its defense, and by our finances for its administrative services. Thus, in place of the concurrence which we had a right to expect from Emperor Maximilian, 400,000,000 of French money have been swallowed up by this ruinous sovereignty, which we have been obliged to sustain by our blood, and which still asks us to pay for its army and internal administration, under penalty of 'vanishing into thin air!'

"A dispatch of the 15th of January, 1866, says that the Convention of Miramar has been torn to pieces. By whom? By Emperor Maximilian himself. Thus this man, whose imperial probity (as well as his political solidity) were vaunted, breaks his word! 'It would be superfluous,' says the same dispatch, 'to seek to-day for the causes of a sit-

uation that my duty alone obliges me to speak of.' And we also said the same things, and when we said them you interrupted us with your murmurs. Now you listen to them because it is the minister who says them, for the minister has come to us. [Interruption.]

"Public opinion has declared itself, and it is fortunate that it is enlightened, for you would still take millions from us to throw them away in foreign parts!" [Prolonged interruption.]

Numerous voices—"Order, order! Such language cannot be tolerated!"

Count Caffarelli—"The Legislative Corps is not to be thus insulted."

President Walewski—"Monsieur Jules Favre, you give way to accusations that are to be regretted, and you choose a bad moment for making them, as you attest the frankness of the government yourself by the quotations which you make from its own documents." [Lively applause.]

Monsieur Glais-Bizoin—"That frankness is enforced now." [Noise.]

Monsieur Jules Favre—"These things are not new; this embarrassment has long been known, and the situation has been understood to be bad for a long time. It dates from the period of the loans, through which it was hoped to provide for it; and it was in the interest of these loans that the seductive pictures to which I have alluded were placed before the country. Except there was blindness, it was impossible not to see that we would have to struggle in Mexico against inextricable difficulties. I know not what secret designs must have existed to cause a veil to be thrown over the truth. It was, in reality, a money affair, into which our country was to be dragged, and it is the gold of France that was to be obtained. [Fresh interruption.] The Honorable M. Corta has said: 'What is necessary for the regeneration of Mexico? A regular government and time.'

"And he represented Maximilian appearing to the Indians of Mexico like the promised man from the East, the man with golden hair and azure eyes, who was to be welcomed like a liberator. [Laughter around the orator.] He said that the budget of Mexico, such as it was offered to the Council of State, only amounted to 150,000,000, including the service of the debt. And the minister of state, adding the authority of his own word to the testimony of our colleague, said: 'Did not the speech of M. Corta determine the House?' And you, gentlemen, who do not know Mexico, exclaimed, 'Yes, yes!' 'Do not be anxious,' continued the minister of state.' Scarcely a year has passed—we now see a complete change of scene. Instead of a prince disposing of a flourishing budget, we only see a prince obliged to ask for help. I will say no more."

A voice—"What more have you to say."

Monsieur Jules Favre—"Let the dispatch of the 15th of January from the minister of foreign affairs be compared with the words by which it was sought to facilitate the loans to Mexico. You told us then that we ran no risk, and, by your own avowal, we find you are now in presence of an empty treasury, of an unpaid army, of an administration which is giving way under the insolvency of its monarch, who has been lauded by you. [Fresh interruption.]

"'With energy and courage, with a firm and well-sustained will,' said the minister of foreign affairs, 'the Mexican empire can triumph

over the difficulties which it encounters upon its way; but success is only to be had at that price.'

"In presence of a situation such as is unveiled to us, is such a remedy sufficient?

"The government now desires the return of our troops; we also desire it, and more than the government does; but we do not think the mode of withdrawal which it has adopted is good, and we have been so greatly deceived that we are still distrustful. [Noise.]

"'The evacuation,' says the minister of foreign affairs, in a dispatch to Mr. Seward, dated 6th of April, 1866, 'is to be effected in three detachments: the first in November, 1866, the second in March, 1867, and the third in November of the same year.'

"The resolution to depart is excellent, without doubt—it can only be approved; but what may it not be permitted to doubt when the recent publications of the *Moniteur* are considered?

"Let it be as it may. when the situation shall be completely free, a definitive debate should take place in this circle, where our honorable contradictors will hear something very different."

Monsieur Granier de Cassagnac—"We will hear and reply."

Monsieur Jules Favre—"For the present I merely borrow one more passage from the bulletins capriciously reproduced by the *Moniteur* in that of the 9th of June, 1866. According to this bulletin—the last we have—the Mexican General Mendez is carrying on his operations upon the Michoacan, and everything causes hopes to be entertained that he will succeed in restoring tranquility in that province. Marshal Bazaine is bringing General Aymard's and Colonel Clinchant's columns toward the north. General Douay is operating upon another point. Our troops, then, are not withdrawing, they are falling back. [Exclamations.] Only those unacquainted with Mexico could say that to send troops toward the north, is to direct them upon Mexico and Vera Cruz. What, then, is the interest at stake, and why these new expeditions? Is it in favor of a prince discredited by you, and whom you declare that you no longer wish to sustain? That is the question which I address to the minister of state."

CHAPTER XI.

DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE.*

The dipolmatic correspondence exchanged between Monsieur Drouyn de L'huys and Mr. Seward from the 6th of December, 1865, to the month of February, 1866, has not, in my eyes, that importance attached to it generally. If, on the side of France, Louis Napoleon and his minister can, without consulting the country, speak and act in its name, even against its wishes and interests, the same is not the case in America; and even were Mr. Johnson and Mr. Seward disposed to hold the dignity, interests and will of the American nation

* Several letters from Mr. Seward, having been received from France, in French, may, having been translated, differ as to the drawing up, but not to the sense.

cheaply, there is a Congress and there are elections, to call them back to the obedience and fidelity which every servant owes to his employer. More than this, if Mr. Seward found in the recourses of his imagination a fertile resource—the means of momentarily directing the attention of the public from their true interests, in three years the people would send other men, to cause another policy to prevail, and while Mr. Seward would wash his hands of the matter. The French government would find itself to be contending with the same difficulties in an aggravated form.

It is with the national feeling, therefore, that Louis Napoleon is obliged to treat; and Mr. Seward is only the letter-box of the American nation.

On the 6th of December, 1865, Mr. Seward communicates to Monsieur Montholon a dispatch, sent to our minister to Paris, in reply to that of the 20th of November, from the minister of France. The following passage occurs in it:

"The views of the Emperor may, I think, be summed up as follows:

"France is fully disposed to evacuate Mexico as soon as possible, but cannot do so with propriety without having received the assurance of sentiments of tolerance, if not of friendship, on the part of the United States towards the empire of Mexico. While thanking His Majesty for his kind feelings, the President regrets to say that he considers the Emperor's demand as entirely impracticable."

Further on:

"The true reason for the demonstration of the United States is, that by invading Mexico, the French army attacks a republican government, profoundly sympathetic to the United States, and chosen by the nation, and replaces it by a monarchy, which, so long as it exists, will be regarded as a threat to our own republican institutions."

After having declared that the United States do not wish to make any republican propaganda in Europe, and that, in consequence, they have a right to demand that Europe shall not come to make any monarchial propaganda in America, Mr. Seward concludes thus:

"After having thus frankly exposed our situation, I leave the question to the judgment of France, and am convinced that great nation will find it to be compatible with its honor and interests to withdraw its troops from Mexico, with a suitable delay, and to leave the Mexicans to the free enjoyment of the republican government which they had chosen themselves, and to which, in our opinion, they had given decisive and touching proofs of attachment."

The dispatch of the 16th of December, from the same to the same, constitutionally establishes the ground of the debate.

"The executive department of this government is not the only one that is interested in the question of knowing whether the present state of affairs is to continue in Mexico. This interest is *national* also, and at all events the *Congress* now sitting is authorized by the Constitution to direct, *by a law*, the action of the United States on this important question."

Thus it is for Congress to determine, by a law, that policy which the United States will follow in this question. Mr. Seward, nevertheless, continues to expose the views of the American people with firmness and dignity.

"The President's design was to inform France respectfully, first, that the United States warmly desire to continue to cultivate relations of sincere friendship with France; secondly, that this policy would be placed in imminent danger if France looked upon it as incompatible with her interests and honor to renounce the continuation of an armed intervention in Mexico, an intervention intended to overthrow the republican government existing there, and to establish upon its ruins

that foreign monarchy which an attempt has been made to inaugurate at the capital of the country.

"In reply to this exposition of our views, Monsieur Drouyn de Lhuys has made the suggestion to you that the government of the United States might perhaps favor the desire expressed by the Emperor to withdraw from Mexico, by giving him some formal assurance that, in case he recalls his troops, the Washington Cabinet would recognize Maximilian in Mexico, as being, *de facto*, a political power.

"My desire, in drawing up dispatch Number 300, was to express, in the name of the United States, the opinion that this idea of recognition thus suggested by the Emperor could not be accepted, and to expose, as an explanation, the motives upon which this decision is founded. I have weighed, with care, the arguments against this decision which have been presented to you by Monsieur Drouyn de Lhuys in the interview which has been spoken of, and I find no sufficient reasons for modifying the views expressed by the United States.

"The only thing now remaining to be done, is to inform Monsieur Drouyn de Lhuys, of my profound regret that, in a conversation with you, he should have left the subject in a condition which does not, in the least, allow us to hope for the conclusion of a satisfactory agreement upon any of the foundations which have been presented up to the present time. I am, etc.,

JOHN BIGELOW, Esquire. W. H. SEWARD."

While Mr. Seward's correspondence reveals, *in what I have quoted*, that moderation, firmness and dignity which are suited to a nation free, strong, and capable of putting a million-and-a-half of men afoot when it wishes, that of Monsieur de Lhuys, as we shall see, is arrogant and hypocritical, and hides impotence under verbiage, having recourse to falsehood to avoid apology.

THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE MINISTER OF FRANCE, IN WASHINGTON.

PARIS, December 26, 1865.

MY LORD MARQUIS—I have read with interest the message that His Excellency, President Johnson, has addressed to the United States Congress, and of which you have sent me a copy. My attention has been more especially directed to those parts of that document which might relate to the questions interesting, at once, to the cabinet of Washington and our own. Mr. Johnson, in a passage *which seems to allude to our expedition to Mexico*, gives himself up to considerations (which it is not befitting for me to discuss here,) upon the vicissitudes of monarchial and republican institutions in the two hemispheres. I would simply observe to you that the pursuit of the redress of our griefs against Mexico has no connection, in that country, with the question of its form of government, nor could it depend upon a geographical question."

Whoever is not acquainted with the *finesses* of the French language would pass by the following phrase without remark: "*Mr. Johnson*, in a passage which *seems* to allude to our expedition to Mexico, *gives himself* up to considerations *which it is not befitting that I should discuss here*," &c. But, to a Frenchman, or in the eyes of any man familiar with the language, or the habits of French society, the President of the United States is treated as the Marquis formerly treated the *croquants par dessous la jambe*. Neither Mr. Bigelow, nor Mr. Seward is capable of understanding the scornful irony of this language.

Mr. Drouyn de Lhuys continues:

"If, at the moment when we exact for our natives just reparation, the power which refused it to us had been a monarchy, that circumstance would certainly not have prevented us from claiming our right, and whatever part of the world that nation had inhabited, which had injured French interests, the protection of the Emperor, due to all his subjects, would have been legitimately extended; in like manner, I cannot think that the first magistrate of the United States can have had the intention to awaken doubt as to ideas so evident."

All that precedes was written for France; what follows is addressed

to the United States. After the rhotomontade comes the shrinking back.

"The same passage of the Presidential manifesto speaks of "provocation," which would oblige the American nation to defend republiconism against forgign intervention. It speaks of 'designs hostile to the United States,' and finally of "digression on the part of European powers." We cannot feel that these expressions touch us, for they in nowise apply to the policy we have followed. It would be superfluous to remind you that *the feelings of constant friendship shown by the Emperor toward the United States* exclude every hypothesis of a provocation or aggression on our part. As for threatening the form of government which that country has bestowed upon itself, and which France itself contributed in founding, at the cost of its blood, nothing can be more foreign than such an enterprise to tradition and the principles of the imperial government."

The minister of France is jesting, of course, when he speaks of its being superfluous *to recall the sentiments of constant friendship shown by the Emperor toward the United States*, &c., &c. Nothing indeed could be more *superfluous*, after the letter of the 23d July to General Forey, turning the Southern revolt to account, in order to establish a Mexican monarchy for the purpose of "holding the American republic in check."

Nothing could be more *superfluous* after the recognition of the South as belligerent.

Nothing could be more *superfluous*, after the reception given to the Southern pirates in the French ports, and the manifest protection granted to Mr. Armand's iron-clad vessels.

Nothing could be more *superfluous*, after the reiterated attempts of Louis Napoleon to draw England into a coalition with France in favor of the South.

Yes, the French people, in its healthy portion, have remained faithful to the traditions of friendship with our fathers, but Louis Napoleon's whole desire is to succeed in dissevering and ruining—by disunion—the present and future strength of our great American Republic, the sole hope of nations and of liberty in this world.

England furnished the money and privateers, it is true, but she refused to engage her political action, and paralyzed the bad intentions of the French government. My own conviction is that the good she did us exceeds the evils which she caused us. I do not thank her for this, but between Palmerston and Louis Napoleon all my hatred, as an American, is toward the latter.

In his reply to Mr. Seward's letter, dated 9th January, 1866, Monsieur Drouyn de Lhuys continues the same mode of argumentation, the same series of affirmations and denials, in complete opposition to truth, as is shown by anterior documents, which I have reproduced in the course of this pamphlet. He again repeats that the blood of France flowed to establish the American Republic, but he takes care not to add that it is not his fault if it has not flowed anew to destroy it.

Napoleon III is, like Napoleon I, the heir to the glorious souvenirs of France. There is not one which he wishes to repudiate, except that of liberty, which has become useless, and is admitted to be dangerous. As a final proof of the ardent love of his master for the American Republic, Rouher exclaims:

"Have we not maintained neutrality in the great crisis through which the United States has passed?"

Without England, it is not at all probable that you would have maintained it. Are there not besides certain principles of public mo-

rality, which interdict governments from causing their people to fight at the will of their caprice, affection or interest, under penalty of being placed under the ban of nations, as private morality interdicts the individual from transforming himself into a cut-throat, under penalty of being placed under the ban of society? Is it a title to gratitude not to be a criminal?

Further on, the overthrow of the Republic is attributed to the partisans of the monarchy, who are numerous in Mexico.

"We did not think it right to discourage this last effort of a powerful party, the origin of which was anterior to our expedition; but, faithful to the maxims of public right which are ours in common with the United States, we declared that this question depended exclusively upon the votes of the Mexican people."

What can be said then of General Prim's letter to Admiral Jurien de la Graviere, and that of Louis Napoleon?

"The Mexican people have decided, Emperor Maximilian was called by the wish of the country. His government appeared to be of a nature to bring back peace into the interior and good faith into international relations. We granted it our support."

Where is the *plebiscitum?* If the Mexican nation really decided thus, show us the regular *plebiscitum.* Without a *plebiscitum* there is no freely expressed national will. There are coteries, conspiracies, *pronunciamentos*, crimes—nothing more.

After having affirmed, without proving, the accordance of the national will with the restoration of monarchy, the French minister risks a cunning invitation to recognize the government of Maximilian as the price of the withdrawal of the French troops.

"As we neither seek an exclusive interest, nor the realization of any ambitious thoughts, our most sincere wish is to hasten, as far as possible, that moment when we may, with security to our natives, and dignity as regards ourselves, recall what remains in Mexico of the *corps d' armee* which we sent there. As I told you in the dispatch to which the communication of Mr. Seward replies, *it depends upon the Federal government to facilitate, in that regard, the accomplishment of the desire which it expresses to us.* As the doctrine of the United States reposes, as well as ours, upon the principle of the national will, there is nothing incompatible with the existence of monarchial institutions; and President Johnson, in his message, like Mr. Seward in his dispatch, repulses all idea of *propaganda*, even upon the American continent, *in favor of republican institutions.* The Cabinet of Washington maintains friendly relations with the court of Brazil, and did not refuse to enter into relations with the Mexican empire in 1822. No fundamental maxim, no precedent in the diplomatic history of the Union, therefore, creates any necessary antagonism between the United States and the *regime*, which, in Mexico, has taken the place of a power that had continually and systematically violated its most positive obligations towards other nations."

Because—very wrongfully, in my opinion—we do not wish to make republican propaganda, it does not follow that we are to tolerate monarchial propaganda. As for Brazil, it is further from us than even Europe, while Mexico is upon our frontiers; and if, in 1822, it suited us to have relations with a Mexican monarch, in 1866 it no longer suits us to do so. Between the two periods, and the two situations, there lies the same difference that exists between an enforced situation and an independent one, between that of 1862 and 1866, between the beginning of the Mexican expedition and its conclusion.

"As for the support the Mexican government receives from our army, and that given also by the Austrian and Belgian volunteers, it does no injury, either to the independence of its resolutions or the perfect freedom of its acts. *Where is the State that does not need allies, either to constitute or defend itself?* Have not great powers, such as France and England, for example, almost constantly kept foreign

troops in their armies? When the United States fought for their emancipation, did the aid given by France to their efforts cause that great popular movement to be other than truly national? And, will it be said that the struggle against the South was not also a national war, because thousands of Irish and Germans fought under the Union flag?"

Monsieur Druyn de Lhuys is deficient in logic. There is a notable difference between the importance of the foreign troops maintained by France and Mexico in their reciprocal armies. In France, out of an army of 500,000 men, the Foreign Legion numbers 4,000 men, 5,000, it may be said, being one hundredth. In Mexico the army numbers more than 30,000 foreigners out of 50,000 men, and at the moment when the monarchy was proclaimed numbered only foreigners. It is permissable to suppose that so great a mass of foreign elements in the Mexican army influences the destinies and decisions of the Mexican nation.

When France lent its support to the establishment of American independence, the movement had began long before, and the French troops left the American soil before it was consolidated. Neither before nor after, directly or indirectly, did the French troops of Rochambaut ever take the smallest part in the political events of the country. When a man is minister of the foreign affairs of France, he should be acquainted with history, and if he knows, he should respect it. If Monsieur Druyn de Lhuys had but taken this truth into consideration, he would not have committed the error of calling *foreigners* those Irish, German and French, who fought under the flag of the Union against the South; they were naturalized, for the most part, and consequently were as American as Washington or Jefferson.

After having promised the evacuation as a recompense of the recognition, the French minister causes the perspective of vast commercial issues to sparkle before our eyes. Does he mean to say that it is the magic virtue of the word monarchy which will suffice to secure commercial security, or the strength of the bayonets that it employs? As for one, I believe in neither; I believe only in liberty. But Marshall Forey has told us that if the French bayonets were withdrawn all would anew be plunged into anarchy; how then can he offer us that anarchy as an inducement to recognize the throne of Maximilian. A man should be logical and rational, or at least should try to appear so.

"*We find them now in the establishment of a regular power, which shows itself disposed to keep its engagements, loyally.* In this regard, we hope, that the lawful aim of our expedition will soon be attained, and we endeavor to make, with Emperor Maximilian, those arrangements which, by satisfying our interests and our dignity, allow us to consider the role of our army upon the Mexican soil as at an end. The Emperor has given me orders to write in this sense to his minister in Mexico.

"We shall, such being the case, return to the principle of non-intervention, and, from the moment we accept it as a rule of conduct, our interest, no less than our honor, commands us to claim the equal application of it from all. Confiding in the spirit of equity which animates the cabinet of Washington, we await from it the assurance that the American people will conform to the law which it invokes, by maintaining a strict neutrality with regard to Mexico. When you shall have informed me of the resolution of the Federal government on this subject, I shall be able to indicate to you the result of our negotiations with Emperor Maximilian for the return of our troops."

The yellow book contains another correspondence betweeu Mr. Bigelow and M. Drouyn De Lhuys, with regard to the atrocious acts or-

dered by Maximilian, as regarded the prisoners of war, and as to the indirect establishment of slavery, in which Monsieur Drouyn De Lhuys, with more good sense than truth, declines all manner of responsibility as to the acts of Maximilian's government, and shows himself to be better acquainted with the English language than we are with the French. Mr Bigelow, in his letter of the 16th January, 1866, to Monsieur Drouyn de Lhuys, makes use of this expression, *planted*, in speaking of the government of Maximilian established by the French government. In his dispatch to Monsieur de Montholon, on the 25th Jan., 1866, Monsieur Drouyn de Lhuys, says: "I declare to you in the first place, that I cannot admit the expression, *planted*, as applied to the role of the French governmeut in the evcnts which have modified the political *regime* of Mexico. In reply to their correspondence, more voluminous than sensible, Mr. Seward replies by neutrality without recognition. Neutrality, so be it, we are not in a condition to undertake a foreign war within the primitive state of our military science and institutions. Let us boast as much as we please of our victories, but do not let us renew them; they cost the people too dear; but let us make the war of tariff, for it brings in and does not cause outlay.

In 1866, the following diplomatic correspondence opened relative to the evacuation:

THE MINISTER OF FRANCE, AT MEXICO, TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

MEXICO, 28th December, 1865.

"MR. MINISTER—The dispatch that your Excellency has done me the honor to write to me, on the 14th of November last, reached me on the 13th of the present month. On the same day I began to take active steps in order to succeed in causing the convention that I have signed, to be modified, as regards the titles to be delivered to our natives.

"I met with lively opposition in the first place. The Emperor and Monsieur de Castillo declared, what is true, that the payment of obligations anolaguous to those of the second loan, instead of the titles of the first, would become more onerous to the Mexican treasury, the conversion and constitution of premium, having occasioned large expenses. However, I was so pressing that I succeeded on the morrow. I have caused it to be understood that it is necessary to place Emperor Napoleon and his government in a situation to declare to the French Houses that the affair of the reclamations is very decidedly settled.

"In order that there should be no further doubt, and that the concession which I have asked for should have a very official character, I have compared notes with Monsieur de Castillo, on this subject.

"The clause, in virtue of which, a sum af 25,560,000 francs, in titles of the first loan, at par, should be paid to us, having become impossible of execution, owing to the conversion, it remains determined that this sum shall be paid us in obligations of the second series, which have remained without determined employment.

"The minister of Foreign affairs has given instructions to this effect, to the Mexican Minister in Paris, and the Mexican commission will deliver the obligations as soon as the convention is ratified.

"I will, myself, wait till your Excellency has made known to me what changes nust be made in the drawing up of the convention.

Receive, etc., DANO."

THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE MINISTER OF FRANCE, IN MEXICO.

PARIS, 14th January, 1866.

"SIR—The situation in which we find ourselves in Mexico cannot be prolonged, and the circumstances oblige us to take a definitive resolution in this regard, which the Emperor has commanded me to make known to you.

"Our expedition aimed, in the first place, at pursuing the revindication of our debt, and the reparation due to our natives. If, however, we had considered it useful to grant our concurrence to the efforts of a nation which aspired to finding order and well-being under a regular government, if our legitimate interest advised

us to second the Prince who gave himself up to this gensrous task, it was intended that our cooperation should confine itself to the prescribed limits that the convention of Miramar aimed at determining. . . . . .

"Our occupation must then have a term, and we must prepare ourselves for it without delay. The Emperor charges you, sir, to determine it in concert with his august ally, after a loyal discussion, in which Marshal Bazaine is naturally called to take part, shall have determined the means by which, as far as passible, the security of our debt and the claims of our natives will be secured, His Majesty desires that the evacuation may begin towards the coming autumn.

"You will, sir, communicate this dispatch to His Excellency, the minister of foreign affairs, and give him a copy of it. I charge Baron Saillard to add, verbally, all the necessary explanations, and to bring me back, in a brief delar, the reply by which you will make known to me the definitive arrangement that will have been concluded. Receive, etc.,

Signed, DROUYN DE LHUYS."

THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE MINISTEE OF FRANCE, IN MEXICO.

PARIS, 15th January, 1866.

"SIR—I think proper to enter here into some developments in order that you may be completely informed as to the subject to which my dispatch of yesterday refers.

"The payment of our claims, such as result from the convention which you signed at Mexico, on the 27th September, 1865, and which has received, in its essential dispositions, the approbation of His Majesty, secures to our natives an acceptable reparation of the injuries they have suffered. This convention will be, we do not doubt, loyally executed; thds, as to what most directly troubles us, the aim of our expedition will be attained, and satisfaction will be given to the grievances which have constrained us to take up arms.

"I need not recall the considerations which had led us not to lose sight of the object of our expedition, *but to profit by it to offer to Mexico the serious chances of a necessary regeneration.* This idea, of which we again affirm the *lawfulness,* the disinterestedness and the *lofty political scope,* determined the support which we have given to the enterprise courageously undertaken by Emperor Maximilian. Decided to second his efforts, we have been obliged, however, to regulate the conditions of our cooperation according to the measure of French interests, which we had, above all, to occupy ourselves with. The Emperor, with wise forethought, wished to defend his government against being carried away by a generous idea, by defining the nature and, in advance, limiting the extent of the concurrance which it was permitted us to afford

"We were obliged, at the same time, to stipulate the equivalent resources which were to be attributed to us, and to fix the quota, and the falling due of the sums destined to defray our expenses. Such was the object of the convention of Miramar, which was to remain the rule of our rights and reciprocal duties. It would be without interest now to return to the circumstances which prevent the Mexican government from henceforth fulfilling the obligations which this act lays upon it, and which threaten to cause the expenses of the new establishment to weigh upon us without any of the promised compensation. I will not insist upon the observations as to this which abound in my correspondence with the Emperor's legation, and it appears to me superfluous to seek now, in a vain discussion, for the causes of a situation that my duties obliges me only to state. By right, as the clauses of the bilateral contract which bound us to the Mexican government are not to be exeeuted by that government, we are ourselves freed from the obligations which we had contracted.

"However, sir, we should perhaps not have thought of making use of the faculty which the non-execution of the engagements of the treaty of Miramar gives us to declare ourselves freed from our own, if our resolution in that regard were not commanded by a consideration of a nature which does not admit of discussion. *The Mexican government is powerless to furnish us with the financial resources indispensable to the keeping up of our military status, and it has even asked us, to take, besides, to our charge, the greater part of the expenses of its internal administration.* These embarassments are not new, and we have several times endeavored to provide for them by loans *which have placed considerable sums at the disposal of Mexico.*

"Now, all fresh recourse is admitted to be impossible. What remains for us to do, in presence of the void which is shown to exist in the Mexican treasury, and the burdens which its penury casts upon us? The provisions of our budget

furnish us with no means of supplying this deficit. Mexico not being able to pay the troops which we keep upon her territory, it becomes impossible for us to keep them there. As for asking fresh credit of our country with this object, I have already explained myself with you on this head; as I have told you, public opinion has pronounced, with irrefragable authority, that the limit of sacrifices was reached. France would refuse to add anything, and the government of the emperor would not ask it.

"Far from me be the thought of ignoring the efforts accomplished by Emperor Maximilian and by his government. The emperor had resolutely faced the difficulties inherent to every new establishment, and these the peculiar situation of Mexico rendered, perhaps, more arduous still. His impulsion has been felt everywhere, and though it has not been given him to operate, as his good intentions directed, and as rapidly as he conceived them, with regard to those transformations which the administration of the country demands, undeniable results nevertheless attest the activity of his initiative measures. In the provinces as well as in the capital, wherever the emperor and the empress, who has so courageously associated herself with the task of her august spouse, have been able to make themselves personally known, the sympathetic welcome of the population testifies their confidence and the hopes which they attach to the firm establishment of the empire. The emperor himself has proclaimed the end of the civil war, if the resistance to his authority indeed deserves that name.

"This situation, encouraging in many respects, leads me to ask whether the well-understood interest of Emperor Maximilian is not in accordance herein with the neeessities which we are bound to obey. Of all the reproaches which the dissenters utter in the interior, and adversaries utter without, the most dangerous to a government which is being founded, is certainly that of only being sustained by foreign powers. Without doubt, the vote of the Mexicans has answered this imputation; it subsists, nevertheless, and is easy to understand how useful it would be to the cause of the empire to withdraw this weapon from its adversaries.

"At the moment when these diverse considerations oblige us to look forward to the termination of our military occupation, the Emperor's government, in its solicitude for the glorious task in which he has taken the initiative and in his sympathy for Emperor Maximilian, exactly comprehends the financial situation of Mexico. *This situation is serious, but it is not at all desperate.* With energy and courage, with firm and persevering will, the Mexican empire can triumph over the difficulties which it meets with on its way; but success can only be had at this price. This is the conviction which we have derived from the attentive and conscientious examinations of its obligations and resources, and you will endeavor to cause it to enter the minds of Emperor Maximilian and his government.

Receive, etc., DROUYN DE LHUYS,"

THE MINISTER OF FRANCE, IN MEXICO. TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

MEXICO, 18th January, 1866.

"MR. MINISTER—Your Excellency already knows that I have obtained from the Mexican government an agreement that we shall be paid in obligations of the second series of the second loan. The Mexican Legation, at Paris, has received the same information; but the under-secretary of state, and of the finances has not yet transmitted the order to deliver us the titles which, according to him, were not to be handed back till after the official ratification of the convention. The two governments being in harmony as to the modifications to be made in it, the convention should be considered as morally ratified. Monsieur Cesar being at this moment absent, the Emperor has sent me a telegram from Chapultepec, in which he apprises me that Monsieur Langlais is empowered to give the necessary orders to the Mexican commissions of finances. I have sent this telegram to the counsellor of state, now on a mission, who, I suppose, does not think himself in any way authorized to order anything, since he has no official character.

"However, I beg him to write to Monsieur Fould or Monsieur de Germing, joining to his letter the telegram by which Emperor Maximilian expresses his intentions. To-morrow, I will beside endeavor, in a telegram to Monsieur de Castillo, to send the formal order to remit the titles,

Receive, etc., DANO."

THE MINISTER OF FRANCE, IN MEXICO, TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

MEXICO, 9th February, 1866.

"MR. MINISTER—Monsieur de Castillo has made known to me that instructions will be sent to the commission of finances in Mexico, now at Paris, for the

payment into our hands of the 47,120 obligations of the second series, representing the 23,560,000 francs which pay our indemnities. The minister of foreign affairs asks me, at the same time, to cause the convention of the 27th September to be ratified by the Emperor of the French, to be again passed through the same formality by Emperor Maximilian, when he shall have made the proper modifications in the drawing up of some of the articles.

Receive, etc., DANO."

THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE MINISTER OF FRANCE, IN MEXICO.

PARIS, 16th February, 1866.

"SIR—At the moment when I am writing this dispatch, Baron Saillard must have reached Mexico. The instructions of the government of the Emperor are then known. His Majesty, himself, has taken care, in his opening speech at the legislative session, to inform the great bodies of the State of his resolutions. I have to-day only to confirm to you the general directions, contained in my messages of the 14th and 15th January, and to recommend you to make, without delay, the proper arrangements with the Mexican government for realizing the emperor's views.

"The desire of His Majesty, as you know, is that the evacuation should begin towards autumn next, and that it should be completed as soon as possible. You will come to an understanding with Marshal Bazaine to set the successive terms, in accordance with Emperor Maximilian.

"I cannot here develop the various considerations to be kept in mind in conducting this operation; some, of a purely military and technical character, belong essentially to the province of the marshal commander-in-chief; others, of a more political character are left to your judgment as to one and all, enlightened as it is by the perfect knowledge which you have of local circumstances, and the necessities which are thereby created.

"It is equally important, sir, to close the account of the financial situation and determine the guarantees which the security of our debt demands. The provisions of the treaty of Miramar, not being realized, *other combinations must be resorted to to secure the payment of our advances, and at the same time provide, in the interest of Mexican credit, for the regular payment of the arrears of the debt contracted by the loans of* 1864 *and* 1865. *Monsieur Langlais will receive detailed instructions by this courier* from the minister of finance, and will communicate them to you. You will be called upon to act in concert with him so as to secure their execution.

"The government of the Emperor thinks that the combination most simple and least burdensome to the Mexican government *would consist in the payment into our hands of the duties of Vera Cruz and Tampico, or others considered more suitable.* Half of the produce would be attributed to us to be devoted, a portion to the payment of the interest at 3 per cent. of our debt *valued in capital at* 250,000,000, and the rest as a partial guarantee of the interest due to the bearers of the titles of the loans of 1864 and 1865. Administered by our care it is permitted to hope that these custom-houses will still furnish important resources after the taxes agreed upon. You will then make the necessary arrangements with the Mexican cabinet for this delegation to be regularly conferred upon us.

"This point being settled, and French interests thus protected, the government of the Emperor will nevertheless continue to testify in a very efficacious manner all the sympathy with which the person of the Sovereign of Mexico inspires him, and which he feels as regards the generous task to which he has devoted himself. You will have the kindness, sir, to give these assurances to Emperor Maximilian in the name of His Majesty. DROUYN DE LHUYS.

THE MINISTER OF FRANCE, IN MEXICO, TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

MEXICO, 9th March, 1866.

"MR. MINISTER—I have received the dispatches that your Excellency has done me the honor to address me, and which are dated 14th and 15th January.

"I am about to set forth that the firm resolve of the Emperor is that the evacuation shall begin towards next autumn; I am at Emperor Maximilian's orders to set this term regularly, in conformity with the instructions I have received; but, in the meantime, Marshal Bazaine is occupying himself with the measures to be taken to secure all the interest at stake, as far as possible.

"Your Excellency already knows the intentions of the commander-in-chief of the expeditionary corps. The evacuation, if begun in the coming November, would end during the autumn of 1867, that is to say, would be completed in eighteen months. Receive, etc., DANO."

MR. SEWARD TO THE MARQUIS DE MONTHOLON.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, Feb. 12, 1866.

SIR—On the 6th of December I had the honor to submit to you, in writing, for the information of the Emperor, a communication upon the subject of affairs in Mexico, as affected by the presence of French armed forces in that country. On the 29th of January thereafter you favored me with a reply to that communication, which reply had been transmitted to you by M. Druyn de Lhuys, under the date of the 9th of the same month. I have submitted it to the President of the United States. It is now made my duty to revert to the interesting question which has thus been brought under discussion. In the first place, I take notice of the points which are made by M. Druyn de Lhuys. He declares that the French expedition into Mexico had in it nothing hostile to the institutions of the New World, and still less of anything hostile to the United States. As proofs of this friendly statement he refers to the aid, in blood and treasure, which France contributed in our Revolutionary war to the cause of our national independence; to the parliamentary propositions that France made to us that we should join her in her expedition to Mexico; and, finally, to the neutrality which France has practised in the painful civil war through which we have just successfully passed. It gives me pleasure to acknowledge that the assurances thus given on the present occasion, that the French expedition in its original design had no political objects or motives, harmonize entirely with expressions which abound in the earlier correspondence of the Minister for Foreign Affairs which arose out of the war between France and Mexico. We accept, with especial pleasure, the reminiscences of our traditional friendship. M. Douyn de Lhuys next assures us that the French government is disposed to hasten as much as possible the recall of its troops from Mexico. We hail the announcement as being a virtual promise of relief to this government from the apprehensions and anxieties which were the burden of that communication of mine, which M. Druyn de Lhuys has under consideration.

M. Druyn de Lhuys proceeds to declare that the only aim of France in pursuing her enterprise in Mexico has been to follow up the satisfaction to which she had a right, after having resorted to coercive measures when measures of every other form had been exhausted. M. Druyn de Lhuys says that it is known how many and legitimate were the claims of French subjects, which caused the resort to arms. He then reminds us how, on a former occasion, the United States had waged war on Mexico. On this point it seems equally necessary and proper to say that the war thus referred to was not made nor sought by the United States, but was accepted by them under provocation of a very grave character. The transaction is passed, and the necessity and justice of the proceedings of the United States are questions which now rest only within the province of history. France, I think, will acknowledge that neither in the beginning of our Mexican war, nor in its prosecution, nor in the terms on which we retired from that successful contest, did the United States assume any position inconsistent with the principles which are now maintained by us in regard to the French expedition in Mexico. We are, as we have been, in relations of amity and friendship equally with France and Mexico, and therefore, we cannot consistently with those relations, constitute ourselves a judge of the original merits of the war which is waged between them. We can speak concerning that war only so far as we are affected by its bearing upon ourselves and upon republican and American institutions on this continent.

M. Druyn de Lhuys declares that the French army, in entering Mexico, did not carry monarchial traditions in the folds of its flag. In this connection he refers to the fact that there were at the time of the expedition a number of influential men in Mexico who despaired of obtaining order out of the conditions of the republican rule then existing there, and who therefore cherished the idea of falling back upon monarchy. In this connection we are further reminded that one of the late Presidents of Mexico offered to use his power for the re-establishment of royalty. We are further informed that at the time of the French invasion the persons before referred to deemed the moment to have arrived for making an appeal to the people of Mexico in favor of monarchy. M. Druyn de Lhuys remarked that the French government did not deem it a duty to discourage that supreme effort of a powerful party, which had its origin long anterior to the French expedition. He observes that the Emperor, faithful to the maxims of public right which he holds in common with the United States, declared on that occasion that the question of a change of institutions rested solely on the suffrage of the Mexican people. In support of this statement M. Druyn de Lhuys gives a copy of a letter which the

Emperor addressed to the commander-in-chief of the French expedition on the capture of Puebla, which letter contains the following words:—"Our object, you know, is not to impose on the Mexicans against their will, nor to make our success aid in the triumph of any party whatever. I desire that Mexico may rise to a new life, and that soon, regenerated by a government founded on the national will or principles of order and of progress, and of respect for the laws of nations, she may acknowledge, by her friendly relations, that she owes to France her repose and her prosperity."

M. Druyn de Lhuys pursues his argument by saying that the Mexican people have spoken, that the Emperor Maximilian has been called by the people of the country, that his government has appeared to the Emperor of the French to be of a nature adequate to restore peace to the nation, and on its part peace to international relations, and that he has, therefore, given it his support. M. Druyn de Lhuys, therefore, presents the following as a true statement of the present case:—France went to Mexico to exercise the right of war which is exercised by the United States, and not in virtue of any purpose of intervention, concerning which she recognizes the same doctrine as the United States. France went there, not to bring about a monarchial proselytism, but to obtain reparation and guarantees which she ought to claim; and, being there, she now sustains the government which is founded on the consent of the people, because she expects from that government the just satisfaction of her wrongs, as well as the securities indispensable to the future. As she does not seek the satisfaction of an exclusive interest, nor the realization of any ambitious schemes, so she now wishes to recall what remains in Mexico of the army corps which France has sent there, at the moment when she will be able to do so with safety to the French citizens and with due respect to herself. I am aware how delicate the discussion is to which M. Druyn de Lhuys thus invites me. France is entitled by every consideration of respect and friendship to enterpret for herself the objects of the expedition, and of the whole of her proceedings in Mexico. Her explanation of those motives and objects is therefore accepted on our part with the consideration and confidence which we expect for explanations of our own when assigned to France or any other friendly Power. Nevertheless, it is my duty to insist that, whatever were the intentions, purposes and objects of France, the proceedings which were adopted by a class of Mexicans for subverting the republican government there, and for availing themselves of French intervention to establish on its ruins an imperial monarchy, are regarded by the United States as having been taken without the authority, and prosecuted against the will and opinions of the Mexican people. For these reasons it seems to this government that in supporting institutions thus established, in derogation of the inalienable rights of the people of Mexico, the original purposes and objects of the French expedition, though they have not been, as a military demand of satisfaction, abandoned nor left out of view by the Emperor of the French, were, nevertheless, let fall into a condition in which they seem to have become subordinate to a political revolution, which certainly would not have occurred if France had not forcibly intervened, and which, judging from the genius and character of the Mexican people, would not now be maintained by them if that armed intervention should cease.

The United States have not seen any satisfactory evidence that the people of Mexico have spoken, and have called into being or accepted the so-called empire which it insisted has been set up in their capital. The United States, as I have remarked on other occasions, are of opinion that such an acceptance could not have been freely procured, or lawfully taken at any time, in the presence of the French army of invasion. The withdrawal of the French forces is deemed necessary to allow such a proceeding to be taken by Mexico. Of course, the Emperor of France is entitled to determine the aspect in which the Mexican situation ought to be regarded by him. It, therefore, recognizes, and must continue to recognize in Mexico only the ancient republic, and it can in no case consent to involve itself, either directly or indirectly, in relation with, or recognition of the institution of the Prince Maximilian in Mexico. This position is held, I believe, without one dissenting voice, by our countrymen. I do not pretend to say that the opinion of the American people is accepted, or will be adopted generally by other foreign Powers, or by the public opinion of mankind. The Emperor is quite competent to form a judgment upon this important point for himself. I cannot, however, properly exclude the observation that while this question affects by its bearings incidentally every republican State in the American hemisphere, every one of these States has

adopted the judgment which, on behalf of the United States, is herein expressed. Under these circumstances it has happened, either rightfully or wrongfully, that the presence of European armies in Mexico, maintaining a European Prince with imperial attributes, without her consent and against her will, is deemed a source of apprehension and danger, not alone to the United States, but also to all the independent and sovereign republican States founded on the American continent and its adjacent islands. France is acquainted with the relations of the United States towards the other American States, to which I have referred, and is aware of the sense that the American people entertain in regard to the obligations and duties due from them to those other States.

We are thus brought back to the single question which formed the subject of my communication of the 6th of December last, namely: the desirableness of an adjustment of a question the continuance of which must necessarily be prejudical to the harmony and friendship which have hitherto existed between the United States and France. This Government does not undertake to say how the claims of idemnity and satisfaction for which the war which France is waging in Mexico was originally instituted shall now be adjusted in discontinuing what, in its progress, has become a war of political intervention, dangerous to the United States and to republican institutions in the American hemisphere. Recognizing France and the republic of Mexico as belligerents engaged in war, we leave all questions concerning these claims and idemnities to them. The United States rest content with submitting to France the exigencies of an embarassing situation in Mexico, and expressing the hope that France may find some manner, which shall at once be consistent with her interest and honor, and the principles and interest of the United States, to relieve that situation without injurious delay. M. Druyn de Luhys repeats on this occasion what he has heretofore written, viz:—that it depends much upon the federal government to facilitate their desire of the withdrawal of the French forces from Mexico. He argues that the position which the United States have assumed, has nothing incompatible with the existence of monarchical institutions in Mexico. He draws to his support on this point the fact that the President of the United States, as well as the Secretary of State, in official papers, disclaim all thought of propagandism on the American continent in favor of republican institutions. M. Druyn de Lhuys draws in also the fact that the United States hold friendly relations with the Emperor of Brazil, as they held similar relations with Yturbide, the Mexican Emperor, in 1822. From these positions M. Druyn de Lhuys makes the deduction that neither any fundamental nor any precedent in the diplomatic history of this country creates any necessary antagonism between the United States and the form of government over which the Prince Maximilian presides in the ancient capital of Mexico. I do not think it would be profitable, and therefore I am not desirons to engage in the discussions which M. Druyn de Lhuys has thus raised. It will be sufficient for my purpose on the present occasion to assert, and to give reassurance of our desire to facilitate the withdrawal of the French troops from Mexico, and for that purpose, to do whatsoever shall be compatible with the positions we have heretofore taken upon the subject, and with our just regards to the sovereign rights of the Republic of Mexico. Farther, or otherwise than this, France could not expect us to go. Having thus reassured France, it seems necessary to state anew the position of this government as it was set forth in my letter of the 6th of December, as follows: Republican and domestic institutions on this continant are deemed most congenial with, and and most beneficial to the United States. Where the people of any country like Brazil, now, or Mexico in 1822, have voluntarily established and acquiesced in monarchical institutions of their own choice, free from all foreign control or intervention, the United States do not refuse to maintain relations with such government; nor seek through propagandism by force or intrigue to overthrow those institutions. On the contrary, where a nation has established institutions, republican and domestic, similar to our own, the United States assert in their behalf that no foreign nation can rightfully intervene by force to subvert republican institutions and establish those of an antagonistical character. M. Druyn de Lhuys seems to think that I have made a double reproach against the Prince Maximilian's alleged government, of the difficulty it encounters, and of the assistance it borrows from foreign Powers. In that respect M. Druyn de Lhuys contends that the obstacles and resistance which Maximilian has been obliged to wrestle with have in themselves nothing especial against the form of the institutions which he is supposed by M. Druyn de Lhuys to have established.

M. Druyn de Lhuys maintains that Maximilian's government is undergoing the lot quite common to new powers, while, above all, it has the misfortune to have to bear the consequences of discords which have been produced under a previous government. M. Druyn de Lhuys represents this misfortune and this lot to be in effect the misfortune and lot of governments which have not found armed competitors, and which have enjoyed in peace an uncontrolled authority. He alleges that revolts and intestine wars are the normal condition of Mexico. And he further insists that the opposition made by some military chiefs to the establishment of an empire under Maximilian is only the natural sequence of the same want of discipline, and the same prevalence of anarchy of which his predecessors in power in Mexico have been victims. It is not the purpose, nor would it be consistent with the character of the United States to deny that Mexico has been for a long time the theatre of faction and intestine war. The United States confess this fact with regret; all the more sincere because the experience of Mexico has been not only painful to her own people, but has been also of unfortunately evil influence on other nations. On the other hand, it is neither a right of the United States, nor consistent with their friendly disposition toward Mexico to reproach the people of that country with their past calamities, much less to invoke or approve of the infliction of punishment upon them by strangers for their political errors. The Mexican population have, and their situation has, some peculiarities which are doubtless well understood by France. Early in the present century they were forced, by convictions which mankind cannot but respect, to cast off a foreign monarchical rule which they deemed incompatible with their welfare and aggrandizement. They were forced at the same time, by connections which the world must respect, to attest the establishment of republican institutions without the full experience and practical education and habits which would render these institutions all at once firm and satisfactory. Mexico was a theatre of conflict between European commercial ecclesiastical and political institutions and dogmas, and novel American institutions and ideas. She had African slavery, colonial restrictions, and ecclesiastical monoplies. In the chief one of these particulars she had a misfortune which was shared by the United States, while the latter was happily exempted from the other misfortunes. We cannot deny that all the anarchy in Mexico, of which M. Druyn de Lhuys complains, was necessarily and even wisely, endured, in the attempts to lay sure foundations of broad republican liberty. I do not know whether France can rightly be expected to concur in this view, which alleviates in our mind the errors, misfortunes and calamities of Mexico. However this may be, we fall back upon the principles that no foreign State can rightfully intervene in such trials as those of Mexico, and, on the ground of a desire to correct those errors, deprive the people of their natural right of domestic and republican freedom. All the injuries and wrongs which Mexico can have committed against any other State, have found a severe punishment in consequences which legitimately followed their commission. Nations are not authorized to correct each other's errors, except so far as is necessary to prevent or redress injuries affecting themselves. If one State has a right to intervene in any other State to establish discipline, constituting itself a judge of the occasion, then every State has the same right to intervene in the affairs of every other nation, being itself alone the arbiter, both in regard to the time and the occasion. The principle of intervention thus practically carrid out would seem to render all sovereignty and independence, and even all international peace and amity, uncertain and fallacious.

M. Druyn de Lhuys proceeds to remark that as for the support which Maximilian received from the French army, as well also for the support which has been lent to him by Belgian and Austrian volunteers, those supports cause no hindrance to the freedom of his resolutions in the affairs of his government.

M. Druyn de Lhuys asks what State is there that does not need allies either to form or to defend? As to the great Powers, such as France and England, do they not constantly maintain foreign troops in their armies? When the United States fought for their independence did the aid given by France cause that movement to cease to be truly national? Shall it be said that the contest between the United States and the recent insurgents was not in a like manner a national war, because thousands of Irishmen and Germans were found fighting under the flag of the United States. Arguing from anticipated answers to these questions, M. Druyn de Lhuys reaches a conclusion that the character of Maximilian's government cannot be contested, nor can its efforts to consolidate itself be contested on the

ground of the employment of foreign troops. M. Druyn de Lhuys, in this argument, seems to us to have overlooked two important facts, viz: Frst, that the United States in this correspondence have assigned definite limits to the right of alliance incompatible with our assent to this argument; second, the fact that the United States have not, at any time, accepted the supposed government of the Prince Maximilian as a constitutional or legitimate form of government in Mexico, capable or entitled to form alliances. M. Druyn de Lhuys then argues in a graphic manner the advantages that have arisen, or are to arise to the United States from the successful establishment of the supposed empire in Mexico. Instead of a country unceasingly in trouble, and which has given us so many subjects of complaint, and against which we ourselves have been obliged to make war, he shows us in Mexico a pacific country under a beneficent imperial sway offering henceforth measures of security and vast openings to our commerce—a country far from injuring our rights or hurting our influences. And he assures us that above all other nations, the United States are most likely to profit by the work which is being accomplished by Prince Maximilian in Mexico. These suggestions are as natural on the part of France as they are friendly to the United States. The United States are not insensible to the desirableness of political and commercial reform in the adjoining country; but their settled principles, habits and connections forbid them to look for such changes in this hemisphere, to foreign, royal or imperial institutions, founded upon a forcible subversion of republican institutions. The United States, in their accustomed sobriety, regard no beneficial results which could come from such a change in Mexico as sufficient to overbalance the injury which they must directly suffer by the overthrow of the republican government of Mexico.

M. Druyn de Lhuys, at the end of his very elaborate and able review, recapitulates his exposition in the following words: "The United States acknowledge the right we had to make war in Mexico. On the other part we admit, as they do, the principle of non-intervention. This double postulate includes, as it seems to me, the element of an agreement. The right to make war, which belongs, as Mr. Seward declares, to every sovereign nation, implies the right to secure the results of war. We have not gone across the ocean merely for the purpose of showing our power and of inflicting chastisement on the Mexican government. After a train of fruitless remonstrances it was our duty to demand guarantees we could not look for from a government whose bad faith we had proved on so many occasions. We find them now engaged in the establishment of a regular government which shows itself disposed to honestly keep its engagements. In this relation we hope that the legitimate object of our expedition will soon be reached. And we are striving to make with the Emperor Maximilian arrangements which, by satisfying our interests and our honor, will permit us to consider at an end the service of the army upon Mexican soil. The Emperor has given an order to write in this sense to our minister in Mexico. We fall back at that moment upon the principle of non-intervention, and from that moment accept it as the rule of our conduct. Our interest, no less than our honor, commands us to claim from all the uniform application of it. Trusting the spirit of equity which animates the cabinet at Washington, we expect from it the assurance that the American people will themselves conform to the law which they invoke by observing in regard to Mexico a strict neutrality. When you (meaning the Marquis de-Montholon) shall have informed me of the resolution of the federal government, I shall be able to indicate to you the nature of the results of our negotiations with the Emperor Maximilian for the return of our troops."

I have already, and not without much reluctance, made the comments upon the arguments of M. Druyn de Lhuys which seem to be necessary to guard against the inference of concurrence in questionable positions which might be drawn from our entire silence. I think that I can, therefore, afford to leave his recapitulation of those arguments without such an especial review as would necessarily be prolix and perhaps hypercritical. The United States have not claimed, and they do not claim, to know what arrangements the Emperor may make for the adjustment of claims for idemnity and redress in Mexico. It would be on our part an act of intervention to take cognizance of them. We adhere to our position that the war in question has become a political war between France and the republic of Mexico, injurious and dangerous to the United States and to the republican cause; and we ask only that in that aspect and character it may be brought to an end. It would be illiberal on the part of the United States to sup

pose that, in desiring or pursuing preliminary arrangements, the Emperor contemplates the establishment in Mexico, before withdrawing his forces, of the very institutions which constitute the material ground of the exceptions taken against his intervention by the United States. It would be still more illiberal to suppose for a moment that he expects the United States to bind themselves indirectly to acquiesce in or support the obnoxious institutions. On the contrary, we understand him as announcing to us his immediate purpose to bring to an end the service of the armies in Mexico; to withdraw them, and in good faith to fall back, without stipulation or condition on our part, upon the principle of non-intervention, upon which he is henceforth agreed with the United States. We cannot understand his appeal to us for an assurance that we ourselves will abide by our own principles of non-intervention in any other sense than as the expression, in a friendly way, of his expectation that when the people of Mexico shall have been left absolutely free from the operation, effects and consequences of his own political and military intervention, we will ourselves respect their self-established sovereignty and independence. In this view of the subject only can we consider his appeal pertinent to the case. Regarding it in only this aspect we must meet the Emperor frankly. He knows the form and character of this government. The nation can be bound only by treaties which have the concurrence of the President and two-thirds of the Senate. A formal treaty would be objectionable, as unnecessary, except as a disavowal of bad faith on our part, to disarm suspicion in regard to a matter concerning which we have given no cause for questioning our loyalty, or else such a treaty would be refused upon the ground that the application for it by the Emperor of France was unhappily a suggestion of some sinister or unfriendly reservation or purpose on his part in withdrawing from Mexico. Diplomatic assurances given by the President on behalf of the nation can at best be but the expresions of confident expectations on his part that the personal administration, ever changing in confermity and adaptation to the national will, does not misunderstand the settled painciples and policy of the American people. Explanations cannot properly be made by the President in any case wherein it would be deemed, for any reason, objectionable on grounds of public policy by the treaty-making power of the government to introduce or entertain negotidtions.

With these explanations I proceed to sav that, in the opinion of the President, France need not for a moment delay her promised withdrawal of military forces from Mexico, and her putting the principle of non-intervention into full and complete practice in regard to Mexico, through any apprehension that the United States will prove unfaithful to the principles and policy in that respect, which, on their behalf, it has been my duty to maintain in this now very lengthened correspondence. The practice of this government from its beginning is a guarantee to all nations of the respect of the American people for the free sovereignty of the people in every other state. We received the instruction from Washington; we applied it sternly in our early intercourse even with France. The same principle and practice have been uniformly inculcated by all our own statesmen, interpreted by all our jurists, maintained by all our congresses, and acquiesced in without practical dissent on all occasions by the American people. It is in reality the chief element of foreign intercourse in our history. Looking simply toward the point to which our attention has been steadily confined—to the relief of the Mexican embarrassments without disturbing our relations with France—we shall be gratified when the Emperor shall give to us, either through the channel of our esteemed correspondent or otherwise, definite information of the time when French military operations may be expected to cease.

To MARQUIS DE MONTHOLON, &c., &c. W. H. SEWARD.

THE MARQUIS DE MONTHOLON TO MR. SEWARD.

LEGATION OF FRANCE TO THE UNITED STATES,
WASHINGTON, April 21, 1866.

Mr. SECRETARY OF STATE :—

SIR—I hasten to remit herewith to your Execellency a copy of a dispatch which I at the moment receive from H. E. M. Druyn de Lhuys, and which answers the dispatch you were pleased to address to me relating to Mexican affairs on the 12th of February last. Accept, Mr. Secretary of State, the assurances of my high consideration. MONTHOLON.

To the Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

M. DRUYN TO THE MARQUIS DE MONTHOLON.

PARIS, April 5, 1866.

To the Marquis de MONTHOLON :

SIR—I have read with all the attention which it deserves the answer of the Secretary of State to my dispatch of the 9th of January last. The scrupulous care with which Mr. Seward has pleased to analyze that dispatch, and the extended considerations upon which he as entered to define, in regard to the *expose* which I have made of the conduct of France in the affairs of Mexico, the doctrines which are the basis of the international policy of the United States, bear witness in our eyes to the interest which the Cabinet of Washington attaches to putting aside all misapprehension. We find therein the evidences of its sentiments of amity which the traditions of a long alliance have cemented between our two countries to prevail over the accidental divergences often inevitable in the movement of affairs and the relations of governments. It is in this disposition that we have appreciated the communication which the Secretary of State has addressed to you on the 1st of January last. *I shall not follow Mr. Seward in the developements he has given to the exposition of the principles which direct the policy of the American Union. It does not appear to me opportune or profitable to prolong on points of delicacy or of history a discussion wherein many may differ in opinion from the government of the United States without danger to the interests of the two countries. I think it better to serve these interests, to abstain from discussing assertions, in my opinion, very contestable,* in order to take action on assurances which may contribute to facilitate one understanding. We never heaitate to offer to our friends the explanations they ask from us, and we hasten to give to the Cabinet at Washington all these which may enlighten it on the purpose we are pursuing in Mexico, and on the loyality of our intentions.—We have said to it at the same time that the certainty we should acquire of its resolution to observe in regard to that country, after our departure, a policy of non-intervention would hasten the moment when it would be possible for us, without compromising the interests which led us there, to withdraw our troops and put an end to an occupation the duration of which we are sincerely desirous to abridge. In his dispatch of the 12th of February last Mr. Seward calls to mind, on his part, that the government of the United States has conformed, during the whole course of its history, to the rule of conduct which it received from Washington by practising invariably the principle of non-intervention, and observes that nothing justifies the apprehension that it should show itself unfaithful in what may concern Mexico. We receive this assurance with entire confidence. We find therein a sufficient guarantee not any longer to delay the adoption of measures intended to prepare for the return of our army. The Emperor has decided that the French troops shall evacuate Mexico in three detachments, the first being intended to depart in the month of November, 1866 ; the second in March, 1867, and the third in the month of November of the same year. You will please to communicate this decision officially to the Secretary of State.

Receive, Marquis, the assurance of my high consideration.

DRUYN DE LHUYS.

To the Marquis de MONTHOLON, minister of the Emperor to Washington.

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES.
PARIS, June 4, 1866.

SIR:—I waited upon his Excellency, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, on Saturday last, in pursuance of a previous appointment, to confer with him upon the subject matter of your instructions, No. 459, marked "confidential." As he had already been apprised of the contents of that dispatch, through the French minister residing in Washington. I was spared the necessity of restating them. He said that the Imperial Gov-

ment proclaimed its intention to retire from Mexico because it suited its convenience and interests to retire, and for no other reason. When, therefore, it announced formerly, not merely to the United States, but to all the world, that the army would be withdrawn from Mexico within a specified term, he thought it should be deemed sufficient. The Government made its declaration in good faith, and means to keep it. It means to withdraw its army within the time prescribed, and it does not intend to take one or two hundred in the first detachment and one or two hundred in the second, leaving the greater body of them to the last, though it had not deemed it necessary to specify with minuteness details of this kind which depends upon hygienie and climatic considerations of which it was the best and the only competent judge. This his excellency said he wished I would say to our government. I asked his excellency if I had ever intimated to him, whether in writing or orally, any suspicion of the Emperor's intention to withdraw his army from Mexico in unequal portions. He replied that I had not. I then asked him if any other person authorized to speak in the name of my government had done so. He said no: but he had read imputations of that kind in one of our papers. I replied in substance that the press was a law in itself, and that we had better not accept it as a law unto us; and as he asked me to communicate to my government a formal answer to what sounded like an accusation of insincerity and bad faith on the part of the Emperor, I wanted his authority for stating that no such accusation had reached him through any official channel. He replied that he only had read it in a newspaper. I then went on to say that the purpose of your instruction, as I understood it, was simply to obtain an explanation, which was sure to be required of you, of the shipment in France of large bodies of troops to Mexico after the purpose to withdraw her whole army had been officially proclaimed. To this his Excellency replied that since seeing me, he had gotten from his colleagues of the Marine and War Departments information to the import that no troops belonging to the corps expeditionaire had been sent to Mexico this year, unless for the sake of partly replacing soldiers missing, but at any rate without any augmentation of the number of standing troops; that the shipment of troops referred to in the public prints, and in your despatch, was most likely that made in the transport Rhone about the beginning of the year; that this Rhone touched at Martinque but not at St. Thomas as was stated; that she carried 916 and not 1,200 soldiers; that they belonged *to the Foreign Legion and not to the Expeditionary Corps;* that they consisted of troops that had been waiting transportation a long time in France and in Algeria, to join their regiments; that no new troops had been enrolled for the Foreign Legion since the Emperor proclaimed his purpose to withdraw his flag from Mexico, and that no more for what he knew were intended to be enrolled. In regard to the shipment of troops from Austria, he said that was an affair entirely between that government and the Mexican, with which France had nothing to do; that since I had spoken to him upon the subject, he had verified his own convictions by a reference to the Ministers of War and Marine, and had ascertained that no engagements of any sort had been entered into by either for the enrollment or transportation of troops from Austria to Mexico. He went on further to say that it was the intention of the government to withdraw the army entirely from Mexico within the time specified in his dispatch to you, at the very latest—sooner, if climatic and other controlling considerations permitted, and it was not its intention to replace them with other troops from any quarter. At the conclusion of a long conversation, of which I have given the important results, I expressed satisfaction with his Excellencey's explanation, and the pleasure I should have in communicating them to my government. This dispatch has been submitted to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and the foregoing version of the results of our conversation has been approved by him.

I am, Sir, with very great respect, your obe't serv't, JOHN BIGELOW.

Hon. Wm. SEWARD, Department of State, Washington, D. C.

MR. SEWARD TO MR. MOTLEY—[167].

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, March 19. 1866.

SIR—Mr. Bigelow informs me by a dispatch of the 15th of February, that he learned from an unofficial source that Gregoeis Barandyn, the diplomatic representative of the Archduke Maximilian, formerly Secretary of Legation under Senor Robles, at Washington, is now in Paris to fit out ten thousand Austrians, who, he says, are ready to embark from Trieste for Mexico. The Mexican Minister informed him that there was no money in his hands. I am not sure of learning the result of the Minister's visit here, as the money, if furnished, must come through indirect and concealed channels. You are instructed to inquire concerning the facts ; and, if they justify the report, to bring to the knowledge of the Austrian Government seasonably that the United States cannot regard with uncommon concern a proceeding which would seem to bring Austria into alliance with the invaders of Mexico to subvert the domestic government of the republic, and to build up foreign imperial institutions. It is hoped that Austria will give us frank explanation. I am, sir, your obedient servant,

W. H. SLWARD.

J. LATHROP MOTLEY, Esq., &c., Vienna.

MR. SEWARD TO MR. MOTLEY.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, March 19, 1866.

SIR—I have your dispatch of the 27th of February, No. 150, by which we learn that efforts are now made to induce the Austrian Government to consent that 4,000 volunteers may be levied within that empire this year for Mexico, on the ground that the supplementary articles of the Convention of Miramar permitted 2,000 each year, and that none were forwarded in the year 1865. Upon this statement of facts you express the opinion that the consent desired will probably be accorded by the imperial government, so that if the funds can be obtained for paying, equipping and transporting 4,000 officers and volunteers, they will be found and may be expected in Mexico this year. At the same time you state that it is your opinion that the funds have not yet been furnished. The case thus presented renders it proper that I should call your especial attention to my dispatch No. 167, which bears the date of and is sent forward this day. In preparing that dispatch I anticipated the case substantially which your communication now presents. You cannot, while practising the courtesy and respect which are due to the Austrian Government, *be either too earnest or too emphatic in the protest you have been directed to make.* In performing this duty you may be assisted by information of the actual state of the question concerning French intervention in Mexico at the present moment. With this view I give you, confidentally, a copy of my note addressed to M. Montholon on the 12th day of February last. As yet no reply has been received to this note, nor have its contents become public. You will. therefore, see the propriety of being discreet in such use of it as you may find it necessary to make. After reading that paper you will be justified in saying that the American government and people would not be likely to be pleased with seeing Austria, at this junction, assume the character of a protector to a foreign military power, which, claming the power of an empire. is attempted to be set up on the supposed subverted foundations of the republic of Mexico.

I am, sir, your obedient servant, Wm. H. SEWARD.

J. LATHROP MOTLEY, Esq., Vienna.

MR. SEWARD TO MR. MOTLEY.—[No. 173.]

WASHINGTON, April 6, 1866.

SIR—An informal note has just been received from Mr. Bigelow, the United States minister at Paris. In this note Mr. Bigelow writes in substance as follows : The *Moniteur* of the 21st of March announces that a military convention was signed at Vienna on the 15th instant between the

Austrian government and the representatives of Maximilian, supplementary to a convention of the same nature which had been previously concluded between the same parties. The purpose of this engagement, says the *Moniteur*, is to insure the enrollment necessary to keep full the Austrian corps in Mexico. Mr. Bigelow further writes as follows: "I have seen it stated in another journal that a line of steamers is to be started from Trieste to Vera Cruz, to ply regularly after the 1st of April."

Again Mr. Bigelow furnishes an extract from the Paris *Constitutionel* of the 21st of March: "We learn from the *Freudenblatt*, Vienna, that the enlistment for Mexico will begin immediately; that the funds had been received from Paris two months since."

Your dispatches, of dates almost as late as that of Mr. Bigelow's note, are silent upon the rumors which he brings to the notice of this government. It is possible that more authentic information which you may possess concerning the disposition and proceedings of the Austrian government may enable you to treat the matter mentioned by Mr. Bigelow with indifference. Looking at the matter, however, from one point of observation, the rumors referred to are deemed sufficient to entitle us to ask a friendly and just exposition of the imperial royal government of the relations which it proposes to assume, to assure or maintain henceforth in regard to Mexico. You are, therefore, expected to execute the instructions which have heretofore been sent to you to that effect, and it is thought proper that you should state that in the event of hostilities being carried on hereafter in Mexico by Austrian subjects, under the command or with the sanction of the government of Vienna, the United States will feel themselves at liberty to regard those hostilities as constituting a state of war by Austria against the republic of Mexico, and in regard to such war, waged at this time and under existing circumstances the United States could not engage to remain as silent or neutral spectators.

The President may desire to call the attention of Congress to this interesting subject. You will see the importance, therefore, of obtaining the information which is desired as early as may be practicable, consistently with the courtesies due to Austria as a friendly government. Should you, however, find important reasons now unknown to us for deferring the execution of this instruction, you will be at liberty to exercise your discretion and report the reasons to us.

I remain, sir, your obedient servent, Wm. H. SEWARD.

J. Lathrop Motley, Esq., &c., &c., Vienna.

MR. SEWARD TO MR. MOTLEY.

Department of State,
Washington, April 16, 1866.

Sir—I have had the honor to receive your dispatch of the 27th of March [No. 155], which brings the important announcement that a treaty called a "Military Supplementary Convention" was ratified on the 15th of that month between the Emperor of Austria and Prince Maximilian, who claims to be an emperor in Mexico. You inform me that it is expected that about one thousand volunteers will be shipped under the treaty from Trieste to Vera Cruz very soon, and that at least as many more will be shipped in the autumn. I have heretofore given you the President's instructions to ask for explanations, and conditionally to inform the government of Austria that the dispatch of military expeditions by Austria under such an arrangement as the one which seems now to have been consummated would be regarded with serious concern by the United States. The subject has now been further considered in connection with the official information thus recently received.

The time seems to have arrived when the attitude of this government in relation to Mexican affairs should be once again frankly and distinctly made known to the Emperor of Austria and all other powers whom it may directly concern. The United States, for reasons which seem to them to be just, and to have their foundations in the laws of nations, maintain

that the domestic republican government with which they are on relations of friendly communication, is the only legitimate government existing in Mexico; that a war has, for a period of several years, been waged against that republic by the government of France, which was begun with a disclaimer of all political or dynastic designs; that, that war has subsequently taken upon itself, and now distinctly wears the character of an European intervention to overthrow that domestic republican government, and to erect in its stead a European imperial military despotism by military force. The United States, in view of the character of their own political institutions, their proximity and intimate relations toward Mexico, and their just influence in the political affairs of the American continent, cannot consent to the accomplishment of that purpose by the means described. The United States have, therefore, addressed themselves, as they think reasonably, to the government of France, and have asked that its military forces engaged in that objectionable political invasion may desist from further intervention and be withdrawn from Mexico.

A copy of the last communication upon this subject, which was addressed by the United States to the government of France, is herewith transmitted for your special information. These papers will give you the true situation of the question. It will also enable you to satisfy the government of Vienna that the United States must he no less opposed to military intervention for political objects hereafter in Mexico by the government of Austria than they are opposed to any further intervention of the same character in that country by France. You will therefore act at as early a day as may be convenient. Bring the whole case in a becoming manner to the attention of the imperial royal government.

You are authorized to state that the United States sincerely desire that Austria may find it just and expedient to come up on the same ground of non-intervention in Mexico which is maintained by the United States, and to which they have invited France. You will communicate to us the answer of the Austrian government to this proposition. This government could not but regard as a matter of serious concern the despatch of any troops from Austria for Mexico, while the subject which you are thus directed to present to the Austrian government remains under consideration.

I am, sir, your obedient servant, Wm. H. SEWARD.

To LATHROP MOTLEY, Esq., Vienna.

After having attentively read all this diplomatic nonsense, and all the words used to disguise the thought, one nevertheless remains convinced of the following facts, with or without the consent of the dignitaries who hold the pen in hand:

In the first place, that Louis Napoleon seeks to make an honorable and but temporary retreat from Mexico, and that Mr. Seward facilitates his doing so by every means in his power. Why! what interest has the republican government of America in showing sympathy with the greatest enemy to nations and to liberty? This is what Mr. Seward could alone explain, and, probably, in a manner more satisfactory to himself than to the country.

Secondly, That the French government affirms, in the letter of Monsieur Drouyn de Lhuys, its right to intervene and the necessity for intervention in Mexico, to change the form of government of that country.

Thirdly, That it reserves to itself, on pretext of a payment of the debt which it is perfectly aware that Mexico cannot pay, an ever-ready excuse to resume, under more favorable circumstances, those projects which have not attained success this time

Fourthly, That these circumstances arise from natural internal com-

plications or those created by European governments in the Republic of the United States or in the South.

It follows, therefore, that the interest of the American Republic is diametrically opposed to that of European governments, for they have an interest in disuniting us, and we have an interest in remaining united; their interest is to make war—ours is to maintain peace, and, in consequence, to be logical, we should unite against them in order to paralize their bad intents.

Fifthly, That, all things considered, the result of the French intervention in Mexico, as well as that of Spain in Chili and Peru, has been disastrous to the aggressive nations as well as to those attacked. France has expended immense sums, which will never be returned, whatever arrangements may be made. How should Mexico, which, according to Monsieur Drouyn de Lhuys' admission, cannot pay the actual expenses of its own government, and wished to borrow from the French government, be able to pay, not only the necessary expenses of its own security and its maintenance, but 250,000,000 besides, a figure at which Louis Napoleon sets the services rendered by France to Mexico, and gives besides an efficacious guarantee to the subscriptions of the loan of 1864 and 1865? How could the two ports of Tampico and Vera Cruz, seized by Louis Napoleon—which, let me say in passing, is a disguised intervention that we should no more endure than any other—be able alone to suffice for paying all these arrears? Where is the new and immense commercial current directed upon Mexico, which is instantaneously to raise the custom-house receipts to the height that imperial coveteousness desires? A ruined nation neither buys nor consumes, and no one lends to such a nation. Does Monsieur Drouyn de Lhuys imagine that he is able to order the silks of Lyons and the Paris articles to walk over to Mexico in order to have the pleasure of paying duties at Vera Cruz and Tampico?

Let her do what she may, France will not be paid, and Mexico is ruined—such is the final account of this adventure, full of artifice, which some call an intervention, and others an assault, and which I, for my part, consider the first step toward the revival of the *grande flibuste.*

Meanwhile, there are things which cannot be confessed, but which must be foreseen. The days of the Mexican empire are numbered, and the treaty which apparently shields French interests, will cease to have even the force of appearing to be a treaty, if it is not ratified by that government, whatever it may be, that will replace Maximilian. Juarez will never recognize *after* what he would not recognize *before*—I mean the Mexican debt—and he is right. Louis Napoleon, on his side, will never recognize Juarez, and will not wish to treat with him. It is here that Mr. Seward's services become especially necessary, and that his journey to Saint Thomas is explained by quite another motive than that of his health. Santa Anna was considered by Seward to be worthy of treating with Louis Napoleon through his intervention, and I do not hesitate, for my part, to believe the three worthy of each other. Santa Anna will recognize the Mexican debt without paying, and will save appearances. Besides, he will satisfy the clergy, and Mr. Seward will give a fresh token in addition to those already bestowed

by him upon the interest of the Catholic Church in America. Oh, nations! what a lesson, and to us, what shame!

France baffled, Mexico ruined and crushed, the United States denying their mission and ignoring their destiny; the Republic humbled in presence of the monarchy by Seward, who coquets with Louis Napoleon. Such is the result of the policy of those exceptional beings whom the credulity of nations entitles statemen.

O sheep of Panurge! when will you be able to do without the butcher and the shepherd!

Since the occasion offers itself, permit me to show you, without disguise, one of these statesmen, dealers in nations, and paid by their shepherds to deliver them up to the butcher. I choose at hazard, and do not choose one of the most perverted. Dubois de Saligny is neither above nor below the average of his brethren.

CHAPTER XII.

DUBOIS DE SALIGNY.

The personification of the evil genius of France at the beginning of the Mexican question is Monsieur Dubois de Saligny. It was he who furnished combustibles for the fire, grouped them, placed them, ignited them, and continually stirred their flames to fury. This work accomplished, his government thought fit to break the tool that would be, henceforth, valueless in its hands. Far be it from me to confound the tool with the hands that use it, or to attribute to Monsieur de Saligny what belongs to Louis Napoleon; but, by throwing a beam of light upon the servant who has, till now, remained in the shade, I think that some rays of it will fall upon the master. "Like master, like man," says the proverb—"like man, like master," we may add.

The family of Monsieur Dubois de Saligny is unknown. Raised as a purser in the College Henri Quatre in Paris, at the period when the Duke of Orleans was studying there, he became intimate with that young prince, who encouraged him, at a later period, to enter upon diplomacy. Such was the origin of his political career, the greater part of which has been passed in America. Monsieur Dubois de Saligny (or Dubois, as those who knew him as a youth, were accustomed to call him) belonged to the Orleanist party through inclination, interest and gratitude—if gratitude could have had any hold upon him—when the Revolution of February broke out. He did not hesitate an instant between Cavagnac and Louis Napoleon, and I remember the conversation which we had one evening as we were walking together near the Magdalen Church in Paris. It was some weeks before the election of the 10th of December. I was then commander of a battalion of Gardes Mobiles, and as I had, beside, raised all those of the Twelfth Arrondissement, the most populous and dangerous in Paris at that period, it was not unimportant to have my influence. Saligny undertook this commission, and, after having represented to me the

personal advantages which I might derive from a determination, such as he desired, he gave me, to support his word, the *exact* figure of the future votes in favor of the two candidates. Was it chance or perspicacity? I do not know. I have, however, always inclined to the latter hypothesis. Monsieur de Saligny has one of the clearest minds it is possible to meet with; and as neither his conscience nor his sensibility ever interpose between his mind and his aim, he often attains it —but he often, also, sees it escape him.

With Louis Napoleon, Saligny triumphed. Not being a personage great enough to play a first *role*, he brought Changarnier into play, and wished to turn that general into the head of a party. He was, if not the soul of the *Rue de Poitiers* (which lay in Thiers), at least its arm, by means of Changarnier, and was, firstly, made head of staff in the National Guard, then commanded by that general, and afterward ambassador to La Haye.

Foreseeing the *coup d' etat*, he thought himself able, not only to prevent, but to be in advance of it in favor of the Orleans family. Changarnier, like him, thought his measures sufficient, and, confiding in success, began the celebrated phrase: "Mandatories of the people, deliberate in peace," &c., the echo of which was destined to be lost in the hurrahs uttered by the drunkards who conquered on the 2d of December, and who sent the mandatories of the people to deliberate in peace, but alone, at Mazas, Lambessa, Belle Isle and Cayenne.

Louis Napoleon was somewhat more prompt, and was better served than Changarnier.

Saligny naturally lost his position, and during some years vegetated in Paris, without means, which was insupportable to a man who had appetites instead of principles.

Tired of this situation, he determined to rally to Louis Napoleon's government, under pretext that France imperatively required his presence in Mexico. I am not satirizing in the least. Monsieur de Saligny thought proper, for form's sake, to consult his former political friends upon his reëntrance into political life, as necessitated by the want of a diplomatic agent in Mexico perfectly acquainted with the country. Every one naturally replied that it was needless to ask opinions, when a determination is already taken. Monsieur de Morny was the intermediary in the diplomatic *rentree* of Monsieur de Saligny. Like the latter, he had been a friend of the Duke of Orleans, and, what is more, had been attached to the king's household. Both he and De Saligny had the same tastes, the same passions, the same absolute want of principle. It is my belief that Morny and Saligny had already concocted the Jecker swindle.

It was then to an Orleanist, a friend of Morny, a man under the indirect influence of one of the counsellors of Jefferson Davis, a man connected by interest with the most influential, grasping and immoral men in France, that French interests in Mexico were about to be confided.

If it be observed that the Jecker debt, of which Morney, Saligny, and those with them, became the purchasers, served as a departing point for the reclamation, and next for the intervention of France: that Jecker, born in Switzerland, was made French for the needs of the scheme: that the secession of the South was one of the determining

causes—as I have shown by diplomatic correspondence—of the armed action of France in Mexico: that the Orleanist party and England have not ceased to observe with pleasure how Louis Napoleon was becoming more and more involved in this unlucky Mexican affair: it will be apparent that Saligny was the man for the situation, and that he fulfilled his diabolic mission fitly. He secured the reimbursement of the Jecker credit, at the expense of the people of France, procured a diversion for the South, by which he was not able, it is true, to profit —but that was not his fault—and tied a ball to the foot of Louis Napoleon, of which that monarch is not yet rid.

If it be observed that Monsieur de Morny, loaded by Louis Napoleon with every favor that an absolute sovereign can confer upon a subject, ought to have been sincerely attached to the empire, I would reply that Monsieur de Morny was suspected of Orleanist proclivities. This is not surprising to any man who knows the human heart. Monsieur de Morny looked upon himself as having quite as good a right to the succession of Napoleon I as Napoleon III, just as Prince Napoleon considers that he has a still greater claim. De Morny's perspicacity was, besides, too great not to see through the weakness of the government founded by him, and not to seek in a more stable government the consolidation of the advantages which he had been the most eager and best able to derive from the first. Certain it is that Monsieur de Morny disappeared with De Saligny, now dismissed from office, once more poor, sore at heart, and engaged in thinking in Paris of the revelations which he might make: revelations that are looked for with impatience, and which he will never dare utter, for, though he has the boldness of intrigue, he has not the courage for action.

If I add to this moral portrait that of a man of brown complexion, small, thin, ruddy, with eyes changing like those of a cat, according to the light that falls upon them, and an exterior naturally commonplace, though somewhat improved by the habits of society; a fast and good talker, who would be very dangerous if he could succeed in being sympathetic, I shall have completed the portrait of a man whose action was fatal to France and to Louis Napoleon, but will, I trust, be powerless in what concerns ourselves.

Now, that I have shown what the instrument is, let us examine the pretext.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE LATIN RACE.

It is in the name of the preponderance of the Latin race that its champion, Louis Napoleon, sent the flag of France into Mexico, and that Lamartine has declared America to be the property of Europe. It is in the name of the interests of the Latin race in Europe, that Spain sent fleets against Chili and Peru, and seeks to lengthen out her powerless arm to grasp anew her ancient colonies, now regenerated and formed into American republics.

Let us glance at this race, let us examine its past, its present and its future, its historical life, active and passive; what it was in Europe, and what it is in America. Let us see if what this race really represents in civilization, in philosophy, and in point of fact, warrants the trammelling of progress, the ruin of right; and let us ask it—like some new Joshua—a crowned, booted and spurred Don Quixote, should say to that sun of thought, the nineteenth century: "Stand still! thou shalt go no further! the Latin race cannot follow thee; and the Latin race is humanity."

A man, a poet, a genius of form, deprived of thought, morality, principle or political faith, made more aged by error and by pleasure than by years, an abortion of a great man, LAMARTINE, in a word, has made himself the bard of the Latin race and its officious advocate.

He alone has understood the imperial idea which he considers "just as necessity, vast as the ocean, new as, *l' apropos*, a statesman's thought fertile as the future, a thought of salvation for America, as well as for the world."

In replying to a man who takes things up from so lofty a stand, I shonld have little to say to embrace my subject entire, starting always from this thought: "It is necessary," says Monsieur de Lamartine, "to depart from a very high stand to conceive its scope. The first empire, an entirely military empire, which gave up Louisiana for a piece of army bread, never conceived such a one."

That is a curious elevation of thought in which the grandest combinations appear to man only as microscopic details. Where Napoleon I, soaring into the future, discovered a rival to England and an ally for France, where his practical genius created both bv ridding himself of a ruinous colony, which it was impossible to retain, his nephew and Lamartine see only an error and a contractor's agreement.

Monsieur de Lamartine continues: "The thought of a bold and efficacious position to be taken in Mexico, against the usurpation of the United States of America, is a novel but just thought."

"Europe has a right to it; France takes the initiative."

"Let us see the right from that elevated point of view from which *the lawfulness of things* are seen, and let us start from the fact, true, though not radical, that *the globe is the property of man; the new continent—America—is the property of Europe.*"

It is a sorry point of view from which the lawfulness of things is discovered outside of morality. The galleys are filled with men who, because they rose so high above the lawfulness of *mine* and *thine*, were brought down to earth at Brest, Toulon, Sing Sing or Tortugas, by the weight of the irons which society thought it advisable to rivet to their feet. It is this galley-slave's morality which controls the lawfulness of property by covetousness, that Monsieur de Lamartine wishes to introduce into the code of nations. His thought is, certainly, quite as novel as it is just; but he deceives himself in making France and Europe the accomplices of his highly original morality.

"Starting from this principle," continues he, "now become a fact, that the American continent is the property of the human species, and not the riven *union* of a single race without right or title, at least over Spanish America, and *the Latin race the parent of all civilization*, the principle of the protection of Europe and its independence, at least in its seven-

teen republican states in Southern America, evidently flows forth as to us and all the powers of the Old World. Events must be foreseen. The Latin race must be protected, and, in order to protect, a position must first be taken upon the threatened point *against* the United States.

"This must be done, or it must be declared that the new continent, *the possession of Europe*, will belong entire, in twenty-four years, perhaps, to those armed pioneers, who only recognize their convenience as the claim to usurpation, and who permit their citizens, as, for example, Walker, to individually raise fleets and armies against Cuba, while their federal general, *in the name of the Union, enters Mexico*, and thence all the capitals of civilized America in the South!"

Who, then, are we who people America? Where is that unique race, without right or title, who possess it? Are we not French, German, English, Irish, Italians, Spanish, Russians, Poles, Belgians, Swedes, Danes, Chinese and Turks—in a word, the living and universal protestation of the free human species against crowned oppressors? There is our right, and therein our title of property. Do you mean to deny this? Advocate of the past! show the title of your client to the property of the future!

And what, after all, is America, if not the immense crucible in which God amalgamates the races in fusion, in order to cause the future type of humanity, *the* FREE MAN, to appear?

The globe is the property of MAN, and the new continent that of LIBERTY!

It is owing to this title, and to it alone, that we all, without distinction of race or nation, exiles, voluntary or not, from despotic and Catholic Europe, have taken possession of this continent; it is by this title that we shall know how to defend its integrity and develop its greatness. By shaking the dust off our feet upon the threshold of the Old World, we have said "Raca!" to that stepmother whose impoverished frame bears only beggars and courtiers, and who has no longer any place at her fireside even for Hugo, the greatest poet of modern times. *Ubi libertas, ibi patria.*

Monsieur de Lamartine is wrong in speaking of that Latin race as "the mother of all civilization." That civilization of the "good old times" is not so far behind us but that we can still hear the groans of its victims. At Monsieur de Lamartine's age, the ossified heart no longer beats, the veiled eye discerns no longer, the impaired hearing is no longer susceptible; but we, we still feel the burning stigma that the *droits du seigneur* branded upon our brows; the rust has not yet eaten away the instruments of torture to which the bleeding limbs of our brothers hung; we see their palpitating remains, and the last death rattle of their agony still grates upon our ears, crying hatred, vengeance and liberty.

Your Latin civilization is Catholicism, and Catholicism is reason humbled before faith. "Believe without understanding, obey without murmuring, humble thyself and hold thy tongue," say your priests and your kings. We say: "Do not believe what you do not understand; only obey that law to which you have consented; raise yourself up, speak and fight, if your rights and dignity are threatened. Be your own judge, priest and king! *Be yourself!* BE A MAN."

It is upon these principles that we have associated ourselves to-

gether, men of the future, without distinction of race or nation—thus preluding that great universal harmony in which a man will no longer be an Englishman, a Frenchman, or an American, but a man, the immense edifice, the eternal monument of divine goodness and wisdom, based upon science and crowned by liberty.

It is in vain that Lamartine endeavors to place Walker's expedition, and similar acts, upon the account book of liberty. It would be necessary to be ignorant or unjust not to know that *flibustier* expeditions were exclusively composed of southern adventurers, and that they derived their origin, as well as their resources, from that aristocracy, driven back by the North, which sought in the South for a means of territorial increase for its privileged institution.

We have been in Mexico, it is true, but, though victory led us there, respect for right brought us back. We ask your superior civilization to imitate us.

You speak of the civilized capitals of South America. To what civilization do you allude? To that which caused thousands of women to perish in the Church of Santa Fé, because of failure in performing a miracle, or to that which protested, by the voice of indignant brothers and husbands, against the excessive influence of the Roman priesthood over their wives and sisters and daughters?

Is it the civilization of Naples, with its bleeding Saint Jauvier and that of Santa Fe with its weeping Virgin, that you wish, in harmony with Spain, to protect in America? It is only necessary to understand the value of words. With you, to *protect* means to *seize*, and civilization means *bigotry*. Let us adopt these definitions, but allow us to repulse both protection and civilization.

We shall be none the less virtuous and religious; we shall continue to go every Sunday to our churches to worship the Eternal Father, without believing in any miracle however small; all the virgins upon earth may shed all the tears in their eyes, and Saint Jauvier may waste all the blood in his body; we shall not pay the slightest attention to it; and as for our ministers, we pay them, but we do not grant them either the hearts of our wives or the keys of our houses.

You see that our civilization is not the offspring of the Latin civilization. Why, then, do you say that the latter is the mother of all others?

Yours is confusion of ideas as well as confusion of words. Where is the Latin race? Where is the Anglo Saxon race? Can France, with two-thirds of its population of Celtic and Saxon races, call herself the Latin race? And can North America, with half her population of Celtic or Latin race, call herself Anglo Saxon? Most assurdly not.

The Latin race is all entire in Southern Italy and in certain parts of Spain and Provence, as the Anglo Saxon race is confined to England. To be convinced of this it is sufficient, without having recourse to any ethmological research, to glance at two crews taken by chance from the English, French and American fleets. The English sailors are ruddy, heavy, light haired and fair, forming a striking contrast with the United States sailors, thin, full of nerve, dark haired and tall, while the French sailors, almost like those of America, are, nevertheless, shorter in stature and broader in the shoulders.

Our race is the race of the future. Without a historical past, that race is as yet without a name. God grant that it may bear that of America.

There was a time when nations, confined and packed into certain very restricted limits, for want of means of communication, to a certain degree, constituted races. Then, there was a Latin race, whose ignorance, lust, violence and narrow-mindedness have left bloody and ridiculous traces in history. That race burned John Huss, and forced Galileo to retract. It had the crown with the tiara and the stake as its symbols, and as its representatives, a warrior, a bishop and a prostitute. Every where that the Latin race appears it is preceded, accompanied and followed by these three personages. Little does it matter whether it crosses the ocean with Cortes or Forey. Centuries change nothing in its way of acting. Only liberty and contact with the Saxon race can modify it.

The Latin race of the past is Borgia and Torquemada. Francis I, the *roi chevalier*, that Latin king, *par excellence*, who died of quite another plague than that of Saint Louis, after having bartered his children for is person and his people for his children. The Latin race is Louis XV, and the present queen of Spain; it is Bourbon and Bonaparte. It is France, with 600,000 functionaries for ten millions of men, a governor to every fifteen governed, which caused Paul Louis Courrier to say that his people were a race of lacqueys.

It is France, an entire nation, formerly free and warlike, now subjected and united in sending her learned men, her old men, her soldiers and her workers to bend down before a lad of ten years of age, president "heaven save the mark!" (of the Universal Exhibition!) It is before this supreme expression of industry and science with a stick of barley candy in his mouth, that the most eminent men from all parts of the world will come to incline themselves. It is great, beautiful, and quite worthy of the epoch! Yet we, free men, propose to form a part of the *cortege* of European servility, and to go and bow down also before the imperial baby!

This is contempt of nations carried to its furthest limit. It is Victor Emmanuel pressing the hand of Napoleon, who retains the capital of his people. It is the Greek people, the Roman people, the Belgian people, distributed without their consent to certain men of a particular species called princes. It is the light-haired prince of Austria declared by Louis Napoleon unworthy of governing Milan, but thought good enough to be made a Mexican Emperor. It is the people of France paying 500,000,000 to extirpate the Hapsburg poison in Italy, and 750,000,000 to transport it to Mexico, where it becomes the universal panacea. The Latin idea is superiority always affirmed, never proved, which says to the Arabs, by Louis Napoleon's lips:— "You belong to us by right of civilization;" to the republics of the South, "by the cannon of Spanish fleets;" Monarchy never abdicate even by treaty; to America by the voice of Leamartine: "You are the property of Europe because you have gold and corn." For, to return to Lamartine's own words: "Now, who does not know that the corn and wheat of America, of the valley of the Mississippi, especially, are the granary of the world in case of famine, as Sicily was the granary of the Romans."

Who does not know that the master of capital is the master of interests, and that Europe, soon given up to this country of all monopoly, would forever bear her yoke? Who does not know that, masters of the price of silver and gold, they would also be masters of our most vital industry, and that their already planned coalition against the silk trade, which rivals their cotton trade, would ruin Lyons, the capital of tissues, and the second capital of France?"

"Let us then seize America."

The Latin idea is the suppression of the commandments of God replaced by the Gosple according to coveteousness.

The Latin idea is monopoly deified in the person of an emperor. Who, then, can print his thoughts, discuss public expenses, defend his interest and the dignity of the country, without permission of the Emperor in France? Who then, has the monopoly of thought in France? Who then thinks, speaks, acts, consumes for France? A man, a single man! Is not this the last shameful and pitable expression of monopoly? Forty million of French monopolised by one!

The Latin idea is hypocrisy, as necessary to tyrants as to slaves. The Latin idea in the past, it is the ferocity of the tiger Marquez, causing Jose Charez to be assassinated in cold blood, after having massacred a hundred of his sleeping soldiers. It is that tiger, with a humane face causing seven physicians, whom he had torn from the bedside of their hospital patients, to be assassinated by moonlight in Tacubaya. It is Miramon stealing 3,000,000, from the cash box of the English consulate; it is Tuloaga, Ramirez and Almonte.

The Latin idea, the traditional idea, is that of sovereign authority, personified in the mind by opposition to popular sovereignity personified in the mass; it is monarchy, just as the American idea is the republic.

The Latin idea, the negation of liberty, equality, solidarity, those essential and divine belongings of man, is a chronic blasphemy, and its triumph would be the denial of God.

Fortunately, side by side with the Latin race of the past, is the Latin race of the present, regenerated by liberty and by contract with the Saxon race of the new world. If the former had its Borgias, its Boubons, its Bonapartes, its Marquez and its Dupins, if it had Michael Chevalier and Lamartine, to preach its crusade, a Saint Simonian condemned by the correctional police for having preached the serfdom of man and the freedom of women, the rehabitation of matter and flesh at the expense of mind and morals, a "free lover," and a beggar without decency, who spits upon the hand that refuses him alms, let us thank God that the latter has had its Bolivar, its Juarez, and its Garibaldi. If Marquez, Dupin, Mendez, and their like, in virtue of the orders of their sovereign have basely assassinated defenceless prisoners, Juarez, better inspired, has generously sent back the Belgian prisoners, refusing to avenge himself upon the innocent.

Guided by the example of Washington and by that of our fathers, these men have perferred right to power, justice to force and the esteem of their fellow-citizens, to titles and crosses. Thanks to these examples and to the remembrance of past oppression, the American republics, regenerated by liberty, they are ridding themselves every day of all useless mitred and gold laced men. Free and joyous, they

have proved to the world that a nation attends to its affairs much better without such men than with them.

But, neither Louis Napoleon nor the Pope nor Spain could tolerate such scandal. The Latin idea mocked at by the Latin's themselves! What an example!

The champions of the Latin race resolved to put an end to the existing scandal and to seek out the idea opposed to their own and strangle it upon its own hearth. We Americans were to strong, they were obliged to content themselves with Mexico, while waiting for something better, and thus it is that the last named unfortunate country has been obliged to undergo the invasion of the Russians of the west, of a new attila coming to destroy republican civilization in the name of monarchial barbarity.

Thanks to the French people, which must not always be confounded with its government, and thanks to ourselves in a measure the experiment will fail. Spain does not consider herself beaten in order to obtain consolation for the prostration of her hopes in Mexico, seeks a compensation in Chile and Peru. The question is the same. The proportions only are changed.

This is the second time, in less than half a century, that Europe has sought to throw itself upon America. The first time, the attempt ended in the Monroe doctrine, let us hope that this time, it will make the solidarity of nations a fact and a truth.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE.

The Monroe Doctrine has furnished and still continues to furnish subject-matter for considerable discussion; and judging from the views of Europe, and those of our State Department, the question appears to be not well understood. By the first it is interpreted as a species of ostracism directed by America against Europe, and is consequently considered as a drawback to the absolute liberty that we invoke; by the second it is interpreted as an edict of the Southern pro-slavery faction, giving the American continent the monopoly of slavery, without the possibility of any interference on the part of the so-called liberals of Europe, as far as regards the "peculiar institution." In the opinion of the latter it is destined to disappear simultaneously with the institution which it was intended to protect and with its founders. Mr. Seward, we believe, would not give one dollar nor one man towards the maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine.

Both of these interpretations err in representing the great palladium, not only of America, but of universal liberty, as a blow aimed at liberty.

As the maintenance of this doctrine is one of the fundamental features of our platform, and as it involves the life and death of America and liberty—which are synonymous terms, America having no right to exist in a political, social, or religious sense, except as the liberal outlet of the old world, and as its regenerator through liberty—we

propose to treat this question thoroughly, in its past, present and future. We design to examine into the circumstances under which and from which it originated; in what conditions it now exists; upon what ground it has been attacked; by what arguments it should be defended; and finally, what would be the political consequences of its abandonment.

DEFINITION.

"The Declaration of Independence was the first breath of independent national life on this continent. The United States assumed at once the rank and the responsibilities of a real nation among nations, having the right to govern itself, to make war and peace, and to determine its own policy in relation to other nations, according to its own judgment of its own interests and duties. This new nation was not in Europe, was not subject to the liabilities of the European governments, nor interested in the rise and fall of European dynasties, not concerned for the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe, not subject to the calculations and complications of European statesmanship. It was a new sensation, an unsolved problem, to meet face to face an American nation, civilized, Christian, responsible, and respectable, demanding a place among the family of nations, as one of them, and yet separate and aloof from all the machinations of diplomacy, and unconcerned in any of the anxieties of state-craft. No wonder that kings and courts were at a loss and uneasy with such an anomaly. From that day no art or effort has been left untried to bring the United States into their circle, as a new subject for their tricks and manœuvres."—*Rev. J. Leavitt.*

The United States, as a nation, originated, as have all other nations, in war. There was a war with France, and a war with England; a war without army, navy, or money, but supported by the people on their own account, a war that could have but one issue—victory.

The independence of the United States as well as the absolute diplomatic isolation of the country were duly admitted. In order to comprehend the value of that diplomatic isolation, and the circumstances which gave birth to the complications necessitating the Monroe doctrine, we have to consider what was, and still is, the compass directing every political combination between the governments of Europe. This compass is known as the "Balance of Power," and is thus defined by Doctor Leavitt:

"The circle of nations who recognize this system are supposed to maintain an understanding among themselves, that no one among them can interfere with the essential rights of another among them, without exposing itself to the censure of the rest, and then to the danger of a counter interference and coalition for the redress of the wrong. Also, that no one nation ought to acquire such surpassing power as to be able to defy this censure, or to domineer at pleasure over any or all of the rest. The coalitions to curb the grasping ambition of Charles V., of Louis XIV., and of Napoleon Bonaparte, are instances of gigantic struggle and vast combination of strength for the preservation of the Balance of Power."

That a practical form might be given to this system the five great powers of Europe declared themselves judges, or an Executive

Committee of the affairs of nations. The following extract from Mr. Kinglake's *Crimean War* very accurately sets forth the custom, if not the law, exercised in regulating European affairs:

"It is a rough and wild-grown system, and its observance can only be enforced by opinion, and by the belief that it truly coincides with the interests of every power which is called upon to obey it; but practically, it has been made to achieve a fair portion of that security which sanguine men might hope to see resulting from the adoption of an international code. Perhaps, under a system ideally formed for the safety of nations and for the peace of the world, a wrong done to one State would be instantly treated as a wrong done to all. But in the actual state of the world there is no such bond between nations. It is true that the law of nations does not stint the right of executing justice, and that any Power may either remonstrate against a wrong done to another State, great or small, or may endeavor, if so it chooses, to prevent or redress the wrong by force of arms; but the duties of States in this respect are very far from being coextensive with their rights.

"In Europe, all States except the Five Great Powers are exempt from the duty of watching over the general safety; and even a State which is one of the five great powers is not practically under an obligation to sustain the cause of justice, unless its preception of the wrong is re-enforced by a sense of its own interests. Moreover, no State, unless it be combating for its very life, can be expected to engage in a war without a fair prospect of success. But when the three circumstances are present—when a wrong is being done against any State, great or small, when that wrong in its present or ulterior consequences happens to be injurious to one of the five great powers, and finally, when the great power so injured is competent to wage war with fair hopes, then Europe is accustomed to expect that the great power which is sustaining the hurt will be enlivened by the smart of the wound, and for its own sake, as well as for the public weal, will be ready to come forward in arms, or to labor for the formation of such leagues as may be needed for upholding the cause of justice. If a power fails in this duty to itself and to Europe, it gradually becomes lowered in the opinion of mankind, and happily there is no historic lesson more true than that which teaches all rulers that a moral degradation of this sort is speedily followed by disasters of such a kind as to be capable of being expressed in arithmetic." (Pp. 36, 37.)

Now, if we wish to see how this balance of power works under the management of the Executive Committee formed of the five great powers, we have but to listen to Doctor Leavitt, who informs us partially of the benefits arising from this holy alliance, but still sufficiently to give us a general idea of the spirit which animates and directs it:

"Some instructive views of the practical operation of this system, in the case of what are called Minor Powers, may be gathered from a cursory examination of the history of Modern Greece. About forty years ago, the people of Greece, of their own accord and by their own motion, threw off the intolerable yoke of Turkey, and declared themselves an independent nation. Thereupon, and forthwith,

the Three Great Powers took the nation in charge, forbade the further attempts of Turkey to subdue them, and required of them to confine their country forever within certain narrow limits, to become a hereditary monarchy, and to choose a king for themselves from among the royal families of Europe, subject to the approval of the Three Powers. They also assume the right of requiring the funding of the revolutionary debt, nominally of fourteen millions of dollars, although only five millions had reached the national treasury. In 1832, the Powers interfered again, creating another debt of ten millions, of which about one million went for roads and other beneficial objects, and the rest was absorbed by the harpies of King Otho's court. In 1854, the debt had grown to sixty millions, and there was another interference of the Three Powers, resulting in a requisition that Greece should reserve annually nine hundred thousand francs—nearly two hundred thousand dollars—for her creditors, out of a revenue barely reaching four millions per annum, in a country where material civilization is far in arrear. This requirement, after some years delay, was complied with for one year, and then followed a revolution. But Greece is still held by the bondage of this debt under the tutelage of the ever present Three Powers, who allow no free choice to the people but to try over again the disastrous experiment so fully tried out in thirty years of unhapiness, of another hereditary dynasty, under a king subject to the approval of the Powers. And the millstone of a debt of sixty millions, for which Greece never received above one tenth of the value, is still bound about her neck, and the yearly payment is to be coerced by the Powers, on penalty of war, and subjugation, and national extinction. Such is the working of the political system of Europe, as organized by the Congress of Vienna, and administered by the Great Powers. Some American writers have spoken of the Holy Alliance as a thing of the past. Greece finds it a living dominion, from whose grasp she as yet sees no possible way of escape. Perhaps some reflecting minds will trace out from this example an analysis of the principles involved in the Treaty of London, under which the Mexican Republic is invaded by a European coalition to compel the payment of debts and claims even more exorbitant than those under which Greece is pressed to the earth, and will thus learn the meaning of the phrase, the extension of the Political System of Europe to the American Continent."

The avowed object of the balance of power system being to establish and maintain public tranquility in Europe, it became necessary for the Executive Committee to adopt a political governing formula, one that should alone be received as legal; and the monarchical form was naturally adopted by the five great monarchical powers as the only one compatible with the peace of Europe. In the name of this sacred principle all liberty to manage their own affairs consonantly with their respective interests and sympathies, was denied to those nations that might be too weak to uphold their rights by force. It was a vast association of speculators in nationalities under the control of five crowned highwaymen and Europe was the scene of their first exploits.

Being warned by the terrible example of France, which, during

twenty-five years, in the name of liberty, withstood alone all Europe coalesced, succumbing only when the despotism of Bonaparte proved that liberty had nothing further to hope from the despot's victories, this European Executive Committee, or Holy Alliance, resolved to prevent the introduction of the liberal element everywhere and under all possible forms of government, even under the monarchical form. its *beau ideal*, its political standard, was asolute and hereditary monarchy, born of divine right, consecrated by priestly ceremonies, and protected by the sword. Constitutional monarchies were concessions made to the times and to the force of public sentiment, a new element born in Europe of the French revolution. This element was weak then, but since it has grown unceasingly until it now occupies an important place in the counsels of Europe, where it will indeed shortly occupy the first.

The Swiss Republic was an anomaly due to circumstances altogether local.

It has never been, nor is it to-day, admitted that a government sprung from the will of the people can have an equal political and moral value with a government arising from divine right, that is, a government based upon traditionary abuses, and one that is accountable to God alone in the persons of its ministers.

The consequence of this doctrine is, that any attempt on the part of a people to directly ameliorate their political form of government is immoral and injurious to the balance of power or the peace of Europe, and sacreligious, moreover, as it aims a blow at the divine rights of dynasties. Such a movement is deemed null and void in right and deed, and it is the province of the Executive Committee to intervene to prevent it, if possible, but in any event to prevent its extension.

This was the doctrine of the conservative party at the period when the Congresses of Aix la Chapelle, Trappau, Laybach, and Verona were held, and it was expressed in the following formula in a joint circular issued by the sovereigns to their respective legations; a circular to which England saw fit to reply by a counter-circular, addressed to her diplomatic agents, which establishes the authenticity of the document. It reads: "The powers have undoubtedly the right to take precautionary measures in common, where it only for the sake of example, against those States where the political changes produced by rebellion are hostile to legitimate government."

We will add, that the doctrine prevailing at that time is the present doctrine of the conservative party. Opportunities to put the doctrine into practice were not wanting before long.

In July, 1820, the Neapolitan revolution broke out. At the request of the Emperor of Austria the Czar of Russia and the King of Prussia met at Trappau, at which conference the envoys of France and England were received, and there it was decreed to quash the Neapolitan revolution. But, before proceeding further, the sovereigns agreed to meet the following year at Laybach, and to invite the King of Naples to be present at this Congress.

The declaration made by the sovereigns was explicit beyond the possibility of misinterpretation. They proclaimed that they would not suffer in any country a political establishment antagonistic to

the principle of monarchical legitimacy, and that they did not in any manner recoginize the new order of things existing at Naples, and they decided that the King should be reinvested with the power *ad integram* as held by him on the fifth of July, 1820. Another dispatch, addressed by these sovereigns to their diplomatic agents on the twelfth of July, 1821, is expressed thus: "Useful or necessary changes in the legislation and administration of States should emanate alone from the free will and the mature and enlightened impulsion of those whom God has rendered responsible and entrusted with power. All action aside from this course must lead to disorder and perturbation, to evils much more intolerable than those which it is attempted to remedy." Being convinced of this eternal truth, the sovereigns unhesitatingly proclaimed it, frankly and vigorously. They decided that while respecting the rights and the independence of every legitimate power, they would consider as legally void and inconsistent with the principles constituting the public right of Europe, any assumed reform effected by revolt or open force.

The following year another congress was held; at Verona this time. It was no longer the question of Naples at this conference, but of Spain, which had drawn up a constitution to the offence of the ligitimate government of Louis XVIII. After consultation, the Congress declared its willingness to support France, if necessary, in the ligitimate enterprise of eradicating this germ of liberalism. Upon this point, Prince Metternich wrote to the Austrain representative at Madrid: "Faithful to the system of conservatism and peace, for the maintenance of which he has contracted invoilable engagements with his august allies, His Majesty will not cease to consider all disorder and perturbations, *whichever part of Europe may suffer by them*, as a subject of lively solicitude to all the governments," etc.

Thus the perturbations and disorder in the Spanish colonies affecting Spain as a part of Europe, Europe proposed to apply the balance of power and public tranquility system in the New World, the whole being based upon the only political form capable of insuring its duration, namely, the monarchical form; and we can conceive that the Government at Washington at that time must have seriously reflected upon the possible extension of the political system of Europe to America.

In order to comprehend the importance of Prince Metternich's dispatch, it must be remembered that the Spanish colonies, during the war between Spain and Bonaparte, being separated from the mother country, restricted as all colonies are, discontented and obliged to provide for their own future, had declared themselves independent, perhaps at the instigation of Bonaparte, and with the exception of Brazil and Mexico, the latter temporarily, had adopted the republican form of government; and this great declaration of independence swept away the last vestiges of European doctrines and influence on the American Continent in one of the great liberal triumphs of this country. Daniel Webster thus describes it in his magnificent language:

"Among the great events of the half-century, we must respect certainly, the revolution of South America; and we are not likely to

overrate the importance of that revolution, either to the growth of the country itself, or to the rest of the world. When the battle of Bunker Hill was fought, the existence of South America was scarcely felt in the civilized world. The thirteen little colonies of North America habitually called themselves the Continent. Borne down by colonial subjugation, monopoly, and bigotry, those vast regions of the South were hardly visible above the horizon. But in our day there has been, as it were, a new creation. The Southern Hemisphere emerges from the sea. Its lofty mountains begin to lift themselves into the light of heaven; its broad and fertile plains stretch out in beauty to the eye of civilized man; and at the bidding of the voice of political liberty, the waters of darkness retire."

We must take into consideration the political situation of the United States in 1823, which is perfectly defined by Dr. Leavitt, in the following terms:

"Fortunately, we had men in the administration of our government, who possessed both the *wisdom and the patriotism* to comprehend the situation, and act as the occasion required. It was the golden *period of our political history.* The devotion to public interests which characterized the days of the revolution had not died out, for Jefferson, Madison, Marshall, Rufus King, and many of their compatriots were still alive. The native sagacity of our early statesmen which had baffled the diplomatic skill of Europe, had been ripened by the practical experience of thirty years in the administration of affairs at home and abroad. Private interest had not become so large as to withdraw most of the ablest men from public service. Party spirit had not eaten out the keen sense of what becomes the honor of the country. And *slavery had not yet extinguished patroitism in half the States of the Union.* It was in the lull of party strife called 'the era of good feelings.' It was the transition period between the patriotic inexperience of our infant Government and the dominant selfishness of late years. Some of the men still in public life had participated in the cares of government when the indifference, if not contempt of Europe for our insignificance was a shield to us against agression. All of them had participated in the anxious and critical period of the 'second war of independence,' by which we had at length gained the respectful consideration of the European governments. It was a crisis in our affairs, and we had men who could see its importance, and who knew how to meet it. And it is not too much to say, that if the policy which they adopted had been properly carried out by their successors, we should have been saved from many humiliations, as well as many political evils, which have been or will be our portion."

By this we may easily estimate the effect produced in the midst of such a social condition, by the following conclusion drawn from the doctrines emanating from the Holy Alliance in the name of Europe: America is simply an aggregation of individuals who are perfectly free to combine or separate at pleasure, according to the capricious law combining them, without injuring any principle of political ethics.

Europe formally declared by the voices of her sovereigns, that the people are created for the kings to whom they may be allotted by the grace of God, represented by his vicars and his ministers here below.

America replied by her acts and proved by her prosperous example

that governments are made by and for the people, and hence that the stability of a government depends entirely upon the consent of the people, which may be granted or refused, according to the merits of the government.

The practical conclusion of this antagonism, and of the European doctrine, was very simple. In a political as well as moral point of view, the Spanish colonies, were it only for the sake of example, according to the apt expression in the circular issued by the Laybach Congress, must resume allegiance to a legitimate government, even should Europe be forced to interfere.

Hence what anxiety must those men have felt who controlled the destinies of America in 1823, when they reflected that two such opposite systems were about to be applied on the same continent! They must have asked of themselves how they might keep two such hostile elements at peace—the one born of Absolutism, the other of Liberty. And when we recollect, moreover, that the existence of America had been staked not half a century before in order to escape from the abhorrent rule whose mere name thrilled them with hatred, we may easily conceive that the idea of again encountering the danger of combatting the armed propagandism of the absolute doctrines of Europe, inspired these men with a vigorous measure, one destined to avert the danger before having to contend with it.

Matters were in this state when the death of Lord Castlereagh occurred. That zealous partizan of the Holy Alliance a short time before his death, stated to Mr. Rush, the American Ambassador at London, that he would not agree to *reconciliation between Spain and her colonies unless based upon their entire submission to the mother country.* Had this decision been carried out, it would certainly have brought about another war with America, and the death of this man, who perished by his own hand, was therefore a fortunate event for mankind. He was succeeded by George Canning, who belonged to a school of politics entirely opposed to that of his predecessor. Canning availed himself of the first opportunity to inform the French Government that England considered the course of events as having substantially decided the question of the separation of the colonies from Spain. On the twenty-third of August, 1823, Mr. Rush wrote to Mr. Canning in reply to that communication:

"That what his government most earnestly desired was to see those States 'received into the family of nations by the Powers of Europe, and especially by Great Britain;' that the sentiments in the note were shared by the United States, who considered the recovery of the colonies of Spain to be entirely hopeless, and would 'regard as highly unjust, and as fruitful of disastrous consequences, any attempt on the part of any European power, to take possession of them by conquest, by cession, or on any other ground or pretext whatever.'"

This was the prologue to the Monroe Doctrine, which was defined by the President Monroe, on the second December, 1823, in his annual message, as follows:

"Of events in that quarter of the globe with which we have so much intercourse, and from which we derive our origin, we have always been anxious and interested spectators. The citizens of the United States cherish sentiments the most friendly in favor of the liberty and

happiness of their fellow-men on that side of the Atlantic. In the wars of the European Powers, in matters relating to themselves, we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded, or seriously menaced, that we resent injuries, or make preparations for our defence. With the movements in this hemisphere, we are of necessity more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective governments. And to the defence of our own, which has been achieved with so much expense of blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed most unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to candor, and to the amicable relations subsisting between the United States and these Powers, to declare, that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European Power we have not interfered, and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence, and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration, and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition, for the purposes of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European Power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. In the war between these governments and Spain, we declared our neutrality at the time of their recognition, and to this we have adhered, and shall continue to adhere, provided no change shall occur, which, in the judgment of the competent authorities of this Government, shall make a corresponding change on the part of the United States indispensable to their security."

In another part of the message he informs Congress that he deemed the opportunity fitting to declare to the Russian Government that the American Continents, by the free and independent conditions they have assumed and maintained, are henceforth not to be considered subjects for future colonization by any European power. This doctrine, as shown in the preceding declarations, is summarily described by Doctor Leavitt in these terms:

"1st. That the American Continents, (leaving out the islands) are henceforth not to be considered subject to any future colonization by any European nation.

"2d. That we shall consider any attempt on the part of the European Powers to extend their political system to any portion of this hemisphere as 'dangerous to our peace and safety,' and of course to be counteracted or provided against, as we shall deem advisable in any case.

"3d. That for any European power to interfere with any American Government for the purpose of oppressing or dictating to them unjustly, or of controlling their destiny by force or threats, would be viewed by us as 'the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States, which we should be called upon to notice by protest or remonstrance, or in such way as we should think our honor and interest required."

The Sage of Monticello characterizes it as follows, in a letter to President Monroe, dated 24th October, 1823 :

"That made us a nation ; *this sets our compass, and points the course which we are to steer through the ocean of time.* And never could we embark on it under circumstances more auspicious. Our first and fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe. *Our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs.* America has a set of interests, (North and South), distinct from those of Europe, and peculiarly her own. She should, therefose, have a system of her own, separate and apart from that of Europe ; the last is laboring to become the domicil of despotism ; our endeavors should surely be to make our hemisphere that of freedom."

And Mr. Benton defined the idea of the American Government even still better in the following sentence :

"The Holy Alliance for the maintenance of the order of things which they had established in Europe, took it under advisement to extend their care to the young American republics of Spanish origin, and to convert them into monarchies, to be governed by sovereigns of European stocks—such as the Holy Allies might put upon them. It was against the extension of this European system to the two Americas that Mr. Monroe protested."

This was the clear and firm reply uttered by liberty and right to kings and despots of the people. America stretched out her mighty hand toward the crowned heads of Europe and cried : "Halt! Not a step further!" This calm warning menace produced a great sensation in Europe, and the Liberals took fresh courage, not only in Spain, but throughout the whole world. President Monroe's declaration was received with equal favor by all parties in the English Parliament. Lord Brougham "declared that no occasion had ever created greater joy, exultation and gratitude among all the free men in Europe ; that he felt a pride in being connected by blood and language with the people of the United States ; that the feeling disclosed by the message became a great, a free, and an independent nation ; and that he hoped his own country would be prevented by no mean pride, or paltry jealousy, from following so noble and glorious an example."

Dr. Leavitt adds :

"Such a declaration, so uttered, and received with such distinguished consideration, and followed by so momentous results, ought not to be regarded as of trifling significance or of trasient authority. By it the United States took the position which of right belonged to them, as the first of American republics, the proper representatives of American principles, the faithful defender of American interests. It was as Mr. Edward Livingstone termed it, 'a pledge to the world,' and involved national obligations and responsibilities which will never die out, so long as we remain a free republic. For the obligations assumed by nations do not die with those who incurred them, or cease to bind because not duly valued by a succeeding generation. It became and is to us, in our relations with both Europe and America, the point of honor, in losing which, we become a base nation, for honor is the chastity of nations, as patriotism is the faith of their citizens. It is to be regretted that so many of our own politiicans, from one motive and another, have either grievously misapprehended the import of the

declaration, or have been insensible of its importance as well as of its permanent force. The learned and judicious compilers of Appleton's Cyclopedia have correctly pronounced it 'a platform of principle on this important subject, which has been approved by the prominent statesmen of the country, from the time of its proclamation to the present.'"

Liberty had at last found a defender. The star of liberty rose from the American horizon, and all people learned that they might rally around a common centre which would protect their rights, their aspirations, and their beliefs. From that day we have to date the material and moral power of America; upon that day her divine mission was clearly set forth in the world's history.

The hope of nations, and a constant menace suspended above the head of despotism, an object of love and gratude to the one, and of hatred and apprehension to the other, such has been the moral rank of America in the world since the second of December, 1823; and so grand and strong is this rank, that notwithstanding the strong desire more than once manifested by Louis Napoleon and the English aristocracy to take advantage of the Southern rebellion, to sacrifice the object of their antipathies, they have been obliged to fall back, momentarily at least, before public opinion.

Notwithstanding the importance of President Monroe's declaration, it needed the sanction of a public contestation in the Congress, which fixed its limits and gave it a national ratification. This contest took place in 1826. The Central American republics, Columbia and Mexico, sent envoys to beg the government of the United States to send representatives to the Panama Congress. Mr. Clay favored the proposition, and the President agreed to it, when the opposition, which was embittered by the alleged bargain for the presidency between Adams and Clay, at once seized the opportunity to attack the policy of the government. Three leading points were brought into discussion:

1st. Whether the United States could send representatives to the Congress of Panama without violating their neutral policy?

2d. The real signification of the Monroe doctrine.

3d. Whether President Monroe's message should be considered as inaugurating the policy of the United States, or as bearing upon a special question?

The opposition said: It is evident that you intend to hold an American council of amphictyons at Panama, and oppose a holy alliance of the people to the holy alliance of sovereigns, and you violate our neutrality. With regard to the Monroe doctrine, said Mr. Hayne, of South Carolina, neither Mr. Monroe nor the American people ever intended to go beyond a simple protest. That great and good citizen well knew that in this circumstance he could only use moral force.

This interpretation raised a general outcry of indignation throughout the country, and both the friends and the opponents of the Administration spontaneously combined to reassert the national honor after this affront. Johnston, Wirt and Webster, as well as Livingston and Forsyth, received the unanimous applause of the country for protesting against Hayne's anti-national interpretation.

Livingston thus summarily discusses the question: "Monroe's declaration has been called an obligation, and so do I consider it. It is

not an obligation made with ourselves and with posterity, (an expression which I consider in fact as a subterfuge unworthy of our country, and in form as a solecism,) but an engagement entered into by us with the world, to resist European intervention in America by all means, and although the engagement has been made by only one of the great powers, it has been ratified by the unanimous consent of the nation."

Again, a certain speaker having blamed the Administration for resuscitating a doctrine which ceased to exist with the cessation of the circumstances that gave it birth, the majority declared that the United States were prepared at all times, and under all circumstances, to oppose the intervention of any European power upon the American continent, and that the Monroe doctrine had, in no wise, ceased to be the basis of American policy.

President Adams's policy received the indorsement of Congress, and in 1859 the same doctrine was reaffirmed, regarding England with the same vigor as in 1823 and 1826.

And why is this not the case in 1864? Have the relations in which Europe stands toward America become changed? Has the balance of power ceased to be the political compass of Europe? Is the Holy Alliance principle no longer in force? Has monarchial propagandism abdicated in favor of popular right? These questions should be put and solved before seeking whether it be advisable to maintain or abandon the Monroe doctrine.

We have seen Greece placed under ransom, bound, gagged, and utterly ruined, but endowed with a protectorate and a king. We have seen Italy, that new Tantalus, to whom Louis Napoleon holds up unity at the cost of liberty, and whose incarnate soul and living saviour, Garibaldi, was martyred at Aspromonte by a bullet from that subject of Napoleon, called Victor Emanuel. Each day we have the spectacle of Italy, panting and oppressed, imploring her unity, her existence, only to be refused in the name of the tranquility of Europe, for the benefit of the balance of power.

Poland, that valiant daughter of the North, has been cut and rent in pieces, broken alive; but her tenacity of life, once more in the name of right, braves and defies that high sheriff of the Holy Alliance, that great European executioner—the Czar of Russia.

Then there is Hungary, a poor victim, crushed in the iron grasp of the Czar of Russia and the Emperor of Austria, those two bandits of the North, yet the heroic resistance of Hungary has written down the Maygar name among those of the great nations of which humanity may be proud.

All resistance from these quarters being prevented, all these nations being despoiled, and the French people, their natural protector, being bound hand and foot by a Bonaparte, there remained nothing for the Holy Alliance to do, in order to extend the benefits of its organization in favor of public tranquility to the whole world and double its profits, but to attack the American giant, that living protest of right against might, of liberty against despotism, of republicanism against monarchism, of youth against decrepitude—in short, of the new world against the old.

In order to secure the continuance of the civil war raging in America, there came first a recognition of the belligerent rights of both sides, thus placing revolt and duty on an equality. From the day that that

monstrous doctrine received the sanction of Seward & Co., we may date the abdication of America as a power in the eyes of Europe; on that day Europe first thought of attaining her ends, by leaving the great Republic of the United States standing alone, so as to be able to attack her in perfect safety, as soon as the country should become sufficiently weakened by its own efforts at preservation.

Louis Napoleon was the executor, and probably the promoter of the first part of this Machiavellian programme.

Are we in less danger now than at the time of the first Holy Alliance?

Was it not in the name of the most essential principles of the Holy Alliance that Bonaparte wrote to Forey to treat any government established in Mexico as provisional, and liable to be replaced at will by another government also provisional? Is not his intention in Mexico simply the putting into practice of the doctrine against which Monroe protested in 1823? He says to Mexico, You have wronged a part of Europe by not paying your debts, and by not assuring the safety of our merchants on your soil; consequently I call upon my allies to join with me and intervene, so as to give you a more stable government, and one more consonant with our principles and our European ideas of order and honesty? What difference is there between the doctrine of the Holy Alliance in 1864 and its doctrine in 1823? Did not Europe make use of the same language in 1823 *to the Spanish-American colonies in rebellion: "You are disturbing public order, injuring a part of Europe, and giving a bad example; restore order or we shall interfere."*

Will not America remain faithful to her origin, to her history, and her great mission? Can there not be found another Monroe in 1864 to lay a heavy hand upon the crown of Louis Napoleon, and say as our fathers did to the first Holy Alliance: "Halt! in the name of the people. You can advance no further!"

The Monroe doctrine, if well understood, involves the gravest question of the age. It is destined to fix the battle-field upon which those two principles that have been opposed during so many centuries must come together; where liberty and absolutism, the people and monarchs, the right of the former to live in freedom, and to dispose of themselves and of the fruits of their labor, and the privilege of a few bandits, crowned by the grace of God, and with the sanction of his ministers, to bequeath to their descendants the sacred and inalienable right of dividing the people, their labor, their treasure, and their blood among themselves, shall decide their contest.

The American people should comprehend now what their fathers so well understood: that what affects one people affects all; that what affects the liberty of one affects the whole. Unity against the encroachments of the monarchial system, in the name of the most sacred of all rights, that of following one's own will—this is the Monroe doctrine.

CHAPTER XV.

CONCLUSION.

I HAVE shown, as clearly and succintly as lies in my power, the different phrases of this pitiable Mexican adventure, represented by

Louis Napoleon as the greatest enterprize of his reign. Notwithstanding, it has not succeeded in pleasing any nation, either in Europe or America; neither Mexicans nor French, neithar clericals nor liberals, not even Louis Napoleon nor Maximilian themselves. Not even the speculators who, vulture-like find a prey everywhere. England alone, perhaps, finds her account in the affair, but she hoped for better things.

I have shown the duplicity, which, as early as 1861, presided over the councils of Spain and France, in the preparations for the expedition. I have shown Spain, deceived in all its Bourbon hopes, retiring sulkily, while England, after having mingled, just sufficiently in the plot to know all its details, retired also, rubbing her hands with satisfaction at having helped France into a quagmire, from which she might emerge as best she could.

I have shown Monsieur Billaut declaring, in 1862, in the name of Louis Napoleon, that France had only gone to Mexico to protect its natives, and not in the least to mingle with the internal policy of that country; still less to overthrow the established government, while Louis Napoleon wrote the contrary to General Forey, telling him: that it was necessary to profit by civil war raging in the United States, to establish a monarchy in Mexico, as a barrier and counter-poise to the power of our great Republic, torn and weakened by the South. I have reproduced the eloquent protestations of General Prim, who bitterly complained of that imperial duplicity, to which he has fallen a victim . . . . an inocent or guilty one, I know not which.

I have indicated the incredible weakness of our diplomatists in foreign countries. I have besides shown Louis Napoleon, puffed up by the success of his arms in Mexico, and confiding in the prolonged resistance of the South, endeavouring to drag England into a mediation hostile to our interests. I have shown him dictating to Monsieur Rouher—the successor of Monsieur Billaut, in 1864—language quite opposed to his predecessor in 1862, causing Monsieur Rouher to avow what Monsieur Billaut then denied, and claiming, for Louis Napoleon, the honor of having from the origin of the Mexican question, prepared, ripened, and profoundly studied that expedition, the aim of which, was to heighten the influence of the Latin race, and of which the execution was destined to be the supreme conception, the masterpiece of Louis Napoleon's reign and of his policy.

Following the course of events, I have traced the language of the French Republic, changing with fortune; passing from bragging to apology and denial, when the defeat of the South, the Mexican resistance, the opposition of the people and that of the American nation had demonstrated to him the inaneness of the imperial conception. Monsieur Drouyn de Lhuys then returns to the language of Monsieur Billaut in 1862, and declares that the American Republic had never a better friend than Louis Napoleon.

I have thrown out, in relief, as far as possible, the flagrant contradiction existing between the assertions, as to order and security, reiterated by the imperial government of France and Mexico, and the reality. I have demonstrated what the imperial guarantee was worth as to order and security.

I have said what I think of the Monroe Doctrine, not only as to American policy, but as to the future liberty of the world. I have re-

presented it as the palladium of nations, the *point d'appiu* of their solidarity, the key of the vault of the future social edifice, which is based upon universal progress, and crowned by universal freedom.

I have noted down, in passing, the imprudent declarations of Louis Napoleon, as to the Latin race and the strange affirmation of Lamartine, the confident of his thoughts, as to his pretended rights in America. I have shown, in some measure, what this race has been in the past and what it now represents in Europe; what it is, what it will be in the future, upon that continent, rocked upon two oceans, caressed by liberty, and sustained by the valiant people of America.

And now it remains for me to conclude. To France, I would say: "In 1862, it was sufficient for you to maintain the Convention of the Solidad. In 1864, when you were in Mexico, you should have treated with Juarez, instead of seeking to establish a ruinous empire, which it was impossible to sustain. In 1865, you should have left the empire to its unlucky fate. In 1866, I give you the same advice.

"Consider your commercial situation," I would add. "Is not your freight higher than that of America or England? Why? Because you keep up the *cadres* of an army of 700,000 men, an immense machine, which consumes without producing and consequently causes the price of everything to be raised. And it is in these conditions that you throw yourself, in the way of free trade! And it is with unequal freight that you wish to struggle with the manufacture of England and Germany! On every side complaints arise, and unless you devote yourself to the exclusive contemplation of your feet, it is impossible not to see the social storm, which Louis Napoleon, has gathered above your head. It is impossible, without imitating the companions of Ulysses, not to hear the dull muttering of revolutionary thunder about to peal forth. Count the coöperative associasions: for on the day, when they shall number the majority of the working men in their circle, the social revolution will be ready.

It is impossible for you to struggle with the two greatest maritime powers in the world, with an unequal freight; it is impossible to re-establish the equality of freight without increasing the production, without decreasing the army; it is impossible to decrease the army without renouncing distant expeditions to Mexico of which the net result, stripped of all art, is the loss of 11,000 men, and 750,000,000, and an enforced retreat.

To the United States, I would say: "Read Louis Napoleon's letter to General Forey with attention, and pause at the following passages. "*It is America that feeds our factories and causes our commerce to flourish,*" and, further on, it is to prevent America "*from seizing upon the Gulf of Mexico, having dominion over the Antilles as well as Southern America, and being the only dispenser of the products of the New World.*" That Louis Napoleon writes and signs with his own hand, that he has resolved upon establishing a monarchy in Mexico. Then draw your conclusions and say whether logic does not demand that we should defend our assulted interests, and place those of the aggressor in jeopardy. Louis Napoleon declares that he sent an army to Mexico in the interest of French commerce, in reality he sent it there in the interest of the monarchial cause. Let us threaten what he protects, we will protect what he threatens. Let us give ourselves up to the pacific and productive war of tariff, let us protect our labor. Let us

teach nations that they are responsible for their governments, and that, if they are so weak as to suffer themselves to be governed against their interests and their wishes, cowardice finds a just retribution here below, like every other vice. It is time to change the international code of kings into that of peoples, and to add to it the new but essential element of justice and truth.

Let us then unite, people of America, ye who enjoy the privilege of being free, to cause it to be comprehended by the nations of Europe that all countries are solidary and that their common, only and universal interest, is to be free and to dispose of themselves directly and to the greatest advantage to their interests. Then there will be no further monarchial aggression, consequently no more war. Where would be the place of a Louis Napoleon among nations? That of Satin in Paradise.

Life must be made as unendurable as possible to monarchial nations, and our people should be made the constant object of envy and jealousy. Perhaps they will then find sufficient energy and good sense to be rid of the monarchial apparatus applied to nation to draw out their substance and crush out their life.

Why should we protect a government which has not ceased to show itself hostile at the expense of our industry and our working men? What interest have we in diverting the lightening from the throne of a man whose bad-will towards us is only limited by his powerlesness? What better ally could we have than a French Republic?

I am not uttering republican propaganda at this moment, but good sense, *common sense*. We do not make republican propaganda, be it so, we are not yet strong enough to do so; but that we should aid in monarchial propaganda is a thing which it is impossible to justify, we nevertheless do so.

To the Mexicans, I would say: "Fight, fight on, without cessation, with or without Juarez, in the name of your republic and liberty, in the name of independence and of the dignity of your country, and if but one of you remains, let that man rise up, his sword in one hand and the flag of his nation in the other, and let him kill before dying. There is no treaty to be made with the foreigner and the usurper. Even death is fertile, it brings forth sympathy, respect and vengance.

What I say to Mexico, I say to the other American republics, for there is but one cause and but one principle at stake, that of justice and liberty threatened by despotion. The struggle of the South against the North, the powerless attacks made against Mexico, Chili and Peru by France and Spain are but the lightening warnings of the irrepressible conflict between the new and the old world, the past and the future, Europe and America. Momentarily abandoned, these struggles will be unceasingly resumed, every time that an internal dissension or reclamation offers an opportunity or a pretext. The European system cannot be developed nor even maintain itself side by side with the American system. It must kill us or die itself. *Divide et impera* is the only motto that it can adopt with regard to us. It has divided the North and South, it has divided Mexico, it will divide all that it can, then it will attack Nations. Let us be united for defence as kings are united for attack, and for our war-cry, let us cast this defiance to the winds of battle! "Solidarity!" victory will respond "Liberty!"

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